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REFERENCE ONLY 
Analysis of the impact of East European change upon European Community and East 
European liner shipping, by Gillian Deborah Ledger. 
In its attempt to analyse the impact of East European change upon the European Commimity 
and East European liner shipping industries this thesis covers an extensive range of highly 
topical subject areas. The wide range of non uniform information gleaned from the research 
and the question of spurious objectivity form the main arguments behind the use of qualitative 
rather than quantitative assessment throughout. The diverse study area also necessitated a 
narrowing to the case of Polish Ocean Lines' North Atlantic operations to enable a meaningful 
analysis to be carried out. 
The early part of the thesis examines the background to the East European situation before 
moving on to identify the main issues that directly affect Polish shipping, through the use of 
a Contextual model. Using the information gained here a newly developed Contextual Matrix 
Model then enables the main issues to be extracted. These issues indicate that the changes 
affecting Polish Ocean Lines require an exercise in repositioning. To assess this fully a 
framework approach is developed to determine Polish Ocean Lines' position for 1988 and 
1992. A further framework is then created for the European Community competitors' 1992 
position, in order that a positional comparison can be carried out with Polish Ocean Lines. 
The results of the comparison indicate that repositioning is taking place at Polish Ocean Lines 
as a direct reaction to the changes occurring throughout East Europe. The discussion 
concludes that this is a dynamic, volatile and topical area which raises a number of points of 
possible interest for fiirther research. 
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Preface 
A numba" of points should be considered before reading this thesis. Notably, the research area 
is extremely diverse, involving a number of areas which have seen continuous change, hence 
the use of a cut oflFdate to ensure consistency. Significantly, during the course of the research 
the European Community changed its name to the European Union; to avoid confiision this 
body is referred to as the European Community throughout the thesis. Also, the Trans-
Atlantic Agreement, which was established during the course of the research, has since been 
both outlawed by the European Commission and replaced by the Trans-Atlantic Conference 
Agreement (TACA). By the end of 1994 neither the European Commission nor the Federal 
Maritime Commission of the United States had passed any final decision on TACA, although 
shipowners were confident that the concessions made would be enough to secure European 
Commission approval of the Agreement. 
CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
The recent dramatic changes which have taken place in East Europe have created a situation 
of a scale never before experienced. Social, economic and political changes have affected the 
activities, organisation and objectives of almost every industry at every level. 
This research looks specifically at the impacts of these changes upon the shipping industry 
within East Europe, and the consequential impacts for its competitors from the European 
Community. That a direct and substantial relationship between East European social, political 
and economic changes and shipping interests exists is undeniable, especially where issues such 
as industrial privatisation, the introduction of bankruptcy laws where none before existed, the 
moves towards the hardening of currencies and the increased role of market forces are 
concerned (Lloyds Ship Manager 1991, The Wall Street Journal Europe 1991). 
The study of these relationships has particular interest because it is unquestionably unique, 
topical and dynamic. In an area where there has been little if any previous research, this 
original work has had to deal with a rapidly and substantially changing industry in a continually 
developing market. 
The research was carried out in direct collaboration with Polish Ocean Lines - the state owned 
operator which controls the overwhehning majority of Poland's liner shipping - and in close 
contact with other major organisations involved in East European shipping. Visits were made 
to all the main maritime operators in Poland, and to several maritime operators and 
organisations in Belgium and the United Kingdom with interests in East European shipping -
a complete hst of contacts visited is provided in appendix 1. Further data and opinion was 
provided by written contacts throughout the world - see appendix 2. Additional information 
was collected from extensive searches in the UK's major maritime and East European libraries 
in London, Glasgow, Liverpool, Birmingham, Exeter, Southampton and Plymouth - see 
appendix 3. 
There are numerous and saabstantial problems which one could expect to encounter within this 
study area. Firstly, the subject area covers a wide range of disciplines dominated by the fields 
of economics, politics and management but having to incorporate far more. This stems from 
its attempt to encompass the broad impacts of East European change on the maritime 
industries of East Europe and subsequently those of the European Commimity. Each of these 
areas must be researched, understood and integrated within the thesis. 
Secondly there is a serious lack of reliable data concerning all issues of East Europe; much of 
the information produced under the old Communist regime is very unreliable, and the amounts 
produced both today and in the past are relatively limited and fragmented. 
FurthCT problems arise due to the amount of time taken for data, when reliable, to emerge from 
East Europe, and for correspondence to pass through a poor communications infrastructure, 
and from a management cuhure in the East which is unused to collaboration with the West. 
Additionally, a constantly changing political and economic environment means that information 
quickly becomes outdated - exemplified by the creation of new states during the course of the 
study, such as Slovakia and the Czech Republic. 
There are drawbacks due to the limitations of previous work in the area of the East European 
maritime industries, although there are some relatively outdated reports, for example by 
ESCEC (1977) and Bergstrand and Doganis (1987). However, the lack of previous work in 
the area adds to the qualities of originality, uniqueness and interest. Meanwhile, working in 
the area of East Europe and in an industry which operates on an international basis may also 
create problems concerned with language barriers. 
Finally, the competitive and commercial nature of the maritime industry throughout Europe 
means that shipping companies are not always willing to divulge large quantities of usefiil data 
and opinion. 
Given this range of problems, the broad objective of this research is to examine the relationship 
between East European change and shipping, and more specifically has been restricted to the 
following:-
1. To assess the situation of the Polish shipping industry before and after the changes 
which have taken place, between 1988 and 1992. 
2. To analyse the effect of East European change upon Polish shipping and to develop 
models to identify the major areas of change and the relationship of changes to the 
shipping industry. 
3. To analyse through further model development, the significance of change in Polish 
shipping when related to European Community based companies operating in a 
competitive market. 
The research area has been constrained geographically to exclude the ex-Soviet Union. 
Reasons for this centre upon the uncertain fiiture condition of the ex-Soviet Union and the fact 
that the shipping industry there is already relatively well researched and documented 
(Bergstrand and Doganis 1987, Ambler, Shaw and Symons 1985, Guzhenko 1977, Lloyds List 
11/10/91, Lloyds Ship Manager 1991 and 1992, Maslov 1984). Also, Hungary has been 
excluded due to its relative insignificance, a lack of available information and lack of 
cooperation by Hungarian shipping interests. With constant changes taking place, the research 
also had to be constrained to a certain time period. The end of 1992 was used as a cut off date 
to provide consistency throughout the study. Consequently, detailed social, economic and 
political changes since then have been largely excluded. 
Before the results of these changes can be examined in any detail it is first necessary to 
complete a review of the recent history of East Europe, and it is to this that we now turn our 
attention. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
EAST EUROPEAN CHANGE AND SHIPPING 
This study of the relationship between East European shipping and social, poUtical and 
economic change in that region has been constricted to the countries of Poland, Bulgaria, the 
Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Romania - see figure 1. The ex-Soviet Union has been 
excluded from the main study due to its considerable complexity and continued chaotic 
condition, Hungary because of its limited maritime interests, and East Germany has been 
excluded as reunification in 1989 meant that it automatically became part of the European 
Community and was thus placed in a situation altogether different from the other East 
European countries. 
Any assessment of developments in the shipping industry in East Europe has to begin with an 
interpretation of the broad economic and political structures that dominated before the changes 
of the late 1980's. The Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA), also known as 
COMECON, was East Europe's closest equivalent to the European Community. It consisted 
in its final days of the Soviet Union, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, East Germany, 
Romania, Bulgaria, Cuba, Mongolia, Vietnam, and at times in the past Associate Members, 
such as Albania and Yugoslavia (Financial Times 10/05/91). It was associated in January 1949 
as a response to the Marshall Plan which provided United States finance to repau" physical and 
economic war damage in Western Europe. 
The official, although at times probably theoretical, tasks of the CMEA were:-
1. to provide a forum to exchange information on trade, 
2. to co-ordinate trade between member states and with the outside world, 
3. to provide the mechanism for exchange of goods within the CMEA without involving 
monetary movements of hard currency, largely based around the use of the transferable 
rouble. 
ex-USSR 
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Figure 1: Map showing Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Poland, Romania and Slovakia. 
UnoflBcially, but in practice, the CMEA provided a way for the Soviet Union to control the 
satellite states of Eastern Europe and to dictate the latter's production to feed the Soviet 
economy (Europa 1994). This system was imposed by the Soviet Union militarily and also 
economically by insisting that payment for goods from satellites was either in barter form or 
in transferable roubles which WCTC largely unusable except in exchange for more Soviet goods, 
thus tying East European economies over the long term to that of the Soviet Union (The 
Independent 29/06/91). 
The CMEA had no constitution and supposedly provided an informal mechanism; in theory any 
member state could ignore CMEA requirements and decisions and could leave at any time. 
In practice members were economically and militarily bound into the Soviet led system and 
rarely ignored its requirements, with for example, open refusal to conform to its decisions 
occurring only three times in its forty one years existence. 
The CMEA worked on two main economic and politically inspired principles aimed at 
strengthening the linkages between member states and the Soviet Union in particular (Drabnek 
1989). 
1. The Planned Economy. 
In 1962 a planned economy system was introduced for all Member States. This was 
supposedly economically advantageous because production levels could be co-ordinated with 
each other to achieve economies of scale and there would also be advantages from linked and 
co-ordinated plan targets. 
Under the CMEA umbrella there were four levels of economic plan (Mieczkowski 1978):-
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i. Long range broad CMEA plans - up to 15 years, 
ii. Plan for the state - for example Poland, normally 10 or 5 years, 
iii. Plan for the sector - for example iron and steel, normally covering 5 years, 
iv. Industrial plant or enterprise plan - for example an iron and steel works; plans from 3 
months to 1 year. 
Transport in general, and shipping in particular, was subservient to each of these plan levels. 
The central focus remained on production targets to which transport was later planned to 
match, and forced to accept as a priority over passenger movements. 
Despite being sound in theory the planned economy was subject to a number of practical 
criticisms (Financial Times 10/05/91):-
i. It was bureaucratically ineflBcient - it was common for 15% of the Member States' 
employees to be employed solely in the administration of the planning mechanism. 
ii. It was inherently corrupt. The state paid employees a standard wage with a bonus if 
the enterprise exceeded targets. Many enterprises claimed to have exceeded targets 
which commonly were not achieved, by providing spurious statistics which went 
largely unchecked by an administration unable to cope and v^ ath little incentive to do 
so. 
iii. There was a failure of co-ordination between the four system levels. 
iv. Transport amongst other service activities (eg energy) was treated as subordinate to 
industrial needs and played no role in creating demand, acting subserviently to 
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industrial production needs. 
V. The objectives of the plan were almost universally for quantity not quality. Market 
demand was guaranteed through the transferable rouble and barter system, and 
numerous restrictions on international trade and the import of competing products 
from the west. 
2. The Division of International Socialist Labour. 
The CMEA dictated where different items were to be produced, by assessing the strengths, 
suitability, and eflBciencies of different locations, plants and economies. The principle was 
logical and suggested potential gains from economies of scale and specialisation. However, 
a lack of logic in where items were produced and a lack of co-ordination caused major 
problems. In practice there were no competitors (for example the majority of buses were 
produced in Hungary); a lack of local production relating to local needs; failure to market 
differentiate (for example between Romania and the Eastern Soviet Union); which led to a lack 
of market response, no incentives to compete, and huge, unresponsive, inflexible plants. 
Another feature of the former Eastern bloc was the Foreign Trade Organisation (FTO). Large 
numbers of these »dsted in each country, responsible for all imports and exports in a particular 
industrial service or commercial field. No trade could occur without permission from the 
relevant FTO, which were state controlled monopolies dictating contract details including 
transport mode and operator for imports and exports; source of imports and exports; and 
trading terms, for example CIF (Carriage, Insurance and Freight) exports and FOB (Free On 
Board) imports. 
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Trade was controlled in such a way, to ensure that the CMEA maximised its potential for 
earning convertible currency, and to conserve the hard currency that member countries did 
possess. The currencies of member states were unconvertible and could not be used to 
purchase much needed foreign goods. The role of shipping, along with other activities such 
as international haulage, was significant as it operated in an international market and was a 
primary source of hard currency earnings. The control of shipping operations and in particular 
trading terms through the FTO' s, meant that the majority of sea trade with non-members was 
carried out by Eastern bloc vessels which either earned hard currency in the process, or 
conserved the expenditure of existing reserves. Western vessels were used only when no 
suitable Eastern bloc vessel was available. 
Because of the dearth of reliable information fi^om much of the remainder of East Europe the 
ex-Soviet Union provides the best example of shipping organisation pre-perestroika, that is, 
until 1985, even though this research will focus on other countries. The same basic 
organisational principles were applicable to all East European countries before 1985, and to 
a certain extent remain with us to this day, as we shall see later. 
USSR shipping was state run under a central planning system with four key organisations:-
1. MORFLOT - the Ministry related to Merchant Marine was set up in 1946. Morflot 
had to collaborate with the umbrella planning authority GOSPLAN which was 
responsible for economic policy-making and broad monetary matters throughout all 
sectors of the USSR. 
2. Shipping Holding Corporations (Sevzaflot, Yuhzflot and Dalflot) -each holding 
corporation had a budget from Morflot and was related to a certain geographical area. 
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It was a planning organisation designed to achieve more precise control of the shipping 
companies. 
3. Shipping Companies - defined geographically; each shipping company received a 
budget from one of the holding corporations. There was a great deal of interaction 
betweaithe companies and the corporations;- for example, frequent loaning of ships. 
The shipping companies were also responsible for running the ports. 
4. Other numerous groups and agencies, for example Sovinflot the state owned shipping 
agency, and Sovfracht the state run chartering monopoly. 
It was also widely recognised (Bergstrand and Doganis 1987) that within this organisational 
structure shipping companies in each CMEA country were involved in three diflferent 
activities :-
1. Genuine commercial activity resembling that of West European market economy 
shipping companies, to import and export goods and provide services for the cross 
trades - ie trades that involve countries whose nationalities differ to that of the vessel's 
flag. 
2. A specific directive of earning convertible currency, which affected, markedly, overall 
commercial policy. For example cross trading provided a method of earning hard 
currency whilst domestic trading enabled currency conservation. At times the 
requirements of convertible currency earning would supersede other commercial needs 
leading, for example, to pricing at lower than cost, simply to earn DM/US$ etc. 
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3. Providing logistical support. Most Eastern bloc shipping had an alternative and 
clandestine defence function. 
In summary, the CMEA was Soviet dominated and created broad plans for member states, 
consequently and ultimately controlling the production levels of each enterprise. Shipping was 
then subservient to production and was also subject to the actions of other state controlled 
groups such as shipping and chartering agencies and those involved in maritime organisation, 
finance, and planning. The system was centrally operated with enterprises reacting to central 
needs rather than to markets. Decision making therefore was downwards (from central 
government), rather than upwards (from the consumer) as in a more western style economy. 
With the accession of Gorbachev to the Presidency of the Soviet Union, decreasing So\det 
intervention in other East European states, declining East European economies, lack of hard 
currency, and pressure from the European Community, United States, International Monetary 
Fund and the World Bank, the CMEA eventually collapsed (Financial Times 24/07/91). On 
28th June 1991, at a meeting of its nine member countries in Budapest, the CMEA was 
formally dissolved with effect in 90 days (Financial Times 29/06/91). 
Effectively the CMEA had ceased trading two years previously. Its members realised that it 
was "economic nonsense" to have an international pricing system completely removed from 
worid markets (Independent 29/06/91). They began to look to the West for trading partners 
that would pay in hard currency, vital to East European economies. According to Bela Kadar, 
Hungarian Minister of International Economic Relations and host of the organisations 
represented at the 46th and closing session, "Comecon was unable to give answers to the 
challenges of a chan^g world". The Soviet news agency Tass reported that "The CMEA has 
exhausted itself but the economic space of its member countries is not a myth but a reality. 
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This must be taken into account, and member countries should not break the traditional 
economic links between them". Pravda described the organisation's "bulky" bureaucracy as 
"legendary" (Financial Times 10/05/91). 
Comecon's only successor was a liquidation committee, given 90 days to work out the 
distribution between members of the Moscow headquarters and other common assets. By 24th 
August 1991 representatives of the nine member states had not managed to agree on a value 
for common assets, although the issue had to be resolved by 28th September, the date for the 
final liquidation of the organisation (Financial Times 24/07/91). 
The effects of the demise of the CMEA were reported in the Economist on the 20th April 
1991. As organised barter and transferable roubles were replaced with trade in US dollars 
which the indebted East European companies could ill spare, much of it simply stopped. 
Factories which made the same product year after year for the same undemanding customer 
were faced with bankruptcy notices - for example dozens of Poland's largest industrial 
companies faced closure, according to its then Prime Minister Jan Krzysztof Bielecki (The 
Economist 20/04/91). 
It was proposed that the CMEA would be replaced with the 'Organisation for International 
Economic Co-operation" (OIEC). However, East European governments differed in opinion 
as to whether any replacement was needed. The Poles and Hungarians preferred the idea of 
a fi-ee trade zone in their part of Europe and would have liked Czechoslovakia to join them in 
this. Conversely the old USSR, Bulgaria, Romania, Cuba, Vietnam and Mongolia appeared 
to be in fevour of an OIEC (The Economist 20/04/91, Financial Times 24/07/91, The Guardian 
20/12/90). The situation remained uncertain for some while until the whole idea of a new 
CMEA lost fevour and was replaced by a marked move by many of the ex-members (notably 
17 
Poland, Ifimgary and Czechoslovakia) towards the west and the European Community markets 
in particular. During 1992 a free trade agreement was signed between these three countries 
(now four) but was restricted in scope and authority . 
Although this provides a broad picture of some of the significant changes which have been 
taking place in Eastern Europe, particularly around the period of the demise of the CMEA, it 
is necessary to look at each country that this research concentrates upon to achieve greater 
detail, and to b^^i to understand the significance of the social, political and economic changes 
that have occurred. As the situation is one of continual change, only those developments up 
to the beginning of 1993 have been included. 
POLAND 
Recent Polish political problems and those of the 1970's and 1980's are the direct consequence 
of its economic problems during this period, and of the enormous changes in the social, 
economic and political fi-amework of the country. The over ambitious rate of growth planned 
by the policy makers of Edward Gierek' s Communist government in the early 1970' s was led 
by imports, primarily from the West, which were expected to provide Poland with modem 
technologies, but the economy failed to generate the production levels and the exports which 
had. been expected. Imports grew to such volumes that drastic cuts were imposed later in the 
1970's. Investment projects were halted. Bad harvests aggravated the problems by making 
increased food imports necessary. The economic downturn, for many key commodities, 
started in 1979, well before the unrest associated with Solidarity and the free trade union 
movement, which led ultimately to the collapse of Communist control and Soviet Union 
domination (Staar 1993). 
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Throughout 1980 and 1981 there were riots and strikes as food price rises were introduced. 
Then the movement for free trade unions arose, out of the workers' confrontation with the 
government and thdr bid to influence the economic development of the country. Solidamosz, 
the Solidarity trade union, was the mass movement which emerged, and it soon had a 
membership of ten million people. However, a change of government, the imposition of 
martial law, and the outlawing of Solidarity brought about a calmer and more ordered situation 
- if one rather more politically and democratically unsatisfactory. 
Throughout 1981 economic output slumped. In fact, the 1981 production figures are excluded 
from the official government statistics series, omitting the record of a disastrous year. The 
poor economic performance was aggravated by the "free Saturdays" which Solidarity had won 
for workers, giving them a five day week. 
In September 1981 Solidarity held its first (and last) party congress. It stated that the only way 
to achieve economic recovery was through the acceptance and implementation of the principle 
of woricer self-management. It urged woikers in other East European countries to set up their 
own independent unions. It demanded basic economic reform, free elections and the right to 
broadcast - the latter had been promised in the Gdansk agreement with state politicians in 
September 1980, but had not been implemented. 
In October 1981, General Jaruzelski replaced Kania as First Secretary of the party. In 
December 1981 he set up the Military Council for National Salvation, which was to run the 
country under twelve generals and which was to put a stop to processes which were deepening 
Poland's economic crisis. Martial law was declared and protestors were severely dealt with, 
some being shot dead. Strikes were declared illegal. Certain sectors of the economy were 
placed under military discipline. Solidarity leader Lech Walesa was interned, whilst Solidarity 
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itself was banned in October 1982. Walesa was later awarded the 1983 Nobel Peace Prize, 
despite intensive ofiBcial attempts to discredit him. Opposition to the Government continued 
through a network operating underground, producing books, bulletins and broadcasts 
(Koralewicz, Bialecki and Watson 1987) . 
The government's programme was gradually implemented and output levels improved from 
the second half of 1982. New, government sponsored trade unions were set up, which by late 
1983 had attracted 3.5 million members. A new political association, the Patriotic Movement 
for National Rebirth (PRON) was formed, and given a constitutional role. The church's 
influence was used to promote new organisations. 
Martial law was suspended in December 1982 and then lifted in July 1983, but disturbances 
continued with many clashes between police and demonstrators. These incidents were played 
down by the media, whilst repression continued to affect many people. Despite being banned. 
Solidarity still operated, its supporters collecting subscriptions to sustain the families of 
members in prison, or those unable to find work for political reasons. 
The government then began to pursue a more conciliatory approach. Charges against 
Solidarity activists awaiting trial were reduced, while some dissidents were offered freedom 
if they agreed to emigrate (East Europe Economic Handbook 1985). 
The policy adopted by the Jarulzelski government was not unproductive. In an amnesty during 
September 1986 virtually all political prisoners were released and moves were made within 
days to set up a provisional council of Solidarity, while nevertheless preserving its underground 
leadership (the TKK). By taking this initiative the Jarulzelski leadership caused a "great deal 
of confusion and misunderstanding among members of Solidarity" (Joint statement by Walesa 
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and TKK 1986). 
Measures such as the 1986 amnesty did not reflect a major change in the regime's approach. 
Nevertheless, the authorities took care to show considerable sensitivity in their handling of 
relations with the church (Rzeczpospolita 01/06/87). Additional evidence of the leadership's 
desire to establish further relations with independent social forces came with the unexpected 
convocation of a Central Committee meeting in October 1987 and a decision to hold a 
referendum over fiarther reform proposals. However, the result of the referendum, with 
government proposals failing to get the approval of more than 50% of those eligible to vote, 
did little to improve the relations of the regime with Polish society (Kolankiewicz and Lewis 
1988). 
In the traditional Communist style, the Polish economy had been managed in a centrally 
controlled manner, although the degree of control had been progressively relaxed in the 1980's 
in parallel with political developments, allowing for example, increased private economic 
activity. 
In 1989 Poland became the first former satellite to extricate itself fi^om Soviet domination and 
vote out the Communists in relatively fi"ee elections. Since then continual disagreements have 
caused four governments to collapse in as many years (Blazyca and Rapacki 1991). 
At the end of 1989 the new Polish government introduced major new policies directed towards 
liberalising the economy, introducing market principles, privatising the state's assets, stabilizing 
the economy (particularly with respect to inflation) and making the zloty convertible for Polish 
individuals and organisations, although not folly convertible on the international markets. 
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In line with other East European countries Poland progressively adopted a market led political 
and economic policy for all sectors which resulted ultimately in considerable additional 
fi-eedoms for organisations and individuals. The economy suffered as a result, for example 
through inflation, production slumping by forty percent, and unemployment climbing fi-om zero 
to thirteen percent in three years (Financial Times 24/02/93); however, the process of 
democracy and Communist state withdrawal had begun in earnest. By the 10th September 
1991, Lloyds List reported that Poland had moved away fi"om martial law and hard line 
Communist government and had "embraced capitalism quickly and enthusiastically" (Lloyds 
List 10/09/91). 
On 28th October 1991, Poland held its first significantly fi^ee parliamentary election since the 
thirties. Poland's Democratic Union Party, led by former Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki 
emerged with the biggest share of the vote. However, 60% of the electorate signalled that it 
had had enough of arguing politicians and falling living standards, by boycotting the elections. 
As a result Poland was divided politically between a number of small parties with little prospect 
of forming a stable parliamentary coalition able to sustain a government with an agreed 
programme (Financial Times 29/10/91). 
During September 1992 the World Bank released a study of the Polish economy which stated 
that "the fiscal situation has worsened to the point where hyperinflation is an immediate 
danger. Unemployment has reached a level that cannot be tolerated" (World Bank 1992). At 
the same time Fairplay (03/09/92) highlighted the enormous scale of debt that Poland had 
inherited. State enterprises both large and small were notorious debtors, being indebted to the 
state budget, to banks, and to each other. 
On 28th May 1993, President Lech Walesa refiised to accept Prime Minister Hanna 
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Suchocka's resignation after the no-confidence vote in her government had been approved in 
the Sejm by a narrow margin. Suchocka's Democratic Union party had grown out of the 
Solidarity movement and was a keen advocate of economic reforms (The Independent 
31/05/93). On the afternoon of May 31st the President announced that he was dissolving 
Paiiiament, and called for fi^esh pariiamentaiy elections although these were not due until 1995 
(Business Central Europe 1993, The Economist 18/09/93). 
A new election law produced a theoretically more workable parliament in the election of 
September 19th, in that the previous 29 factions were reduced to six parties. The result of the 
election was to place parliament in the hands of parties descended from the old communist 
regime. However, the Economist reported on 25th September 1993 that this did not mean that 
Poland was reverting to Communism (Economist 25/09/93). The Democratic Left Alliance, 
which emerged from the ruins of the Communist party, won 173 of parliament's 460 seats. 
The Alliance was led by young politicians who claimed to be Social Democrats and preached 
market reforms and privatisation. They also favoured moderately increased social spending. 
The other party to feir well with around 128 seats was the Polish Peasant Party. The Labour 
Union gained around 42 seats, the Democratic Union 69, the Confederation for an Independent 
Poland 24, and the Non Party Block to Support Reform 20 seats. 
In October 1993 International Management noted that while the rest of East Europe was in 
decline, Poland was recovering after more than three years of former finance minister Leszek 
Balcerowicz's 1990 "shock therapy programme". GDP rose by 1.2% in 1992, despite a 
drought that hit agriculture. Industrial production increased by 4%. During the first half of 
1993 output grew by 9% over the same period of 1992. Inflation which was almost 700% in 
1990, slowed to 44% in 1992, was below 36% in 1993 and was expected to be below 25% in 
1994. Productivity in manufacturing and construction rose by 13% during the first half of 
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1993 compared with the first half of 1992 (International Management 1993). 
For all the problems in the fourth year of Poland's transformation, Domberg, a Warsaw 
journalist, writes that the "good news outweighs the bad" and that there is a "feeling that the 
Polish miracle will endure and that the economy is on the launchpad" (International 
Management 1993). 
ROMANIA 
In 1948 a "Treaty of Friendship and co-operation" with Moscow cemented Romania's status 
as a sateUite. In 1951 the "Moscow Communists" led by Ana Pauker controlled the top 
government posts. Meanwhile the nationalist Gheorghiu-Dej established power throughout 
the Romanian Workers Party and became general secretary in 1945, finally toppling Pauker's 
faction fi'om power in 1952. Stalin's death in 1953 enhanced Gheorghiu-Dej's belief that he 
alone could determine Romania's path. He firmly believed that his regime's Socialist fiiture 
depaided on the forced growth of heavy industry. Khrushchev's plans for the CMEA involved 
Romania as a provider of oil and agricultural products, but Gheorghiu-Dej opposed these plans 
and in the eariy sixties unveiled plans that would define Romania's independent path over the 
next three decades. Following Gheorghiu-Dej's death in 1965 Ceausescu took care to 
preserve Romania's autonomous stance (Zonis and Semler 1992). 
It took Ceausescu approximately four years to consolidate his personal control over the 
renamed Romanian Communist Party. During these years he mirrored his predecessors 
commitment to industrialisation and an independent foreign policy. He displayed populist 
tendencies and opened up political debate and participation for the masses. Travelling the 
country widely he raised the hopes of many Romanians that a more relaxed political era had 
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begun. In foreign policy in 1968 when Soviet tanks rolled into Czechoslovakia, Ceausescu 
denunciated the invasion and Romania refused to participate. Romania's relations with the 
USSR deteriorated and it reduced its contacts with the Warsaw Pact. 
In 1973 Ceausescu launched the economic campaign that was to define the rest of his reign. 
During a party meeting he oflBcially redefined Romania as a "developing socialist country", 
>^^ ch gave him the authority to launch an ambitious industrialisation campaign, and enabled 
him to obtain concessional trade provisions from many western nations. During the 1970's 
Ceausescu's strategy paid important dividends. Romania's economy grew vigorously and 
Ceausescu was feted as a courageous statesman. However by the end of the 1970's the plans 
had gone awry. Bucharest had imported large amounts of industrial goods on credit from the 
West. Foreign exchange was necessary to pay foreign bills, yet Ceausescu had limited his 
options by concentrating on expanding the country's petrochemical industries. With 
Romania's once large oil supplies dwindling, the economy became precariously dependent 
upon the limited amount of oil that remained. Unless it could import Middle Eastern oil at 
favourable prices, its petrochemical exports would shrink and the country's financial burden 
would become unsupportable. The combination of OPEC price shocks, the Iranian revolution, 
and the Iraq-Iran war proved devastating for the country. Romania's industrial productivity 
plummeted, and its foreign debt increased rapidly to $16 billion (Nelson 1992). 
In 1977 a large scale miners strike in the Jiu Valley signalled growing unrest. Romania's 
economic crisis contributed to Ceausescu's declining legitimacy. As his economic plans 
faltered Ceausescu increased political repression to sustain his political power. He believed 
that in Poland the huge foreign debt had played a significant role in its economic collapse 
which in turn had forced a change in the country's leadership. Fearing for his own power 
Ceausescu became obsessed with erasing the debt. 
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In 1982 he declared that Romania's foreign debt would be eliminated by the end of the decade. 
He also demanded that the pace of economic growth be maintained. These could be 
accomplished only if the population's standard of living was severely depressed. Ceausescu 
succeeded in rapidly reducing the foreign debt, but the rationing of food, basic amenities and 
enagy produced virtual wartime conditions. Exiled dissidents estimated that at least 15,000 
Romanians died annually from malnutrition, cold and lack of medical care. Meanwhile 
Ceausescu and his immediate supporters continued to live in luxury. By 1989, the year of the 
revolution, Ceausescu was hated by his people, ostracised by fellow socialist leaders and 
vilified in the west. Still Ceausescu remained certain of his power and crushed dissent 
wherever it arose, until the Romanian people finally rose up in revolution in 1989 and 
Ceausescu was killed (Ratesh 1993). 
Throughout his rule Ceausescu resisted any retreat from his Stalinist economic model. Even 
in 1991, two years after the revolution, Romania remained the most centralised command 
economy in East Europe with an industrial infrastructure in complete decay. By late 1991 per 
c^ita gross domestic product was only half that of 1989 East Germany, and consumer goods 
were generally nonexistent. The new government of the National Salvation Front (NSF) 
expressed its intention of joining other former satellites in a reorientation to a market economy. 
However, it is widely agreed that Romania faces the greatest difficulties of all the CMEA 
countries in transition. Because of Ceausescu's human rights violations and suspicions that 
his overthrow was less the product of a popular uprising than a long planned coup with at least 
initial backing from the KGB, the government is largely isolated, both from the newly 
reforming East and the West. Only by mid 1991 did that isolation begin to break as the IMF 
entertained the possibility of a $1 billion loan (Zonis and Semler 1992). Since then only very 
gradual progress has been made towards the development of a less centralised and more 
liberalised economy. 
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BULGARIA 
Bulgaria was taken over by the Communists on 9th September 1944. One day after the Soviet 
army had entered Bulgarian territory, the Fatherland Front, the antifascist coalition founded 
by the Communist party, came to power. The Fatherland front was a coalition of parties of 
which the Communist Party was the strongest. Until 1945, the Fatherland Front operated as 
a coalition called the Bulgarian Agrarian National Union (BANU), but Giorgi M. Dimitrov 
presented his party as an independent alternative to the Communists. Dimitrov resigned under 
pressure in January 1945 and his removal marked the end of the coalition. The Communist 
party began choosing the leaders of other parties in the coalition and suppressing its partners. 
Eventually a series of show trials saw defendants accused as traitors and spies and sentenced 
to death or life imprisonment. 
The Communist Party came to power in Bulgaria through a series of carefully planned moves 
and received its greatest support from the occupying Red Army. Both the army and the party 
used brutal force to eliminate its competitors (Zonis and Semler 1992). 
The Bulgarians viewed the previous 500 years of Turkish rule as a period of economic 
stagnation, and after World War n, the immediate goal was to industrialise the country. A two 
year plan began the process through the implementation of a Stalinist economic model of state 
owned industry and coUectivised agriculture. The plan advanced Bulgaria rapidly as an 
urbanised and industrialised country, as is evidenced by the following figures:-
Urban Population % of population 
(% of total) employed in industry 
1930's 20.0 7.7 
1960 38.0 21.9 
1985 64.8 37.2 
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Source: Zonis and Semler 1992 
Heavy industry and industrial employment grew rapidly, but neither agricultural employment 
nor living standards matched the gains of heavy industry. When Stalin died in 1953 there was 
a move for reform. 
In 1954 Todor Zhivkov became head of the Bulgarian Communist Party (BCP). After ten 
years of minor changes Zhivkov announced a comprehensive set of economic reforms 
decentralising economic decision making, restructuring wages to link them more closely to 
profits and instituting a more flexible pricing system. The reform was halted in 1968 in the 
face of a severe economic downturn. Throughout the 1960s and 1970s Zhivkov failed to 
move the country out of its worsening economic crisis. As the domination of the USSR over 
its satellites began to loosen in the latter half of the 1980s, Bulgaria once again moved in the 
direction of more comprehensive change (White, Batt and Lewis 1993). 
The reforms of the 1980s were meant to devolve power to workers and managers and lead to 
the production of more marketable goods. The administration of the country was reorganised, 
and greater authority over prices and wages were given to individual firms. However, in 1988 
Zhivkov cancelled the reforms because they were not producing the results he expected. 
Bulgaria failed to match the economic performance of the West or even other East European 
states, and the policies of the BCP had produced periodic economic crisis and shortages of 
goods. 
In May 1989 violent protests broke out among Bulgaria's ethnic Turkish population and the 
government sent in its special forces. At the end of May it was announced that all Turks 
would be able to leave Bulgaria for Turkey, and some 300,000 Turks fled across the border. 
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The exodus caused immense hardships for an already floundering economy as the Turks 
constituted a significant proportion of the agricultural workforce. To counter the food crisis 
the government announced firms would remain open on Saturdays, vacations would be 
cancelled and youth brigades would serve longer tenures (Europa 1994). 
During the summer of 1989 the flight of the Turks continued, the economic crisis sharpened 
and social turmoil spread. What followed was the reorientation of the Communist party; the 
elections in 1990, in which the reformed party won a governing majority; and then its abrupt 
disintegration as a unified and powerfiil force. Bulgaria faced uncertain political turmoil as its 
two principle political groupings, the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP) and the Union of 
Democratic Forces (UDF) fragmented into new political parties. The movement towards 
western democracy is certainly not what the Communist reformers meant for their country in 
1989, but it is the goal towards which the country has steadily progressed. However, in similar 
van to Romania, considerable economic, social and political change remains to be achieved. 
EX-CZECHOSLOVAKIA 
Roosevelt agreed with Stalin to allow Soviet troops to liberate Czechoslovakia after World 
War n. When Czechoslovakia emerged from the war Edward Benes again became President 
and signed a fiiendship treaty with Stalin. Elections in 1946 gave the Communists a strong 
position in the National Front, the coalition government of four parties from the Czech 
territory and two from Slovakia. In 1948 the likelihood of a weaker showing in the 
forthcoming elections led the Communists to stage a "coup from within". Non communist 
police officers were dismissed and the cabinet resigned in protest. The elections never took 
place and the Communist Party pushed Benes into suspending the elections and appointing 
their members to fill the cabinet vacancies. The democratic leadership either fled the country, 
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was forced into exile or was quietly eliminated. Benes died in September 1948 allowing 
Klement Gottwald to assume the Presidency. 
After seizing power the Communist Party adhered rigidly to the Soviet model. Centralised 
planning and heavy industries dominated the economy. Large scale industrialisation was 
brought to Slovakia, significantly less developed than Moravia and Bohemia. The pattern of 
intenave development continued into the eariy 1960s when its failures became overwhelmingly 
clear (Zonis and Semler 1992). 
In 1962 reform economists tried to decentralise economic decision making, but fearing that 
dispersing economic control would lead inevitably to the erosion of Communist power, 
Antonin Novotny, who had become party secretary following Gottwald's death in 1953, 
resisted. 
Challenges to Novotny's rigid Stalinism increased as economic stagnation became impossible 
to ignore. In November 1967 students organised demonstrations against poor housing 
conditions which grew into general political protest. With support from Moscow, the Central 
Committee replaced Novotny with Alexander Dubecek, the first secretary of the Slovak 
Communist Party. 
In April Dubecek announced an action program which called for the restoration of civil 
liberties in a democratic socialism. The Kremlin could not accept the Action Program because 
of its reformulation of the role of the party. When the Czechoslovak Communist Party called 
a Congress formally to approve the Action Program and to purge the remaining advocates of 
traditional Communist rule the USSR decided to use force. The Soviet Union with token units 
from its "fraternal socialist" allies Poland, East Germany, Hungary and Bulgaria (but not 
30 
Romania) invaded Czechoslovakia on the night of 20th August 1968, seizing the reform 
leaders. The Czechoslovakian army was ordered not to resist, although the people resisted 
courageously and non violently but succeeded only in slowing the reimposition of political 
orthodoxy. 
Dubecek was replaced by Gustav Husak who restored Stalinist controls, obliterating any hint 
of a civil order while sapping the economy of any remaining vigour. He increased his political 
strength and in 1970 conducted a party purge. The purge was deep and changed the 
relationship between the Czech and Slovak republics. He ousted some 500,000 party 
members, nearly all Czechs, a fiiU third of the party membership. By diflFerentially pimishing 
the Czechs, the Slovak Husak greatly damaged the ah^eady strained relationship between the 
two peoples. In the 20 years following the purge the relationship never improved as Husak 
continued to fevour Slovaks. Disproportionately higher investments were directed to Slovakia 
and larger numbers of Slovaks were promoted to national oflBce, traditionally filled by the more 
numerous Czechs. The purge had a debilitating effect on the party and the state as those 
promoted to replace the purged ofBcials provided an ineffective political and economic 
bureaucracy (Europa 1994). 
The most important event in Husak's 20 year regime was the emergence of the powerful, 
though small voice of dissent known as Charter 77. After the signing of the Helsinki Accords 
in 1975, a group of isolated individuals and former cultural leaders began to meet. In January 
1977 it released its first charter calling for the government to abide by its own laws and 
international agreements, particularly the human rights provisions of the Helsinki Accords. 
Although the group remained small with at most 2000 members, it became the main force of 
Czechoslovak political dissent. It stimulated other groups into action and maintained public 
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awareness of issues of human rights and democracy. Charter 77 served as the leading moral 
force for change in all of Eastern Europe. 
In its only significant change of power prior to its fall the party replaced Husak as first 
secretary with Milos Jakes in December 1987, and Husak was given the Presidency - a 
figurehead position. Jakes appointed no reformers and introduced no reforms because of 
profound disagreements within the party on how to maintain its dominance. While Communist 
parties were falling in neighbouring states, Jakes and his colleagues could only agree on an all 
or nothing stand. With no capacity for internal reform, the impetus for major change in late 
1989 came fi"om outside the Party. Charter 77, the voice of dissent for over 10 years was to 
form the core of the newly formed democratic government. On December 10th 1989 President 
Husak swore the new forum dominated government into office and then resigned. The new 
regime was named the Government of National Understanding and was to stand until free 
elections could take place in June 1990. Havel, who had taken over the Presidency from 
Husak, emerged victorious in the country's first post war democratic elections. By June 1991, 
all Soviet troops had withdrawn from Czechoslovakia and bilateral relations since then have 
beoi amicable. More recently, Czechoslovakia has split into two separate states, Slovakia and 
the Czech Republic. These two have taken quite diflferent paths with the Czech Republic 
moving towards a freer economy based upon market forces, whilst Slovakia has turned back 
towards state interference (White, Batt and Lewis 1993). 
THE MARITIME SECTORS 
Haying established some of the background developments for each country we can now turn 
our fiill attention to their respective shipping industries, which have continued to operate and 
develop throughout the period of political, economic and social chaos outlined in the previous 
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section. 
(1) POLAND 
The modem history of the Polish maritime sector dates back to 1919 following the regaining 
of the country's independence and with it access to the sea. The government's involvement 
in the construction of port facilities in Gdynia in 1926 led to the establishment of the Polish 
Steamship Company (PZM), which still exists today, based in Szczecin. In 1930 the joint 
stock company Polish Transatlantic Ship Company was established. This company, which 
engaged in passenger shipping and general liner trade, was nationalised in 1951. It has 
operated until the present day under the name of Polish Ocean Lines. 
The Polish maritime sector and supporting service sectors are now dominated by five operating 
organisations which have an effective monopoly of business in their fields. Formerly this 
position had been protected by government regulations and although these have now been 
swept away, new competitors have only recently begun to emerge and on a small scale as yet. 
The major organisations are (Ernst and Young 1990):-
1. Polish Ocean Lines (POL) based in Gdynia concentrates on the liner trade. Its fleet 
consisted of 104 vessels at the end of 1989. Of the 5.1 million tonnes of fi"eight carried 
by POL in 1988,43% was cross trade and 17% transit. The company made losses in 
the early 1980's but was believed to be operating more profitably in 1989. 
2. Polish Steamship Company (PZM) specialises in tramp operations, and in 1986 
operated 149 vessels with a total tonnage of approximately 3.85 million deadweight 
(Fairplay 1987). The fi-eight carried in 1988 was 24.3 million tonnes of which Polish 
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direct trade contributed 65%. Long term contracts are an established practice in PZM 
with Polish and large foreign shippers. The financial standing of PZM was sound in 
1989 and this had been the case for more than a decade. 
Both POL and PZM with average ship ages of around 14 and 11 years respectively in late 1989 
have been involved in attempted fleet modernisation programmes to meet the challenges of 
fierce international competition. 
3. Polish Baltic Shipping Company was established in 1976 largely as a specialist ferry 
operator. It owned 11 ships with a tonnage of 12,400 dwt at the end of 1989. The 
first ten years of operations were not very successfiil, but with government subsidies, 
advantageous credit arrangements and by introducing severe austerity measures the 
company has survived. 
4. Polfracht ship broking and chartering company was established in 1951 as a state 
owned monopolistic organisation for booking and chartering of cargo in Poland and 
as the general agent for Polish shippers and Polish shipping companies. In 1988 it lost 
all legal advantages but its present position in the Polish shipping sector remains very 
strong and unchallenged. In 1988 the volume of cargo freighted through Polfracht was 
28 million tonnes of which 24 million was on Polish vessels. 
5. C. Hart wig group of state owned companies are freight forwarders and handle 
approximately half of Poland's foreign trade (1990). 
Other active participants in the maritime sector include two other principle ship owning 
companies Zegluga Polska Spolka Akcjjna who charter their entire dry bulk fleet to Polish 
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Steamship Company and Polskie Towarzystwo Okretowe whose container and multi purpose 
vessels are chartered to Polish Ocean Lines. 
Another company, Chipolbrok, was established in 1951 to operate liner services between 
Chinese, Polish and West European Ports. By 1992 the company owned a fleet of 21 ocean 
going multi-purpose vessels with a total tonnage of approximately 418,000 DWT and a 
container capacity of over 15,000 TELTs. Meanwhile there are other relatively minor shipping 
companies such as Transocean, Zegluga Gdanska, and Zegluga Szczecinska. 
Following recent changes in the economic policy of the country, the sector is undergoing a 
gradual transformation with a growing number of newcomers entering such fields as ship 
chartering, freight forwarding and port services. This can be expected to continue. 
Organisation of the maritime shipping sector in Poland has evolved during the postwar period 
in line with the general direction of the evolution of the economic and socio political system 
in Poland as a whole. The traditional three stage hierarchical structure of the command type 
economy ie the ministry - branch association - enterprise had already been abandoned in 
shipping in the late fifties and in other maritime sub sectors by 1982. The 1992 organisational 
scheme of the Polish maritime sector is illustrated in figure 2. 
The Polish merchant fleet at the end of 1988 consisted of 256 ships (4.1 million dwt), of which 
89 were bulk carriers, 46 containerships (including ro-ro and semis), 18 specialist vessels 
(tankers, ferries etc) with the remainder being relatively small and dry cargo vessels. 
The 1988 fleet carried 30.8 nullion tonnes of which 18.2 million was on direct trades, 10.5 
million on cross trades and 2.10 million on transit operations. The total seaborne freight in and 
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OTHER 
BRANCHES 
OF 
TRANSPORT 
SECTOR 
(railways, 
road and air 
transport. 
inland 
navigation. 
etc.) 
MINISTRY OF 
TRANSPORT 
ANDMARTITME 
ECONOMY 
MARITIME 
AUTHORITIES 
- Gdansk 
- Szczecin 
AUTONOMOUS STATE-OWNED COMPANIES 
comprising 43 fums conventionally 
classified as Maritime Economy and 
operating in the following branches 
(sub-sectors): 
HARBOUR AUTHORITIES 
- Gdansk 
- Gdynia 
- Koiobrzeg 
- Szczecin 
- Swinoujscie i BROKERAGE & CLEARING 
- Polfrachi 
- 2 Maritime Agencies 
RESEARCH AND TRAINING 
INSTTTLTIONS 
- Maritime Colleges 
- Mantime and Fishing 
Research Institutes 
PRIVATE MARITIME SECTOR 
a number of recently esublished small 
private firms operating in brokerage, 
clearing, port services and shipping 
SHIPPING 
- 3 major & 3 minor operators 
PORT HANDLING 
- 3 port handling companies 
PORT SERVICES 
- 2 dredging firms 
- 2 tallymen & control firms 
- 2 port services firms 
- 1 port repair company 
SHIP REPAIR YARDS 
- 2 in Gdansk 
- 2 In Szczecin 
- 1 in Gdyiua 
- 1 in Swinoujscie 
nSHING & nSH PROCESSING 
- 3 deep-sea fishing firms 
- 5 Baltic fishing firms 
- -1 fish processing plants 
H OTHER SUPPORTING SERVICES 
- Polish Register of Shipping 
- 1 sea salvage company 
- 2 maritime designer firms 
- 2 radio repair firms 
Figure 2: Organisation of the Polish Maritime Sector 
Source: Ernst and Young 1990 
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out of Polish ports was about 40.1 million tonnes of which seaborne trade with the European 
Community in 1988 was 13 million tonnes. The Polish - European Community seaborne trade 
has been dominated by Polish exports (90% of total) of which two thirds were coal deliveries. 
The Polish government introduced, at the end of 1989, major new policies directed towards 
libo^sing the economy, introducing as far as possible market principles, privatising the state's 
assets, stabilising the economy and making the zloty convertible for Polish organisations and 
individuals. Prior to this the majority of the economy had been managed in a traditional 
centrally controlled manner although the degree of control had been progressively relaxed in 
the 1980's in parallel with political developments as noted earlier. 
The Polish maritime sector has always been in a privileged position with respect to the degree 
of autonomy granted by the government administration in respect of operational decisions. 
The practice of charging freight rates, at least indirectly driven by the international market, was 
introduced into the industry much earlier than in other sectors, and from at least the 1970's. 
However, Poland is undergoing the most radical restructuring ever attempted, and the Polish 
maritime sector feces a difficult period of adjusting to the new environment (Lloyds Shipping 
Economist 1990). As an industry which traditionally has operated with a high degree of 
independence and to a large extent in international markets, this sector is expected to be among 
the best performers in the new Polish economy. 
Successive Polish governments since the economic transformations have piimed their hopes 
on privatisation of the economy, but while a number of early high profile candidates may be 
successfiiUy sold off, serious problems exist. Most notably, there is a lack of fiinds within 
Poland, but their are also problems of valuing companies in a meaningfiil way. 
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Two other main hindrances to economic development are infrastructure and finance; for 
example the Polish telecommunications systems can take several hours to make an international 
connection, and there is a lack of fax machines which rely on the same Unes. Also, Poland's 
external ddjt stood at around $40 billion in 1990 with interest arrears estimated at $7.1 bn and 
remains a continued drain on convertible currency reserves and the economy generally. 
Polish trade declined during the 1980's as economic upheaval followed the unrest in 
1980/1981 and martial law. During 1990 a number of influences merged to exacerbate this 
trend: general economic contraction, falling domestic demand and the gradual break up of the 
CMEA. By volume, coal exports and oil imports remained the dominant trades. The coal 
trade is in decline and together with the end of cheap Soviet oil will be detrimental to the 
PoUsh trade balance. The decline in Polish sea borne trade has been accompanied by an 
increase in the reliance of the Polish fleet on cross trades, although domestic trade remains a 
significant source of employment. 
In the new climate POL, PZM, PBSC and other shipping companies will have to choose 
whether to privatise. They may also need to choose foreign partners and expand into new 
areas, whilst countering competition in areas where they have been dominant. 
Competition has already been experienced in the export of Polish crews, where Morska 
Agencja w Gdynia (MAG) have been very active. An estimated 6000 Polish seafarers are 
employed on foreign flag ships and since 1988, 10-20 smaller agencies have emerged to 
contipete with MAG and three other state run companies. Companies such as MAG which are 
not capital intensive, have few incentives for fiiU scale joint ventures. They would prefer to 
work with foreign partners on a commission based, project specific basis. 
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POL believe privatisation will be relatively simple in view of the ease with which assets, if not 
the whole company, can be valued. For the time being central ship operating activities will 
remain in state hands; the Treasury funded most of its asset base and it is likely that it will 
retain an interest in the company even if some form of sell off is embraced. However, plans 
are advancing to split ancillary service sections of POL into separate companies which may be 
sold or retained. Operationally it is felt that this will improve services. 
POL also has a substantial fleet renewal requirement - the average age of the fleet in 1990 was 
14.6 years. Polish companies have been free for several years to order overseas if financing 
was available. One route to western credit under the new Polish legal framework is through 
a joint venture with a western company. This may involve co-ownership of the entire 
enterprise; however POL feel that any collaboration should be confined to specific projects. 
The other m^or operator of Polish shipping, PZM, is likewise taking a measured approach to 
privatisation, with similar plans for the breakaway of units providing support services as 
subsidiaries or independent companies, while the main company will remain in some sort of 
partnership with the Treasury. No maritime joint ventures were under consideration up to 
1992, although ancillary activities were being developed in conjunction with western financiers, 
for example a hotel development in Szczecin. 
Overviews of the state of Poland's merchant fleet are shown in tables 1, 2 and 3, which provide 
fleet statistics for the three main shipping companies POL, PZM and Polish Baltic Shipping 
Company. 
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Type 
DC 
DN 
WA 
DR 
RF 
PM 
JN 
CL 
PU 
WL 
Tot 
Av. 
Age 
1986 
No. 
43 
42 
16 
11 
4 
3 
2 
3 
0 
0 
124 
DWT 
534,370 
377,053 
226,569 
70,435 
24,114 
10,030 
10,933 
68,400 
0 
0 
1321904 
12.18 
1988 
No. 
40 
37 
15 
4 
2 
2 
1 
3 
1 
2 
107 
DWT 
501,766 
346,223 
184,409 
24,555 
11,314 
5,000 
5,510 
68,400 
7,170 
45,242 
1199589 
13.46 
1990 
No. 
40 
33 
11 
0 
3 
3 
0 
2 
0 
2 
94 
DWT 
487,730 
304,506 
99,200 
0 
17,701 
20,031 
0 
45,600 
0 
45,242 
1020010 
14.59 
1992 
No. 
11 
2 
6 
0 
0 
2 
0 
1 
0 
1 
23 
DWT 
159,656 
24,808 
37,574 
0 
0 
7,938 
0 
21,305 
0 
22,603 
273884 
8.65 
Table 1 : POL Fleet 1986 -1992 
Key to vessel types - see appendix 4 
Source: Fairplay World Shipping Directory - various years 
Polish Ocean Lines statistics show a gradual decline in the size of the fleet from 124 vessels 
in 1986 to 94 vessels in 1990, however, in 1992 the figure is drastically reduced at 23. This 
is partly due to the initial privatisation processes taking place which have split the company 
into a number of sectors leaving the core of POL both limited and specialised. The changes 
are aimed at greater efficiency, and positive results are reflected in the significant reduction in 
the average age of vessels from 14.59 years in 1990 to 8.65 years in 1992. 
One such division has led to the creation of Euroafiica Shipping Lines Company Ltd, which 
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has POL as a parent company. By the end of 1992, Euroafiica was listed as having eight 
vessels, mainly of DN type, with a total deadweight tonnage of 54,819. 
Type 
BS 
DN 
BN 
TO 
DC 
TC 
TQ 
MB 
AN 
TN 
Total 
Ave. 
Age 
1986 
No. 
67 
41 
27 
5 
2 
2 
2 
2 
1 
0 
149 
DWT 
2291948 
245,361 
548,786 
498,682 
8,830 
19,596 
19,449 
198,000 
15,650 
0 
3846302 
9.22 
1988 
No. 
70 
40 
3 
3 
2 
2 
2 
0 
0 
0 
143 
DWT 
2580504 
241,942 
469,886 
206,924 
8,821 
19,596 
19,449 
0 
0 
0 
3547122 
10.15 
1990 
No. 
55 
33 
25 
3 
2 
2 
2 
0 
0 
0 
122 
DWT 
1972452 
190,150 
543,356 
206,924 
8,821 
19,596 
19,449 
0 
0 
0 
2960748 
12.92 
1992 
No. 
48 
2 
56 
1 
2 
2 
2 
0 
0 
1 
114 
DWT 
1744999 
7,228 
1069226 
145,680 
8,821 
19,596 
19,449 
0 
0 
1,345 
3016344 
11.35 
Table 2: PZM Fleet 1986 -1992 
Key to vessel types - see appendix 4 
Source: Fairplay World Shipping Directory - various years 
PZM statistics show a gradual reduction m the total size of the fleet fi-om 149 vessels in 1986 
to 114 vessels in 1992. The 1992 fleet is made up of a significantly higher proportion of BN 
type vessels, their number at 56 being ahnost double that of any previous year. These would 
appear to have replaced DN type vessels which reduced in number fi-om 33 in 1990 to 2 in 
1992. The average age of vessels rose from 9.2 in 1986 to a peak of 12.92 in 1990, but fell 
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sUghtly to 11.35 in 1992. 
Type 
DN 
PV 
BN 
Total 
Average 
Age 
1986 
No. 
6 
6 
0 
12 
DWT 
7,738 
6,451 
0 
14,189 
20.42 
1988 
No. 
? 
? 
? 
? 
DWT 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
1990 
No. 
10 
6 
0 
16 
DWT 
14,300 
6,592 
0 
20,892 
12.44 
1992 
No. 
3 
6 
2 
11 
DWT 
5,760 
6,495 
2,141 
14,396 
14.5 
Table 3 : Polish Baltic Shipping Fleet 1986 -1992 
Key to vessel types - see appendbc 4 
Source: Fairplay World Shipping Directory - various years 
The fleet of the Polish Baltic Shipping Company is shown in some detail in table 3. 
Unfortunately there is no available data for 1988 but the overall trends can be gained from the 
remaining figures. The total number of vessels has changed little over eight years from 12 with 
a total deadweight tonnage ofl4,189inl986to 11 with a deadweight tonnage of 14,3 96 in 
1992; however, the average age has fallen significantly to 14.5 in 1992, from 20.4 m 1986. 
Notably, Fairplay lists nine new ship owning companies for 1992, and their details follow: 
Przed'stowo Polowow Dalekomorskich I Uslug Rybackich Gryf 
Own one JN vessel of 1,480 DWT. 
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Maritime Reefer Transport 
Own one RH type vessel of 49,977 DWT. 
Morski Institut Rybacki 
Own one QF type vessel of 1,200 DWT. 
Polish Scandinavian Shipping Lines Ltd 
Own one PF type vessel of 2,541 DWT. 
Polish Ship Salvage Company 
Own one OB type vessel. 
Polskie Towarzystow Okretowe SA 
Mentioned earlier, Polskie Towarzystow Okretowe SA is a principle ship owning company 
whose container and multipurpose vessels are chartered to POL. More specifically, they own 
the following. 
Type 
DC 
DN 
PM 
Totals 
No. 
22 
21 
1 
44 
DWT 
223,467 
210,919 
2,500 
436,886 
Table 4: Polskie Towarzystow Okretowe SA fleet 1992 
Key to ship types - see appendix 4 
Source: Fairplay World Shipping Directory 1993 
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Deep Sea Services & Fish Handling Co. TRANSOCEAN 
Own one RH type vessel of 46,387 DWT. 
Wyzsza Szkoia Morska 
Own one JX type vessel of 705 DWT. 
Zarzad Porta Szczecin 
Own the following: 
Type 
AR 
GT 
Total 
No. 
2 
2 
4 
DWT 
679 
6,990 
7,669 
Table 5: Zarzad Portu Szczecin Fleet 1992 
Key to vessel types - see appendix 4 
Source: Fairplay World Shipping Directory 1993 
Perhaps one of the most notable changes in the sets of figures is the rise in the registered 
number of ship owning companies in Poland, from just three in 1990 to twelve in 1992. This 
increase is most likely a consequence of chan^g economic and political factors within Poland, 
encouraging the initial proliferation of new, if small, players in the market. 
(2) ROMANIA 
In the days prior to Ceausescu's overthrow in late 1989, almost a quarter of the Romanian 
merchant fleet of around 290 vessels, comprising more than 5m dwt, was laid up because the 
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finance required to carry out repairs to bring them up to class was not available (Lloyds List 
01/11/91). Furthermore, the government requirement that its fleet had to serve the domestic 
economy alone, meant deploying vessels on long ballast voyages to loading ports resulting in 
a huge drain on resources. 
By the summer of 1991 following the demise of the Ceausescu regjme in late 1989/ early 1990, 
and the collapse of Communism's control, a great deal of change had taken place. Captain 
Marinescu, Romania's Secretary of State for Maritime Affairs, explained "At this moment we 
have only eight vessels laid up world wide, three bulkers and five general cargo ships. They 
are laid up because of sub-standard equipment on board which was manufactured in Romania. 
We will get these vessels back in service with the help of overseas money and co-operation, 
and we will strive to ensure our fijture place as a competitive nation in the international 
market" (Lloyds List 01/11/91). To obtain this finance the Romanian shipping industry was 
actively turning to negotiations to set up joint ventures, procuring the help of established 
western organisations to ensure eflBcient operation of their fleets, and utilising expertise which 
for many years was oppressed for political reasons. 
The first success came at the end of July 1991 when the Greek company Ermis Corporation 
agreed jointly to operate five 65,000 dwt Panamax size bulk carriers and two Afiramax tankers 
for Petromin, the organisation set up in Romania in 1990 to operate the bulk carrier and tanker 
fleet. All seven vessels were taken off the Romanian register and transferred to Malta. 
On 12th September 1991 Lloyd's List reported that Economou, the large Greek shipping 
services group, had established a subsidiary m Romania as part of its plans to expand 
cautiously into East European markets, initially by creating agency offices. The Piraeus based 
company, which includes shipping agencies, ship supplies, crewing, repairs and travel among 
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its activities, opened its new office in the port of Constantza, and said it was considering a 
presence in several other countries in the region (Lloyds List 12/09/91). 
By November 1991 Romania was involved in discussions with the Greek seamen's unions with 
a view to employing Romanian crews on board Greek flag vessels. It was recognised that a 
rise in unemployment withm the Romanian fleet was inevitable, by virtue of the feet that 
Romanian vessels were overmanned in comparison with western-owned vessels. 
In November 1991, talks were also in progress with Piraeus-based Gourdomichalis Maritime 
SA which would result in the Greek company providing management facilities for more 
Petromin vessels. Keen to utilise first hand ship management knowledge available in Piraeus, 
some Petromin personnel were to be transferred to the Gourdomichalis office to help oversee 
the operation. This move was similar to the management venture with Norwegian owner T 
Klaveness when a new company Petroklav was set up to manage two Petromin vessels. 
Petromin's association with UK based United Dutch shipping was also developed. United 
Dutch guaranteed around $20m to bring six 65,000 dwt bulkers up to class and operate them 
in a joint pool (Lloyds List 31/10/91). 
In the meantime, Romania has enjoyed a sizeable domestic new building programme. 
Construction work in the country's three major building yards is expected to last until late 
1995 covering construction of bulkers fi-om 25,000 dwt to 165,000 dwt, tankers of 85,000 dwt 
and general cargo ships fi"om 8,700 dwt to 15,000 dwt. 
The Romanians also planned to build ships overseas. In Korea, Hyundai showed interest in 
building a series of bulkers for the Romanians and although they would need to borrow money 
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for such a venture, Korean banks were actively assessing the possibility of providing the 
necessary resources. However, the Romanian shipping industry in 1992 were still paying back 
to the State money which was paid out to build up the fleet during Ceausescu's regime. All 
those contracts hold 25 year repayment terms. 
As to the future, Marinescu concluded that "the coming years will be difBcult. We have to 
correct all that was wrong but we are convinced that we will become an internationally 
competitive nation" (Lloyds List 1/11/91). 
These changes and developments in western co-operation and to the industry have to be seen 
in the light of restructuring in the Romanian maritime sector. In July 1990, immediately post 
revolution, the Romanian fleet of Navrom had split into three parts (Armar: Cpt A Stoica & 
R Newton MD):-
1. Navrom - general cargo vessels 2500 to 15000 dwt. 1991 figures indicate 90 dry 
cargo ships (Fairplay 1991). 
2. Petromin - tankers and dry bulk carriers. 1991 figures show 80 vessels. 
3. Romline - intended to be for specialised vessels but allocated some general cargo 
vessels to equalise size of classes; it includes for example, container 
ships, ro-ro vessels and ferries. Totalling 70 vessels in 1991. 
The split was carried out to improve control and efficiency of financial and organisational 
management. Each company has now been split internally into subdivisions for example by size 
of ship for bulkers; again this is for the same management reasons. 
In 1991 the state still owned the larger proportion of the companies - between 75 and 90% 
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although the aim was to reduce this figure to 51%. It remained unclear who would purchase 
the remaining parts of the shipping companies. The government is overwhelmed with political 
and administrative problems and legislative needs and is unlikely to hurry shipping 
privatisation, although the necessary structures are slowly emerging. 
Meanwhile, in market trams, Armar - Romanian shipping agents in the UK - suggested in 1992 
that Romanian involvement in the cross trades must have increased to compensate for the 
drastic M in e}qx>rts, due to the change of emphasis fi^om exporting as many goods as possible 
to earn hard currency pre-revolution, to that of providing for the domestic economy now. 
Romanian shipping also has been affected by currency issues and in particular the dramatic 
change in exchange rates fi^om 14 lei to the £1 in 1989 to around 370 lei in 1991, and up to 
900 lei in 1992, making the acquisition of hard currency even more important. 
Another major change to have taken place in the structure and organisation of the industry is 
that all income generated by shipping goes to the shipping companies, who then use this 
income to pay ship repayments, taxes and disbursements. Prior to 1991, the Romanian 
government took all shipping income and returned an undisclosed sum of hard currency and 
Romanian lei reputed to be limited, irrational and inconsistent. However to date no further 
detailed information is available in this area, for example regarding tax rates. According to 
Armar the Romanian fleet is "not highly profitable". 
An overall impression of the state of the Romanian merchant fleet can be gained fi^om table 6. 
The figures show a gradual decline in the size of the fleet fi"om 298 vessels in 1986 to 255 
vessels in 1992, and a notable decline in deadweight tonnage fi-om 5,775,875 to 4,217,972. 
Also, there is a notable rise in the average age of the fleet fi-om 9.45 years in 1986 to over 13 
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Type 
DN 
DC 
BS 
TN 
TO 
BN 
WA 
BO 
PM 
CN 
ZO 
JN 
DK 
RH 
BC 
TR 
Tot 
Av. 
Age 
1986 
No. 
107 
73 
44 
10 
8 
19 
14 
5 
1 
2 
1 
1 
3 
10 
0 
0 
298 
DWT 
617,113 
723,645 
2281174 
473,332 
917,021 
299,110 
78,365 
268,076 
12,000 
16,500 
0 
6,000 
10,109 
73,380 
0 
0 
5775875 
9.45 
1988 
No. 
112 
72 
46 
11 
8 
19 
14 
5 
2 
2 
1 
1 
3 
10 
0 
0 
306 
DWT 
687,888 
697,120 
2316684 
644,232 
917,021 
299,110 
78,365 
268,076 
24,000 
16,710 
0 
6,000 
10,291 
73,030 
0 
0 
5815795 
10.79 
1990 
No. 
105 
72 
45 
6 
8 
18 
11 
6 
1 
2 
1 
1 
1 
10 
0 
0 
287 
DWT 
676,542 
714,818 
2384378 
342,450 
916,553 
272,610 
63,365 
446,826 
12,000 
16,710 
0 
6,000 
6,777 
72,977 
0 
0 
5932006 
10.48 
1992 
No. 
83 
67 
30 
8 
4 
33 
9 
4 
2 
2 
0 
1 
0 
10 
1 
1 
255 
DWT 
605192 
665,970 
1502003 
344,100 
498,157 
320,849 
53,470 
93,853 
24,000 
16,710 
0 
6,000 
0 
72.977 
4,800 
9,891 
4217972 
13.17 
Table 6: Romanian Fleet 1986 - 1992 
Key to vessel types - see appendix 4 
Source: Fairplay World Shipping Directory - Various Years 
years in 1992, which places extra pressures upon building programmes. Perhaps the most 
notable change to have taken place is the creation of new ship owning companies, the majority 
of these emerging from divisions of Navrom. 
49 
(3) BULGARIA 
The Bulgarian maritime industry and its ancillary sectors are covered by three state owned 
enterprises which are still monopolies or virtual monopolies in their areas. Although there are 
no Fonaining formal obstacles to overturn this monopoly no strong competitors had emerged 
by 1993, and none were on the immediate horizon. 
These enterprises were outlined by the Commission of the European Communities in 1990 
(Ernst and Young 1990) as :-
1. "Bulgarian Shipping Company" based in Varna and with the following business 
activities - maritime transport of cargoes and passengers, handling and forwarding and 
ship repair. The company includes the following subdivisions: the Public Company, 
Navigation Maritime Bulgare (PC NMB), Port Varna, Port Bourgas, the ship repair 
plant "Odessoss" in Varna, the Board of Material and Technical Provision, the 
Research Institute of Shipping, and two training centres. The merchant fleet is 
operated entirely by PC NMB from Vama. Bulgarian Shipping Company is the main 
liner and tramp carrier in Bulgaria. Established in 1947 it is now one of the largest 
firms in Bulgaria and one of the major shipowners in the Black Sea region. 
2. "Bulfracht Co", which is based in Sofia, undertakes the booking and chartering of 
cargoes and ships. It was established in 1965 and developed as the state organisation 
for booking and chartering of cargoes and ships in Bulgaria and as the chief agent for 
the Bulgarian shippers and shipping companies. Under the new economic reforms 
Bulfim:ht lost all legal advantages associated with its monopoly in its field of operation. 
However, being an internationally reputable organisation with highly qualified staff and 
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an extensive network of agencies, Bulfracht remains very strong. 
3. "Despred Company" with oflBces in Sofia is the main domestic and international 
forwarder in Bulgaria. The maritime sector is served by two a£Bliated branches in 
Bourgas and in Varna. The company was established in 1947. As an international 
forwarder it handled in 1992 nearly 40% of Bulgarian foreign trade. Until the 1989 
economic reforms Despred was a monopoly. Having an extensive network of agencies 
in the country and abroad, and on the basis of their experience and contacts, Despred 
retains a strong position in its main activity of domestic and foreign forwarding. 
The Bulgarian maritime fleet comprised 120 ocean going vessels in May 1991 (Lloyds List 
13/5/91), and as noted earlier, the main owner of the Bulgarian maritime tonnage is Bulgarian 
Shipping Company. Its ships are operated by PC NMB. The economic circumstances of the 
seventies and eighties, as well as the financial difiQculties of the State during the eighties are 
heavily reflected in the average age of ships operated by the company. At the end of 1990 the 
average age of these ships was 14.29 years, rising to 15.38 by 1992. 
ThCTe are two other small companies in Bulgaria which own and operate ships. One of them 
is SOMAT which has several ro-ro/passenger vessels. The company operates an intermodal 
system for transporting cargo^ fi-om west Europe to Iran/Iraq (Roe 1991). It uses the crews 
and the technical services of the Bulgarian Shipping Company. The State Establishment for 
Maintenance at Sea Channels and Ports' Aquatorium Salvage Tugs (MSCPAST) has some 
maritime tonnage which it charters out to the Bulgarian Shipping Company. These ships are 
old but still good for navigation. Bulgarian Shipping Co. provides crews, maintains the ships, 
and meets the costs. 
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On 24th October 1991 a decree of the Council of Ministers dissolved the NMB state group, 
dividing it into a number of sections including ports (Varna and Bourgas), Baltic and Black Sea 
Shipping Company, NMB (shipping only), and a number of other companies. Assets of the 
ori^nal NMB were divided between these new companies, and the new NMB took over assets 
and activities of some subsidiary companies, for example the Balkan and Black Sea Shipping 
Company. Under the new decree, the Balkan and Black Sea remains a stock company with 
the whole stock to be controlled by the government initially. The share holding structure is 
now ready for privatisation. 
The major problem of privatisation is finance - finding buyers for the companies. As an 
international activity, shipping is appropriate and perhaps more attractive for privatisation than 
many other sectors, although due to its international nature it may be argued that shipping is 
less afiTected by the country's problems and privatisation may not be necessary. Cpt 
Domoustchiev - Chairman and Managing Director of the Balkan and Black Sea - felt that 
privatisation may not be necessary if an alternative method of motivating the industry could 
be devised, for example profit sharing with employees (Interview 26/11/91). Other problems 
associated with privatisation in Bulgaria include limited public cash, with only a few potential 
mvestors who would dominate subsequent ownership as a result. 
To improve image and to satisfy the west, shares might be sold cheaply or even given away, 
but this would not generate any of the much needed capital. An alternative is to use western 
involv^nent. This is seen as important in Bulgarian shipping as it may provide a method of:-
renovating and/or renewing vessels; 
providing know how; 
gaining market penetration; 
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improving management skills. 
The final path taken may involve a combination of western investment and selling shares to 
oi^loyees and possibly to the public. The Bulgarian state is unable to help with the provision 
of capital for shipping as it has other more pressing demands for the little capital available. 
In 1991 the taxation of shipping companies stood at 40% on profits, 10% on municipal tax, 
and 2% of other taxes. There was also a tax placed on all salary increases in foreign currency, 
which represented a 25% tax on profits. Any remaining revenue is kept by NMB. The majority 
of Bulgarian shipping expenditure is in hard currency and this presents a major problem; 
working for domestic charterers, they are paid in local currency (leva). The state run bank will 
exchange leva for dollars, but at a punitive rate and one becoming increasingly so. 
According to Domoustchiev, the Bulgarian fleet needs a replacement rate of at least six vessels 
per annum, as the average vessel age in 1992 reached 15.38 years. The taxation rate precludes 
this at present, but if tax rates were lowered it might be achievable. More recently the fleet has 
been pushed towards higher levels of cross trading as the domestic trade falls away and the 
need to earn hard currency increases. 
An overall impression of the Bulgarian fleet can be gained fi^om Table 7. The figures show a 
relatively stable fleet size with NMB operating 118 vessels in 1986 and 116 in 1992, and only 
a modest reduction in deadweight tonnage. However, there is a gradual increase in the variety 
of ship types - a change which is most likely linked to catering for market demand. Perhaps 
the most notable figures are those indicating a rise in the average age of vessels fi"om 10.8 
years in 1986, to over 15 years in 1992. 
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Type 
DN 
BS 
TN 
WA 
TR 
DC 
FT 
TO 
BN 
JN 
PV 
CN 
WB 
PM 
TC 
RF 
TR 
Tot 
Av. 
Age 
1986 
No. 
45 
21 
10 
3 
6 
8 
2 
5 
13 
1 
2 
2 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
118 
DWT 
338,680 
684,434 
193,097 
31,300 
142,244 
98,378 
24,870 
460,281 
218,741 
6,000 
15,431 
18,918 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
2232374 
10.8 
1988 
No. 
39 
21 
9 
1 
6 
11 
0 
5 
12 
1 
1 
2 
2 
2 
0 
0 
0 
112 
DWT 
292,499 
684,434 
117,822 
6,235 
142,244 
119,224 
0 
280,695 
222,429 
5,525 
4,931 
18,918 
20,868 
24,870 
0 
0 
0 
1940694 
12.49 
1990 
No. 
37 
21 
7 
3 
4 
9 
0 
4 
14 
1 
1 
2 
2 
2 
4 
1 
0 
112 
DWT 
275,426 
684,434 
98,711 
19,200 
84,244 
102,628 
0 
183,900 
290,789 
5,525 
4,931 
18,690 
20,868 
24,870 
12,800 
1,394 
0 
1828410 
14.29 
1992 
No. 
25 
21 
6 
3 
0 
10 
0 
5 
29 
1 
1 
3 
2 
2 
4 
0 
4 
116 
DWT 
194,460 
684,434 
97,138 
19,200 
0 
116,128 
0 
280,695 
397,528 
5,525 
4,931 
27,635 
20,868 
24,870 
12,800 
0 
84,244 
1970456 
15.38 
Table 7: Bulgarian Fleet 1986-1992 
Key to vessel types - see appendix 4 
Source: Fairplay World Shipping Directory - Various Years 
(4) EX - CZECHOSLOVAKIA 
In Autumn 1948, the Czechoslovak joint stock company Metrans was founded with a 
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monopoly in the sphere of international forwarding and shipping, including the operating of 
sea going ships. In 1952, a part of the Metrans's business related to maritime shipments was 
transferred to the newly established company with monopoly rights - Cechofracht. Its task was 
on the one hand to arrange forwarding services and, on the other hand, to operate shipping 
with its own vessels. In 1953, Cechofracht was transformed into a foreign trade enterprise. 
On a dedsion of the Czechoslovak government, Czechoslovak Ocean Shipping was established 
on April 1st 1959, as the first shipping agent in the Czechoslovak history. As an international 
joint stock company, it was put in charge of operating ocean shipping, purchasing, selling and 
chartering ships, executing orders of third parties, and taking part in foreign as well as internal 
trade. Czechoslovak Ocean Shipping took OVCT from Cechofiacht all the ships operating imder 
the Czechoslovak flag (Machota 1989). 
On 1st January 1991 the fleet consisted of 18 ocean going vessels; of these seven were less 
than two years old and only four were over 15 years (COS 1990). There were no plans afoot 
to sell these vessels; a 55% profit tax would make this a pointless exercise. Negotiations are 
taking place to reduce this figure for ship sales once privatisation has taken place. 
In 1990 the company produced its first annual report along western lines. In 1992 figures 
indicated that the company employed 1200 workers, 100 at central offices and 1100 seamen. 
In previous years Czechoslovakian trade dominated the company's trading patterns and the 
most frequented ports were in Poland, Yugoslavia, East Germany and the Soviet Union, as the 
ex-Czechoslovakia had no ports of its own. Trade has changed dramatically since then and 
today the cross trades dominate and a wider variety of ports are used. Figures supporting this 
were presented by COS during an interview (5/2/92):-
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1988 75% of cargo carried (tons) = Czechoslovakian trade 
25% of cargo carried (tons) = cross trading 
1991 2% of cargo carried (tons) = Czechoslovakian trade 
98% of cargo carried (tons) = cross trading 
This represents a substantial change in 3 years and presents problems of adaptation; however 
it does mean that convertible currency can now be earned in some quantity whereas previously 
it was mainly saved by avoiding the use of foreign owned ships. 
Undo- the old system COSCO was obliged to work with Cechofi^ acht (the state forwarder) to 
carry Czech imports and exports. Today they have complete fi^eedom to act in the best 
interests of the company. This explains the move toward cross trades, and the need to increase 
these has been heightened by the decline in the ex-Czechoslovak economy. COSCO still 
works with Cechofi^ acht, although they no longer have a monopoly on forwarding, and as a 
state company COSCO are obliged to offer them first refiisal on trafiBc. However, fiill market 
rates are still charged. 
Although still owned by the state, management of COSCO and its policies are now fiilly 
independent, \^ diich has been the case since 1989/1990. COSCO is involved with tramping but 
has no specific trades and no conference membership; their main aim is to keep the fleet fiilly 
occupied. As at February 1992, half the fleet was operating on long term time charters, with 
the other half operating on short terms. Until 1989 some countries such as Taiwan, South 
Korea, and South Afiica were closed to trading due to Czechoslovakian government bans. 
Recent changes have meant that these are now opened up, except for Israel which remains 
unsaved. Eariier times also saw preferential traffic (eg Cuban sugar) and some forced traffic 
(eg Chinese - to pay for power stations through barter) being directed through COSCO. 
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Similarly, these requirements no longer exist. 
Ninety nine percent of COSCO shares are held by the state owned company FINOP, the 
ronaining 1% belong to Cechofracht which is 100% state owned. Privatisation, as a method 
of improving eflSdency, was planned for June 1992, \^ dien it was proposed that FINOP be sold 
to the Czechoslovakian public through coupons. All individuals have a right to the coupons 
which can be obtained for a fee of 1000 crowns (then about £20). The fee is to cover 
administration costs and does not represent the value of the company. Private companies, 
known as privatisation flmds, have been established, which can buy the rights to coupons from 
individuals not wishing to invest. They can also administer coupons for people by a method 
similar to unit trust fimds. It is expected that 90% of FINOP will be bought by banks and 10% 
through coupons, although this is still some way off. 
A small number of company shares are reserved for employees who do not require coupons. 
At present the consequential high degree of uncertainty in the management of COSCO, has led 
to as few decisions as possible being made. Once privatised, COSCO will receive no indirect 
subsidies and it will have the potential to become bankrupt. Non nationals are unable to 
purchase shares but when the company is privatised and a stock exchange is opened shares 
may be bought and sold at will by any person or company. 
As to joint ventures the company up to 1992 was not involved in any deals as they were 
awaiting financial advice and legal agreements on a number of possibilities. Delay was also 
partly due to Czechoslovakia being split into two separate countries, Slovakia and the Czech 
Republic. 
Convertible currency has been seen as an important issue for some time and remains one today. 
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In the past, the artificial rate of exchange between US$ and crowns meant that hard currency 
needed to be earned. Now, the rate varies weekly but crowns are fi-eely convertible in both 
the Czech Republic and Slovakia. The only important factor now is the increasingly harsh 
exchange rate. In the past, like all East European countries all convertible currency went to 
the state who gave some back and also paid for new ships. Now COSCO keeps its convertible 
currency, minus tax, but also has to finance new vessels through profits or mortgages. 
Other changes have included taxation rates which are aimed to come into line with western 
countries. Taxes on profits have altered as follows:-
Year 1989 1990 1991/1992 
Tax level 80% 61% 55% 
The wage bill is also taxed at 20%. Wage levels will remain controlled by the state until 
privatisation; at present seafarers are paid a mixture of US$ and crowns whilst at sea, but only 
crowns when ashore. 
Further details of the ex-Czechoslovakian fleet are shown in tables 8, 9, and 10. The fleet has 
remained relatively stable, showing, if anything, a small increase in deadweight tonnage. The 
most noticeable changes have emerged through the division of Czechoslovakia into Slovakia 
and the Czech Republic. The Czech Republic retained the majority of Czechoslovak Ocean 
Shipping which became Czech Ocean Shipping, whilst the Slovaks formed a new company, 
Slovak Danube Navigation, with just three vessels. The other notable change is the rise in 
average age of vessels fi"om 6.4 years for Czechoslovakia in 1988 to 8.79 and 9.5 years 
respectively for the Czech Republic and Slovakia in 1992. 
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Vessel 
type 
BS 
DC 
DN 
BN 
Totals 
Ave. Age 
1986 
No. 
7 
9 
4 
1 
21 
DWT 
241,523 
112,814 
23,834 
22,623 
400,794 
8.14 
1988 
No. 
10 
9 
3 
1 
23 
DWT 
434,169 
106,931 
17,911 
22,623 
580,934 
6.43 
1990 
No. 
8 
9 
0 
1 
18 
DWT 
339,507 
107,880 
0 
22,623 
470,010 
6.68 
Table 8: Czechoslovak Fleet 1986-1990 
Key to vessel type - appendix 4. 
Source: Fairplay World Shipping Directories - Various years. 
Vessel type 
DC 
BS 
DN 
Totals 
Average Age 
1992 
No. 
9 
9 
1 
19 
DWT 
108,699 
311,833 
22,623 
443,155 
8.79 
Table 9: Czech Fleet 1992 
Key to vessel types - see appendix 4 
Source: Fairplay World Shipping Directory 1993 
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Vessel Type 
BN 
DN 
Totals 
Average Age 
1992 
No. 
1 
2 
3 
DWT 
3,641 
4,800 
8,441 
9.5 
Table 10: Slovak Fleet 1992 
Key to vessel types - see appendix 4 
Source: Fairplay World Shipping Directory 1993 
Summary 
As a whole the countries studied show an overall reduction in fleet size and a corresponding 
reduction in total DWT, although this is sometimes accompanied by an increasingly wide range 
of vessel types. Generally it might also be said that average age of vessels has increased, and 
in recent years there has been an increase in the number of registered ship owning companies. 
The fundamental social, economic and political changes that have taken place in East Europe 
have notably affected the shipping industry at every level. It is to a more detailed examination 
of the relationship between these aspects and an attempt to relate them more specifically that 
we now turn our attention, with the development of the structure of the research that foUows. 
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CHAPTER 3 
THE RESEARCH OUTLINE 
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Having looked at the background to East European change and to the East European shipping 
industries we now need to relate the two. The relationships and reaction of the shipping 
industry to aich change can be viewed in tairis^of competitive positioning of a service industry 
(East European shipping) in a context of major macro change. In attempting to analyse these 
relationships and their effects, we shall divide the task into a series of stages. The aim of the 
first part of the research in attempting to analyse the effects of recent political, social and 
economic changes in the Eastern bloc upon the region's shipping industry, represents a broad 
and complex task which will be facilitated through narrowing the area to a specific 
geographical region. Poland has been chosen for this purpose because the shipping industry 
and economy in general are relatively well documented, it is a large maritime nation compared 
to most other East European countries - owning approximately 37% of the total DWT 
op«^ed by the five covmtries selected earlier (ie Poland, Romania, Bulgaria, Czech Republic 
and Slovakia) - and the political, social and economic situation is not as chaotic as that of the 
Commonwealth of Independent States, Romania or Bulgaria, where for example, divisions of 
the ex-Soviet Union are leading to arguments over asset ownership (Lloyds List 02/09/91). 
The issues that will emerge are likely to be both numerous and varied. For any meaningfiil 
comparison to be carried out the research area needs to be narrowed fiirther to simplify the 
analysis. The liner shipping market, rather than Polish shipping in general, has been chosen for 
reasons of data availability, the close contacts maintained with POL, the major liner shipping 
company within Poland (POL maintains a global network of 22 liner routes and is among the 
largest 20 container operators in the world), their active involvement in the cross trades, 
European Community interest and competition on these trades, and the potentially sizeable 
impact of expanding trade in East Europe upon liner shipping. 
Having narrowed the research area we can now turn our attention to specifically modelling the 
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impact of East European changes upon the Polish liner industry. With the increasing power 
of micro-computers it has become possible to develop models that can assist in j u d ^ g future 
trends in the shipping market, such as those summarised by Stopford (1988). One of the most 
common maritune activities is the preparation of models for forecasting and market research 
studies, but because the shipping industry is international in its operations and highly complex 
in its structure, it is often difficult to achieve useful and useable results. 
Although models have been widely used within the shipping industry (Dinwoodie 1988, 
Beenstock and Vergottis 1993), forecasting generally has a poor reputation in maritime circles 
(Evans & Marlow 1991). The argument that forecasts are never right has been put forward 
often by shipowners. Beck, planning director at Shell UK adds "When looking at forecasts 
made in the 1970's one can find many failures but few successes. Indeed one may be shocked 
at the extent to which the most important forecasts turned out to be wrong" (Beck 1983). 
One example comes fi-om forecasts of demand for new ships produced between 1978 and 1984 
which were outlined by Stopford (1988). Each successive forecast predicted a diflFerent pattern 
of demand over the following seven years. The 1980 forecast predicted 50% more demand 
in 1986 than the 1982 forecast, and even this proved to be too optimistic. In defence of the 
experts who produced these forecasts there were developments in the world economy that 
reasonably could not have been anticipated. However the fact remains that they were 
consistently wide of the mark. Before introducing maritime forecasting Stopford points out 
that "the case against forecasting seems formidable" - a view supported by Drucker (1977). 
The poor record of maritime forecasting and modelling, and the extensive range of influencing 
fectors present in particular in the East European shipping market have led to the need for an 
altonative and original approach in the research. This is reemphasised by the fact that the link 
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between East European change and the subsequent impacts upon the shipping industry 
rq)resents an entirely new and extremely complex situation and no substantial research work 
has yet been carried out in this area. 
These problems and the complexity of this research mean it is not possible to use a 
convoitional econometric model - such as the application of multiple regression techniques -
to analyse subsequent development of the shipping industry, which comprises nimierous 
complex social issues and involves ahnost continual change. A potentially usefiil alternative 
has been found in contextual modelling - an adaptation of a specific variant of conceptual 
modelling - which can be applied to the specific case of Polish maritime activities. 
Although few references exist, successfiil examples can be found in the fields of computer data 
moddling (The Open University 1989) and environmental appraisal, where in the latter Joyce 
and Williams (1976) identified several separate contextual sub-models including both 
operational and theoretical contexts, in analysing the relationship between the urban 
environment and those affected by it. These models were used because of their ability to 
accommodate the broad nature of social, political and economic data. Whilst incorporating 
all data characteristics, they also highlight their inter-connectivity, strength, relevance, and 
significance to the relationship under study. 
The application of contextual modelling is carried out by dividing the broad subject area - in 
this case changes in East Europe and their subsequent effects on Polish shipping - into a series 
of contexts, these being constraints upon and issues relevant to the research which help to 
direct the work and identify the most significant factors which relate to it. The changes taking 
place in East Europe may be considered as forming the macroenvironmental element of the 
maiketing environment described by Kotler (1993). Macroenvironmental discussions such as 
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those by Kotler (1993), Lancaster and Massingham (1993) and Gross, Banting, Meredith and 
Ford (1993) have identified several contexts and their sub elements, which have been adapted 
to apply more specifically to this research. 
Once the contextual model has identified the specific relationships between economic, social 
and political change in East Europe and the maritime sector, what will then be needed is a 
method of extracting the m^or issues that emerge and which dominate this relationship, fi-om 
which it will be possible to begin to assess the adaptation in the market place of the Polish 
shipping industry to the changes which have taken place. No existing suitable technique is 
available to achieve this, so the contextual matrix model has been developed by the author, 
using a variation of a broad strategic matrix approach. The use of matrices as a display 
technique is supported by Jain, Urban and Stacey (1981), Clark, Gilad, Bisset and Tomlinson 
(1984), Westman (1985) and Miles and Huberman (1994). Possibly the best known display 
matrix was developed by Leopold et al (1971) for evaluating environmental impact. The 
usefiihiess of this matrix was demonstrated in the assessment of exploratory drilling sites in 
Antarctica (Parker and Howard 1977), and by the North West Water Authority (1978) when 
looking at the potential environmental impacts of extracting water fi^om different catchment 
areas. In Canada, the matrix has been promoted by the Federal Environmental Assessment and 
Review OflBce (FEARO) as a screening method to overcome the weaknesses of both project 
and environmental based screening methods (FEARO 1978). Fortlage (1990) supports their 
use as they enable all aspects of a problem to be taken into account, but emphasises that they 
are relatively undeveloped as yet. One relatively recent example of their use is provided by 
McDonald and Leppard's study "Marketing by Matrix" (1992). 
By setting out and comparing the elements of the contextual model the matrix enables second 
order causes to be clearly identified. These would, for example, involve the effects of 
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economic change on social issues within the maritime sector. This would include the fact that 
economic change in Poland has led to suppressed demand resulting in unemployment in the 
shipping sector. Through the use of consistent terminology, the most important issues will 
emerge as they will occur repeatedly. 
The emerging issues will indicate the main market impacts for PoUsh liner operations, and 
demonstrate the need, if it exists, for a repositioning exercise. Positioning and repositioning 
form an important element of service marketing, to which we will now turn our attention. 
In agreement with a number of service marketing texts - such as Cowell (1991), Lovelock 
(1991), Congram and Frddman (1991) and Morgan (1991) - Kotler (1993) describes a service 
as 
"any activity or benefit that one party can offer to another that is essentially intangible 
and does not result in the ownership of anything. Its production may or may not be tied 
to a physical product". 
Shipping would appear to fit this description, a view supported by Whiteman (1981) who 
specified that sendees include the transport of both goods and passengers by bus, rail, air and 
sea, but exclude private motoring. 
According to Cowell (1991) services have a number of characteristics, the most common of 
which were identified as the following:-
(i). Intangibility 
Services are essentially intan^ble in that they cannot be heard, seen, tasted, smeh or felt before 
they are purchased. 
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(ii). Inseparability 
Services often cannot be separated from the person of the seller, and creating or performing 
the service may occur at the same time as full or partial consumption of it. Goods are 
produced, sold and consumed whereas services are sold, then produced and consumed. 
(iii). Heterogeneity 
It is often difficult to achieve standardisation of output when providing services - each 'unit' 
of a service may differ from other units, and from the customer's view point it is difficult to 
judge quality in advance of purchase. 
(iv). Perishability 
Services are perishable and cannot be stored - for example, empty cargo space on a ship's 
voyage represents capacity lost forever. With some services, fluctuating demand may 
aggravate this feature. 
(vi). Ownership 
Lack of ownership is a basic difference between a service industry and a product industry 
because a customer may only have access to, or use of a facility. Payment is for the use of^  
access to or hire of items. 
Each of these five characteristics can be applied to the shipping industry. The service provided 
by shipping companies is intangible, perishable in that it cannot be stored, inseparable from the 
person of the seller, heterogeneous in its lack of a standard output, and the use of the service 
does not result in ownership of the vessel. 
The Institute of Marketing defines marketing as "the management process responsible for 
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identifying, anticipating and satisfying customer requirements profitably". It has been 
suggested that service dominant organisations are less market orientated than manufacturing 
firms. Cowell (1991) offers several reasons in support of this argument:-
(i). The intangible nature of services may cause greater marketing problems than with 
physical items, 
(ii). Some service businesses are opposed to the idea of marketing, 
(iii). Many service organisations are small and in direct contact with their customers and 
may not require the same kinds of marketing approaches as medium size or larger 
organisations, 
(iv). Some service organisations have enjoyed more demand for their services than they 
could cope with, 
(v). Ethical constraints may limit marketing in some service areas, 
(vi). Some organisations have enjoyed monopoly powers in their service field, 
(vii). Quality of management is not as good as in service organisations, with top 
management often not recognising what marketing is or its importance (Stanton 1981), 
(viii). There is relatively little published work in the area of service marketing. 
Cowell (1991) suggests that in recent years managers in the service industries have shown 
greater interest in the relevance and applicability of marketing concepts. He continues by 
stressing that marketing does have relevance to the service sector but that knowledge of the 
status of marketing in the service industries is limited, disjointed and under-developed - a 
concept that is supported by the very limited amount of shipping related marketing literature 
that exists. 
Against this background of service marketing we can now examine positioning in some detail. 
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Trout and Ries (1972) introduced the concept of positioning in the 1970's in a series of three 
articles describing the origin of the idea. They described the 1950's as the "product era", the 
1960's as the "image era" and the 1970's as the "positioning era". They argued that it is 
imperative that marketing messages be designed to communicate clearly a product's and/or 
company's position relative to the competition. By 1986 they claimed that in order to be 
successful, a company must become competitor oriented and attack weak points in 
competitors' positioning strategies (Trout and Ries 1986). Green, Tull and Albraum (1988) 
reinforce the importance of careful positioning. 
Organisations that sell to consumer and industrial markets realise that they cannot appeal to 
all buyers in those markets, or at least to all buyers in the same way. Different companies will 
be in bettCT positions to serve certain segments in the market, and each company needs to find 
the parts of the maiket that it can serve best. Today's companies have moved away from mass 
marketing and product differentiated marketing toward target marketing. 
Target marketing calls for three major steps. The first is market segmentation, dividing a 
market into distinct groups of buyers. The second is market targeting, evaluating each 
segment's attractiveness and evaluating which segments to enter. The third step is market 
positioning. 
Once a company has decided which market segments to enter it must decide what positions 
it wants to occupy within those segments. Market positioning is arranging for a product to 
occupy a clear, distinctive and desirable place relative to competing products, in the minds of 
target consumers (Kotler and Armstrong 1992). 
Wind and Robinson (1972) stated that product (brand) positioning referred to the place a 
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product occupies in a given market. Conceptually, the origin of the positioning concept can 
be related to the economists' work on market structure, competitive position of the firm and 
the concepts of substitution and competition among products. They noted that increasing 
attention was being given to product image. This suggested a new perspective on product 
positioning, one which focused on consumers' perceptions concerning the place a product 
occupies in a given market. 
Lovelock (1991) describes positioning as the process of establishing and maintaining a dis-
tinctive place in the market for an organisation and/or its individual product ofiferings. The 
theory has been used extensively to market tangible products (Bradley 1991), but examples of 
its use in the service sector - such as Telex and Avis (Keegan 1989) - despite being successful, 
have been limited. Shostack (1977) promoted the idea that the basis of any service positioning 
strat^y was the service itself and presented an approach which suggested that within service 
systems, structural process design could be used to "engineer" services on a more scientific, 
rational basis. 
In the service sector it is important to note that, because branding is not common, positioning 
refers to positioning of the entire service organisation and its services (Friedman 1991). In 
1992 Lovelock noted that the issues involved in service positioning are numerous and that in 
a structural sense processes themselves appear to have characteristics that not only affect 
market position, but also can be managed deliberately and strategically for positioning 
purposes. By manipulating complexity and divergence, a service marketer can approximate 
some of the product analysis and design fiinctions that are traditional in product marketing. 
Moreover, he introduces the use of blueprints to provide a mechanism through which services 
can be "engineered" at the drawing board, as well as a tool for identifying gaps, analysing 
con^)etitors, aiding market research and controlling implementation. The concept of service 
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positioning is further supported by Morgan (1991) and successfiil examples of positioning 
strate^es in the service and transport industries include those of United Airlines and American 
Airlines (Lovelock 1992). 
To plan a product's position a company first identifies the existing positions of products 
curraitly serving its maricet segments. It then decides what major product attributes customers 
desire and selects a position on the basis of its ability to satisfy consumer wants better than 
competitors. A marketing programme then delivers the position to target consumers. 
In planning a positioning strategy, a new business or a new service must start fi^om the 
beginning; however, an established con^any or service may be faced with a repositioning task 
if unsatisfied with its current position, if the position has become outdated, or if the position 
has acquired negative associations - all three of which apply to this research. 
According to the AMA (1991), the positioning or repositioning of a service should follow 
similar procedures:-
Step 1. Consumer research - for example in the form of similarity judgements 
Step 2. Development of a perceptual map through multidimensional scaling. On a 
perceptual map the "psychological" distances between services are reflected on 
the dimensions consumers deem relevant in evaluating the service. 
Step 3. The perceptual map is used to look for gaps or areas where there is open space 
and possibly a new position. 
A product's position is a complex set of perceptions, impressions and feelings that consumers 
hold for the product compared with competing products. The marketer can pursue several 
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positioning strategies; for example the product may be positioned on any of the following 
bases:-
(i). On product attributes; 
(ii). On the needs it fills or benefits it offers; 
(iii). According to usage occasions; 
(iv). According to classes of users; 
(v). Against a competitor; 
(vi). Away fi"om a competitor; 
(vii). According to different product classes. 
These examples show how positioning is being developed beyond its initial focus on consumer 
perceptions of the market place, to include even additional consideration of competitors' 
positions and actions - a concept potentially relevant to this research. 
Given the basis for positioning products, the choice of which to use depends on a number of 
characteristics of the firm, product, market, and environmental setting (Wind 1982). These 
include:-
(i). The firm's market position. 
(i). The positioning used by current competitors. 
(iii). The compatibility of the desired positioning with the consumers needs, wants and 
current perception of the product's positioning versus its competitors, and the given 
product class, 
(iv). The "newness" of the considered basis for positioning and its departure fi"om the 
current practice in the market. 
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(v). The resources available to communicate the positioning effectively and the 
compatibility of the positioning with the firm's marketing strategy, 
(vi). The firm's desire for an innovative versus similar image, in relation to its competitors, 
(vii). The ability to develop an effective creative execution for the chosen position, 
(viii). The legal environment. 
Although there are no such examples in shipping as yet, it is felt that the adaptation and 
application of a positioning model to this sector provides a useful method of analysis (Ries & 
Trout 1972, Shostack 1987, Day & Wensley 1988, Green, TuU & Albraum 1988, Hooley and 
Saunders 1993). In the context of East European change, however, it may be necessary to 
examine the repositioning that has occurred in the Polish liner market, fi^om a rather different 
perspective than that put forward by the AMA (1991), outlined earlier, in that service 
repoMtioning in East Europe will involve rather more cooperation, direction, and participation 
in the liner shipping market, than customer perception. This results fi^om a combination of the 
forces driving company change in East Europe - ie. political, economic and social change - and 
the specifically regulated environment of the liner industry. This in turn may well require a 
rather different approach. 
Having decided upon a positioning strategy the company can plan the details of the marketing 
mix - the set of controllable marketing variables that the firm blends in order to produce the 
response it wants in the target market. In planning to develop a position or to reposition, a 
company's marketing mix will indicate where strengths lie and on what basis it can sustain a 
viable position. The marketing mix can provide a method of describing and structuring a 
company's position. 
According to Booms and Bitner (1981) the marketing mix for services consists of seven 
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elements. An adapted version of their idea is shown in figure 3, which is followed by greater 
det^ of each element: 
Prodact 
Range 
Quality 
Level 
Brand name 
SCTviceLine 
Warranty 
After sales 
service 
Place 
Location 
Accessibility 
Distribution 
channels 
Distribution 
coverage 
Price 
Level 
Discounts 
Payment terms 
Customer's 
perceived 
value 
Differentiation 
Quality/price 
Promotion 
Advertising 
Personal selling 
Sales promotion 
Publicity 
Public relations 
Physical Evidence 
Environment 
Furnishings 
Colour 
Layout 
Noise level 
FaciUtating goods 
Tangible clues 
Process 
Procedures 
Mechanisation 
Employee discretion 
Customer involvement 
Customer direction 
Flow of activities 
People 
Personnel: 
training 
discretion 
commitmrait 
incentives 
^pearance 
interpersonal 
behaviour 
Attitudes 
Other custcHners: 
behaviour 
degree of 
involvement 
Customer/customer 
contact 
Figure 3: The marketing mix for services: (Booms & Bitner in Donnelly & George 1981) 
The first consideration in the marketing mix will be the product. The service product 
comprises the range, quality and level of services provided, and requires consideration in 
particular of the use of branding, and for shipping and transit, the after sale service. The 
product mix of such elements can vary considerably, as may be seen in the comparison of a 
small shipping company operating ferry services to neighbouring islands and an international 
shipping company running a wide range of services for a variety of cargoes to numerous 
worldwide destinations. The product is the core around which all positioning strategies 
revolve. The company needs to consider whether there is a new benefit it can offer (for 
ecample on time service in the transport industry), a new appHcation it can fiilfill (for example 
extending a shipping service to include a new port of call), or a new product classification it 
can enter (for example extending a transport service to cover door to door). Blueprinting as 
outlined by Lovelock (1992) may be useful here - it provides a method for rationalising and 
visualising the service production and delivery process, and provides an opportunity to look 
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for positioning potential. 
The second consideration is price, which involves levels of charges, discounts, allowances and 
commissions, terms of payment and credit. Price may also be used to diflferentiate services and 
customers' perceptions of value obtained fi^om a service, and the interaction of price and 
quality are important considerations. Clearly important pricing issues which relate to liner 
shipping include service contracts, rebates and level of pricing when compared with 
competitors. 
The place element relates to the location of the service providers and their accessibility both 
physically and by other means of communication, as well as the use of technology in delivering 
services, and the physical evidence that accompanies most services. Linked to this is the issue 
of distribution channels used and the extent of their coverage, although the concepts of the 
traditional channel of distribution for goods are not applicable for services. Significant 
shipping issues here might include ports served, the location of offices, representatives and 
agents and the trade routes operated. 
Physical evidence includes elements such as the physical environment which is fundamental 
to the service offer (shipping company offices, fiimishings, noise), the facilitating goods that 
allow the service to be provided (eg. ships, cargo handling equipment) and peripheral physical 
evidence such as tickets and receipts which are of little independent value. Other significant 
physical evidence will be the vessels and containers themselves, plus related ancillary 
equipment such as trucks and rail wagons. 
Promotion includes methods of communicating with markets through advertising, personal 
selling activities, sales promotion, direct publicity and indirect forms of communication Uke 
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public relations. Promotion is a powerful force in the positioning process; for example 
American Express has repositioned its credit services to women, solely through advertising. 
However, Lovelock (1991) stressed that positioning is more than advertising or promotion, 
and must involve each of the 7 P's w^ch make up the marketing mix for services such as liner 
shipping. Liner operators sometimes actively engage in promotional activities including 
advatising and sponsorship, and the supply of promotional items. Market research may also 
be undertaken. 
The final two elements of the services mix, which will require careful consideration are the 
people who provide the service and the process required to perform the service. 
Firstly, 'people' refers to those who perform a production or operational role in the 
organisation and those involved in selling; the activities of these people can be critical in the 
selling of the service (Brundage and Marshall 1980). Davidson (1978) suggested that in a 
service industry the secret of success is recognition that the customer contact personnel are 
the key people in the organisation. The relationship between customers also needs to be 
considered, as one customer's perceptions of the service may be influenced by those of 
another. Clearly significant issues here are the quality of seafarers and oflBcers on board 
vessels, and the attitude and skills of oflBce personnel ashore. 
Secondly, process involves the overall operation of the system including policies and 
procedures adopted, level of mechanisation, employee discretion, customer involvement, 
information flows, appointment and waiting systems, and capacity levels. Although 
traditionally operational management concerns, these aspects affect customer perceptions of 
the service and are also of concern to marketing management. Performance, people and 
process are inseparable in many service industries and shipping is no exception. 
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Each of the 7 P's must be considered when formulating a marketing plan as ignoring any of 
them could influence its overall success or failure. The specific marketing mix adopted will 
vary according to circumstances, and the mix must be reshaped in response to changing market 
needs. There is much overlap and interaction between various components of the mix and 
dedsions cannot be made on one component without considering the effects upon the others. 
Also the precise nature and impact of elements in the mix and their importance at any one time 
will vary. 
Cowell (1991) also points out that the marketing mix for services should be used with caution 
because it is intuitively rather than empirically based. Borden (1965) indicates that arriving at 
the marketing mix is both an art and a science - a theory supported by Cannon (1980). 
Marketing managers need to undertake research in the markets for which their respective 
marketing mixes are shaped. 
In practice the content of marketing plans varies considerably although a key element in any 
planning will be the development of an effective marketing strategy. McDonald (1980) 
supports the theory that this involves two related tasks, namely selecting a target market, then 
developing a "marketing mix" for each market. 
A m^or task of marketing management is to blend the elements of the mix so as to meet the 
needs of each target market. This process must take account of other variables such as 
resources and objectives of the enterprise, and aspects of the external environment. 
Formulation of a marketing strategy for services must also take into account some of the 
unique aspects of services such as : 
(i). the intangible nature of a service may make consumer choice more difiScult 
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(ii). inseparability of the producer and the service may localise service marketing and 
restrict consumer choice; whilst 
(iii). perishability prevents storage of the service and adds risk and uncertainty to service 
marketing (Bessom and Jackson 1975) 
As discussed earlier, a marketing mix can provide a method of structuring an analysis of a 
company's position. Hence the marketing mix for Polish Ocean Lines requires carefiil 
consideration in order to assess any repositioning strategies. When a firm or provider 
establishes and maintains a distinctive place for itself and its offerings in the market, it is said 
to be successfully positioned. In the increasingly competitive service sector, eflFective 
positioning is one of marketing's most critical tasks. 
Positioning is important because it relates to diflferentiation, commonly recognised as the key 
point of successfiil marketing, it forces difl&cult decisions that focus upon the key areas, it has 
the potential to make the consumers' selection task easier, and it can help the company to 
acquire and retain the position of market leader within its industry, or at the other end of the 
spectrum, to survive substantial external change (Green and Tull 1978). 
POSITIONING METHODS 
So far this chapter has only hinted at the methods which might be used to measure this type 
of positional change, or might be adapted for such a use. If the repositional activities of POL's 
liner sector are to be compared with those of the EC competitors, then a 'measurement' 
method will be needed. These methods fall into two broad groups - quantitative and 
qualitative - which will now be discussed in greater detail. (It should be noted that the 
references used in some of the following sections stem in particular from the 1970's, reflecting 
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the limited amount of research carried out in these areas in recent years.) 
Quantitative 
Quantitative methods may be fiirther divided into the foUowing sections:-
(i). Spatial Representation 
Methods for spatial representation of structures in data are continuing to appear in ever 
increasing number and variety and many of these have the potential for application to positional 
measurement. The confiision that this creates has been aggravated by the widespread 
introduction of completely different trade names for what are slightly different variants of 
already existing methods. Papers that report the use of "proximity analysis", "smallest space 
analysis" "elastic multidimensional scaling", "Kruscal's M-D-SCAL program", Guttman-
Lingoes SSAI", or "TORSCA" are all referring to basically the same type of analysis - namely 
the kind of non-metric multidimensional scaling originally introduced and perfected by Shepard 
(1962a, 1962b) and Kruscal (1964a, 1964b). All of these terms refer to specific methods or 
particular computer programs that share the following three properties:-
a. they are based upon the same basic model (one that assumes a monotonic relation 
between interpoint distances and the given data); 
b. they use an iterative procedure of adjusting the coordinates for the points to achieve 
a closer and closer approximation to this desired monotonic relation; 
c. they yield spatial representations that are typically indistinguishable, for practical 
purposes, when applied to the same matrix of data. 
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Alternatively, papers that report the use of "multidimensional scalogram analysis", "parametric 
mapping", Kruscal's "MONANOVA" or Carroll's "INDSCAL" are referring to quite different 
types of analyses based upon fiindamentally different models concerning the relation between 
the data and the spatial representation (Shepard et al 1972). 
In 1972 Wind and Robinson outlined the basic concept behind multidimensional scaling 
techniques. They stated that a market could be percdved as a multidimensional space in which 
individual brands are positioned. A product's positioning is determined from its position on 
the relevant dimensions of the similarity space, its position on the various attribute vectors (if 
a joint space analysis is und^taken), and its position v^th respect to other brands, as might be 
obtained through a cluster analysis. 
Structural Mapping 
Structural mapping, a derivative of Multi Dimensional Scaling was proposed in a series of 
papers by Rivett (1977a, 1977b, 1978 and 1980) and Clarke and Rivett (1978), where two 
methods have been suggested for classifying multi-objective policies. These in turn could be 
adapted to classify and measure the position of companies within an industrial market, since 
the original idea of using structural mapping to assess public policies is similar to the concept 
of commercial service positioning. The first method is to use indifference among policies as 
input to a multidimensional scaling (MDS) algorithm in order to produce a structural map. 
The indiflference refer to the attractiveness of the consequences, or impacts of the policies, (and 
potCTtially therefore, the attractiveness or impact of company service position) and are derived 
by the analyst's own judgement of the data. No formal arithmetic rules are applied. The 
indifferences are used as input to the MDS algorithm to generate a map. The map is 
interpreted to give an ordering of the policies or positions. Multidimensional scaling 
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techniques are concerned primarily with the spatial representation of relationships among 
behavioural data (Green 1970, Luck, Wales, Taylor and Rubin 1982, Coxon 1982, Davison 
1983, Cox and Cox 1994). 
Full details of the multidimensional scaling method or structural mapping are given in Rivett's 
papers, but it is evident that there is a heavy reliance on subjectivity for classifying the policies 
or attributes of product or service prior to input into the MDS algorithm. Although Rivett 
argues that this prior intervention is a strength, Massam (1982) believes it a limiting factor. 
The policy or service attribute indiflFerence table is formulated on the basis of judgement of 
values in the initial impact matrix. Several analysts are likely to produce diflFerent sets of 
indiflFerence, as might one analyst on diflFerent occasions. Also, subjective judgement has to 
be used to determine the best and worst parts of the multidimensional space in order to 
produce a ranking of the policies. A multidimension scaling map has no preferred orientation. 
DiflFerent analysts may make diflFerent suggestions and a formal criterion is needed to judge 
each one -a benchmark, or hypothetical best or worst policy, may provide a solution. 
Utility Values 
The second method used by Rivett (1977a, 1977b, 1978 and 1980) is an adaptation of 
structural moping and employs an additive utility model. In this approach the initial data are 
convrated to a set of personal attribute utility values. These are summed to give each policy 
or service attribute a final score, and the policies or attributes are ordered on the basis of these 
final scores. This provides little extra objectivity to the original Rivett methods. 
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Lexicographic ordering 
This technique can be used to search for a best policy from a set of alternative policies using 
several criteria (Massam 1980), and can be adapted to provide a ranking of company position 
on a series of attributes such as price and promotion. It requires criteria to be ordered from 
the most to the least important, and each alternative poli^r or position receives a score for each 
critfflion, in terms of its position achieving or moving towards a particular company objective 
in the market. The scores allow comparisons to be made, and the lexicographic principle of 
ordering by the first significant difference is used. The alternatives are compared first with 
reelect to the most important criterion. The dominant criterion is declared to be the best. If 
policies or positions tie for best they are compared using the scores on the second most 
important criterion. This process is continued down the ranked list of criteria until only one 
alternative remains. This is the best as it has received the maximum number of highest scores 
on the criteria. 
Difficulties with lexicographic ordering include the lack of information about the magnitude 
of the difference between criteria. Also there is no account of the magnitude of the difference 
between the scores for policies or attributes on each criterion. There is no way in the method 
to trade off scores among criteria, which is perhaps the greatest weakness of lexicographic 
ordering as a method for determining the best policy. 
The requirement for ordering the criteria is valid but by making it a necessary precondition to 
the analysis many types of data cannot be used. A method has been devised which attempts 
to get around this requisite. Using every possible ordering of criteria means that overall the 
criteria will be considered equal and there is no dominant order. This allows policies or 
positions which are dominant on several criteria to be identified. 
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Overall, lexicographic ordering does not produce a complete ranking of all the alternatives and 
does not indicate the degree of difference between the tabled ranks which represent the closest 
q)proximation to a summary of relative attractiveness. However it may be used as a guideline 
to indicate the most desirable position for a company where a set of alternatives is presented. 
(ii). Multivariate Analyses 
Multivariate analyses with potential application to positioning fall into two main types, as 
follow: 
Factor Analysis 
Although a very old and well tested technique, Stewart (1981) pioneered the use of this 
approach for tackling multi-criteria policy choice problems, such as that presented by the 
introduction of a positioning strategy. The positional policy choice problem is similar to the 
traditional classification problems addressed by factor analysis, in that each alternative policy 
can be regarded as a case, with the impact values as the observations on each variable. The 
variables are the criteria used for evaluating the positional policies. The purpose of this 
approach is to reduce a complex array of data to a format that will help identify the relative 
attractiveness of alternative positional policies. Factor Analysis could be used in positional 
assessment (and therefore measurement) by creating a series of factors fi^om the criteria that 
are used to indicate position (such as price and promotion) which are composite and will thus 
overcome the problem of comparing and combining criteria with different scales, metrics or 
no metric at all. Its drawback in this research, other than the extensive debate that has 
surrounded its use and validity over the years (Nijkamp 1979, Stewart 1981), is that it requires 
large quantities of data on each criterion (for example, sizeable sets of prices over many 
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companies; or prices of many products for one company), to produce statistically reliable 
information. The context and structure of this research cannot fiilfill this requirement as it is 
examining poationing of a limited number of products (for example 20\40\ reefer containers 
with a limited number of market segmented products) in a single market. Thus, despite 
potential it cannot be used. Its application has most potential where the data set is one of 
customer opinion on company product, and not the product itself 
Concordance Analysis 
This is a formal arithmetic procedure by which multicriteria policies can be classified, and thus 
product or service provision, and the results are used as input for a multidimensional scaling 
algorithm. This could be used to indicate favourable positions and their related strategies. The 
general procedure is similar to that of Rivett's structural mapping approach, except that the 
policies are classified objectively rather than subjectively. For reasons stated earlier this is seen 
as a preferable methodology. Concordance analysis is a technique whereby all possible pairs 
of poUcies are compared with regard to their impact for each criterion, and a concordance 
index is calculated for every pairwise comparison. 
The concordance indices are summarised on a concordance matrix, which will be square with 
the policies on position on each axis. This matrix can be interpreted to determine the relative 
attractiveness of the policies by calculating a row sum scale, but it is more accurate to 
transform the matrix into a dissimilarity matrix which can then be input into a multidimensional 
scaling algorithm. The use of a benchmark is helpful in classifying the alternatives in the 
multidimensional space. Problems again emerge in this research context because of the type 
of data required by the technique and that available. 
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Evaluation of the advantages and disadvantages of the various techniques are uncommon, 
although McAllister (1980) looked at the overall framework of the appraisal process (and its 
application to positional problems) and produced a checklist of criteria by which to judge 
alternative methods. This list was studied by Massam and Askew (1982) who made the 
following comments:-
Factor analysis appears to be an unsatisfactory procedure, as not all the available 
information is used - much is discarded to simplify the analysis. Stewart (1981) shows 
that factor analysis can break down on problems where there are fewer alternatives 
than criteria - as would be the case in this research. 
Lexicographic ordering is also at fault through not necessarily considering all the 
informatioa It has the advantage of allowing the decision maker to assign an ordering 
to the criteria, but using ordinal information means that the magnitude of the 
differences between ranks is not known, and the lexicographic principle can result in 
only the first few criteria being considered. 
Of the two methods proposed by Rivett, the use of indifference and utility values have 
drawbacks as follows:- Firstly, in both cases, the use of a subjective interpretation of 
the data prior to an objective analytic technique would seem to undermine the validity 
of using the technique (MDS algorithm and summation). Secondly, both methods 
assume that the analyst can perceive correctly the marginal rates of substitution 
between the criteria. For the indifference method this would be intuitive, but the utility 
value method needs commensurability between the scales by which the criteria are 
measured to allow the summation to be possible. A usual additive utility model 
achieves this by data normalisation (Rivett 1980), but the subjective approach is 
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dependent again on the analyst's intuition. Together these two methods violate two 
principles of decision making procedures. Being subjective they are unsystematic and 
non-replaceable; further, the nature of the procedures make the data analyst also a 
decision maker as the two roles are necessarily inseparable here. 
None of the problems discussed here appear to apply to the concordance analysis 
method. It is objective, permits incommensurable scales, and utilises all the given data. 
It allows sfflisitivity analyses to be easily included through varying different aspects of 
the procedure and presents the set of best positional pohcies in a way that indicates the 
relative attractiveness of all the policies. Further, disaggregation of the data to indicate 
the distributional characteristics of the impacts can be readily incorporated into the 
procedure. The ability of a procedure to compare poUcies, or positions, according to 
the individual groups or sectors of the population affected, is an important quality. 
However, it remains inappropriate due to the statistical requirements of the technique 
compared with the availability of data. 
Further problems associated with quantitative techniques which could be appUed to 
positioning, include the much discussed areas of measurement and valuation:-
Measurement: Massam (1980) argues that while judgement, opinion and intuition may be 
called upon to defend a choice, a stronger case can be made if indisputable 
measurements are available to show the advantages of a particular selection. 
He points out that not all individuals have the same point of view and make 
the same kinds of trade-offs among the various elements involved in 
comparing alternatives. Measurement is not always possible as there may be 
indirect effects which require consideration but may not be easily identifiable. 
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Similarly, there may be some eflFects which are difficult to measure in a 
meaningful way, for example marketing strategies, workforce attitudes and 
quality of service. 
Valuation:- Once each aspect has been measured, the positional measurement must be 
converted into a common metic. This presents further problems, for example, 
how to commonly value time, risk, pollution, views, attitudes, prices and so on. 
The common element of all the methods reviewed so far is that they aim to present a set of 
better positional policies from a larger set of feasible alternatives. As such the methods may 
be seen as sieving devices for reducing the set of feasible alternatives, rather than as a means 
of identifying the best position. The most appropriate method needs to be comprehensive, 
systematic, simple and quick, and be an aid in the decision making process. Massam and 
Askew suggested that concordance analysis and multidimensional scaling meet these criteria, 
but remain fraught with difQculties. 
Wind and Robinson (1972) agreed that MDS techniques were especially suited to the 
portraying of the perceived position of a product. Moreover, they stated that nonmetric MDS 
scaling and clustering techniques utilise data that need only be rank ordered which facilitates 
the respondent's task and places the burden of analysis on the researcher. 
In discussing the concept and measurement of positioning they described a number of studies 
in \^ iiich multidimensional scaling procedures were used to determine the product's marketing 
position. The use of MDS techniques to measure positioning is further supported by Green 
and McMennamin (1973), Kotler (1971) and TuU and Hawkins (1980). However, there are 
a number of problems associated with the techniques, such as the lack of any satisfactory 
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statistical methods available to determine the dimensionality of MDS solutions (Jain, Pinson 
and Ratchford 1982). More specifically in the case of this research - the study of POL's 
position - the technique is notably unsuitable for the following reasons:-
(i). Consumo* preferences and perceptions are of limited relevance, as the market is often 
regulated, being controlled by agreements such as those on the Trans Atlantic and by 
state intervention, 
(ii). Differences in the carriers are unclear to many consumers as the market is fixed, and 
there is often no direct contact between POL or other operators and the consumer, as 
agents are used, 
(iii). The existence of fixed market shares, fixed prices, agreements and contracts prohibits 
the use of MDS. 
(iv). The changes taking place throughout East Europe, which include political, social and 
economic issues, are driving POL to reposition its product rather than it being market 
led by consumers. This suggests that we need to apply a service marketing approach 
within the context of these changes. 
However, Massam and Askew emphasised that each of the methods outlined should only be 
used as aids in the choice of an optimal positional policy. Meanwhile, all the techniques suffer 
from measurement and valuation problems which stem directly from their quantitative 
ambitions. Hence the qualitative approach. 
Qualitative 
Qualitative techniques are analytical, non quantitative methods for examining project proposals 
or company strategies. In terms of assessing position and positional strategy for a company 
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in the market place, most qualitative approaches are derived fi^om project and plan evaluation 
methods orig^ting in the public sector where the difiSculties of aggregating disparate criteria 
are substantial. Similar problems are met in measuring company positional strategy and hence 
there are opportunities to use the techniques in attempting to assess the changes occurring at 
Polish Ocean Lines. The position evaluation or policy choice problem may be simply stated. 
Given a set of alternative positions, evaluation and assesanrait are concerned with the selection 
of one of the alternatives that best fulfils the objectives of the company. The traditional 
approach to this type of evaluation is the cost-benefit method as used by Pearce and Nash 
(1981), Walshe and DafiFem (1990), and Layard and Glaister (1994). This could be adapted 
to assess positional strategies of a company to give a valuation of each. Cost-benefit 
evaluation involves a tabulation of all the benefits and costs of strategy or project, followed 
by a comparison of the sum total of all the benefits and costs, m order to arrive at an estimate 
of value. Although in a theoretical sense the cost-benefit method would seem to provide a 
potential solution to positional measurement, in practice it suffers fi-om the following 
difficulties :-
(i). It is difficult to evaluate intangible criteria (for example, corporate image). The 
estimation of the intangible benefits can often distort the whole value estimation 
process, 
(ii). The expense of obtaining all of the benefit and cost data needed to apply the benefit 
and cost method is often prohibitive, 
(iii). Cost-benefit analysis is not easily related to indirect costs of related projects or 
programmes, 
(iv). It is difficult to allow for various uncertainties of implementation in cost-benefit 
analysis. 
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(v). Problems of measurement and valuation (including pricing of intangible items) are 
predominant, as noted earlier. 
If another method is to represent an improvement over cost benefit analysis it must overcome 
to some degree the difSculties listed. What is needed is a method that would handle intangible 
benefits and indirect costs with less data collection, analysis effort and spurious objectivity 
(Schlager 1968). 
Planning balance sheet approach 
The planning balance sheet (PBS) attempts to overcome some of the weaknesses of the cost 
benefit analysis method. The PBS stresses the importance of recording all impacts, whether 
monetary or not, and analysing the distribution of impacts. Although originally designed for 
town planning issues, it is appropriate for adapting to company positional analysis as it 
attempts to measure and assess the variables that describe a multi facetted situation. 
PBS is a method for conducting systematic evaluations devised by Lichfield (1960, 1964, 
1966,1969,1970,1975) and applied by him on several occasions to town and regional plans 
in Great Britain. In PBS, as in CBA, impacts are measured in non technical terms and 
estimated where possible by scientific methods. However in contrast to CBA the evaluator 
is given Avide latitude in making judgemental estimates because PBS seeks to determine 
impacts at a more detailed level, which therefore is less amenable to scientific estimation 
procedures. 
Impacts are converted into monetary figures whenever possible, but other impacts are also 
recorded. This means that an overall aggregated assessment cannot be calculated. Instead, 
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the user is required to determine the alternative most advantageous to the planner or 
company's interest for each impact category. Thus the rating method yields a set of simple 
sub-indices: one for each impact category (McAllister 1980). In positional terms it could be 
used to assess the numerous and diverse criteria that reflect a company's approach to the 
market, whilst attempting to measure or value them all. 
Matrices 
Matrix evaluation techniques are the most formalised of the alternatives to cost-benefit 
analysis. Numerous derivations exist each of which possess two major characteristics:-
(i). The type and size of the impacts/policy, are listed in disaggregated form and 
occasionally also in terms of individuals or groups upon whom the impacts fall. 
(ii). The impacts are then weighted with relative values so that they can be compared to 
one another and some matrix of performance can be derived. Alternatives are selected 
on the basis of this index. 
Matrix construction is carried out by placing alternatives in the horizontal axis, and objectives 
in the vertical axis. The measures of how the alternatives perform in relation to the objectives 
are placed in the cells. This simple process can be elaborated or simplified in a variety of ways 
to suit particular circumstances. A number of different evaluation matrix techniques have been 
proposed and these have been detailed by Lichfield (1970) as:-
Bending on 
This is a process developed in the UK whereby the ideal form is agreed upon and then 
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alternative plans are tested to see how well they conform. Often social and economic 
objectives are formulated then tested. The best is then selected and 'bent on' to the actual 
situation in question having due regard to the opportunities and constraints. 
Th^e exists only a tenuous link between objectives and the ideal form and there is no certainty 
that the bent on' version is better or worse than the one rejected. Costs are ignored, 
producers and consumers are not distinguished, nor are the costs falling on them. There is 
little reference to incidence and benefits are not accurately measured. Although potentially 
q)plicable to positioning the failure of the technique to be comprehensive, accurate or specific 
in its recommendations makes it inappropriate. 
Policy Evaluation Matrix 
This technique was devised by Kreditor (1967), and compares more directly the objectives for 
the actual plan or company strategy proposals. Alternatives are ranked against a series of 
objectives to show whether each is affected directly, marginally, negatively or not at all. 
Altogether this gives a quaUtative visual ranking. This is usefiil but there is no explicit 
distinction made between costs and benefits, and it is not comprehensive in its consideration 
of objectives, nor of incidence. 
Goals Achievement Matrix (GAM) 
This is the most well known and sophisticated matrix approach and was developed by Hill 
(1960,1968,1973). It resembles the Policy Evaluation Matrix of Kreditor but the whole issue 
of objectives is more carefully considered. It was devised as a response to the deficiencies Hill 
saw in Planning Balance Sheet Analysis and Cost Benefit Analysis. 
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Kucharzyk (1977) outlined the main characteristics of GAM as follows:-
(i).. All objectives are specified in advance of both the design of alternative plans and the 
analysis of their consequences; 
(ii). The objectives involved are multi-dimensional; 
(iii). GAM is designed to compare mutually exclusive plans or company positions; 
(iv). The selected objectives are assigned weights to reflect relative importance, prior to 
actual evaluation. Information for these weights may have to be obtained from 
attitudinal and behavioral studies; 
(v). Alternatives are measured in terms of the extent to which they allow progress towards 
or away from each objective; 
(vi). There is no conversion of scores to a common monetary base. This problem is shifted 
to objective weighting and index choice; 
(vii). It allows for the effects on different groups to be evaluated and distributional issues can 
be covered. 
In effect. Hill's GAM displays a substantial quantity of information, but it can also be used to 
decide between alternatives. Three major types of method exist:-
(i). Goals achievement account - Here there is no synthesis of information at all. The 
decision about the best alternative is left to the decision maker entirely. 
(ii). Weighted index of Goals Achievement - the combined weight of the objectives and 
their incidence is assigned to the measures of achievement of the objectives. The 
weighted indices of goals achievement are then summed and the preferred alternative 
is that with the largest index. This provides a good summary of information and a 
comparison of alternatives is easily carried out; however it does tend to hide much that 
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might be usefiil. Also there is doubt whether such disparate factors can be combined, 
(iii). Goals achievement transformation functions - AckoflE'(1962) has proposed a method 
for relating outcomes measured in different units to avoid some problems confronted 
when aggregating measures using different units of measurement. However it is a 
method with many practical problems. 
Hill (1972) discussed the advantages he felt would arise from adoption of the GAM which are 
summarised as follows:-
(i). It expresses the complexity of the consequences, and the use of all available 
information enables more rational decisions to be made, 
(ii). It is an improvement in many ways upon PBSA or cost-benefit analysis techniques, 
(iii). GAM includes both qualitative and quantitative aspects, 
(iv). It can be usefully applied and compared with standards, and the costs of reaching such 
standards can be determined, 
(v). The weighting of alternatives and objectives gives the method inherent flexibility. 
Hill also pointed out the disadvantages and problems associated with applying GAM which can 
be summarised as:-
(i). It cannot determine whether a project should be executed or not. 
(ii). The GAM is designed for plans in a single functional sector, and remains of limited 
application as a result, in the evaluation of programmes which include 
recommendations for projects in several sectors, 
(iii). The paradigm of rational planning upon which GAM is based, is rarely found. 
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(iv). Problems exist in the simultaneous analysis of costs and benefits relating to qualitative 
and quantitative objects since these are fi'equently measured on differing types of scales 
- ordinal, interval and ratio. 
(v). It is difiScuh to determine weights objectively, and this is the key to decision making 
in the GAM. 
(vi). There is the problem of obtaining su£5cient reliable data to make the method workable. 
Many of these problems are also suffered by the m^ority of techniques which could be applied 
to positional assessment, and overall, are not solely confined to GAM but to matrix evaluation 
techniques in general (Roe 1980). Any form of matrix technique makes simplifying 
assumptions and the results cannot be treated as sacrosanct. They produce no more than best 
estimates - although this must not detract fi"om the need to be rigorous in their development. 
Chmara and Langley (1973) concluded that the matrix is a useful conceptual fi^amework within 
which a detailed assessment methodology can be developed. The important issue is how the 
matrix is used and how scales, scores and weighting can be selected for incorporation into it. 
If the limitations associated with the selection of these factors are recognised, then the matrix 
approach provides a usefiil tool in evaluating a project, proposed investment, or positional 
strategy. It is flexible, allows political weighting to be introduced, can accommodate any 
number of factors and can be varied in form so that any particular consequences (eg. cost, 
safety) can be emphasised. Finally its emphasis on goals means that the achievements of any 
strat^y are closely related to the original aims of the decision-makers, and this in turn, helps 
to ensure a more rational decision-making process. 
Frameworks 
The use of the fi:Bmework - essentially a derivative of a matrix approach - in plan and project 
98 
^praisal has been demonstrated by the UK Department of Transport (1977) who concluded 
that whilst current methods of scheme appraisal based on cost benefit analysis were sound as 
far as they went, they believed the assessment to be unbalanced and suggested a shift of 
emphasis in the whole approach. They stated that it was unsatisfactory that the assessment 
should be so dominated by those factors which are susceptible to valuation in money terms, 
and they believed it to be inadequate to rely simply on a checklist to comprehend 
environmental factors. Positioning assessment faces the same sort of multi facetted problems 
and hence fi'ameworks offer a potential solution. 
The Department believed that the right approach is through a comprehensive fi^amework, 
relying on judgement, which embraces all the fectors involved in scheme assessment; also, that 
such a fi"ameworic should be employed fi"om the earliest planning stages of a scheme. Extensive 
examples of framework usage can be found in the October 1979 report of the Standing 
Advisory Committee on Trunk Road Assessment (SACTRA 1979). 
As a display method, a fi^amework is a matrix structure which Usts elements on the vertical 
axis, with scenarios on the horizontal. Information is then sorted into the appropriate section 
of the fi-amework, enabling all results to be displayed. 
In a marketing context. Wind (1982) fluther supports the use of display techniques such as the 
fi:ameworlc to measure position, where consumer evaluations of a set of brands are unavailable 
or inappropriate, as is the case in the context of this research. 
The inherent problems involved with quantitative techniques, combined with a basic lack of 
specific, quantifiable data available to the research being undertaken, have led to the rejection 
of these methods for repositioning in favour of qualitative techniques, as supported by Bagozzi 
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(1994). Of these, the most fevourable is the framework analysis which, although not faultless, 
has been successfully used in previous transport planning situations (Department of Transport 
1977,1979). The use of display techniques is supported by Voodg (1983) who highlighted 
Chadwick's (1971) criticism of'reductio ad absurdum' of the qualities of an alternative into 
one single number, and stated that it is necessary that important distinctions and differences 
are kept intact in a presentation. As well as the multicriteria planning carried out by Voodg, 
display techniques have been used widely in Environmental Impact Analysis - for example 
relating to major European transport projects in the European Community - where the state 
of knowledge and the techniques will often only permit a qualitative assessment (Department 
of the Environment (1976) and Clarke and Herington (1988)). Friend and Hicklmg (1987) 
provide numerous fiirther examples of the use of display techniques in the area of strategic 
planning. 
The qualitative techniques are analytically descriptive, but the framework approach allows all 
types of available data to be taken into account and enables comparisons to be made between 
company positions whilst not excluding quantitative information. It avoids the pitfalls of the 
quantitative approaches, with their rather spurious objectivity, in attempting to measure and 
aggregate positional criteria, and provides a qualitative approach that retains detail whilst 
facilitates comparison and analysis. Quantitative measurement is both impossible and 
impractical for this research, since we are assessing a wide range of multivariate company 
activities, not those of consumer opinion, so that only relative movements and positions can 
be shown in this final stage. It is suggested that the key discussion areas for research into the 
repositioning of POL are isolated by the 7 P's, which provide structure to the research. 
Lovelock endorsed this theory in 1984, by stating that positioning, or repositioning, involved 
each element of the marketing mix. In chapter six, a framework will be used to provide a 
model for PoUsh Ocean Lines and its market positional change from 1988 to 1992. 
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Information for the frameworks was gathered during a number of personal, or individual 
intCTviews as described by Green, Tull and Albraum (1988) and Bagozzi (1994). According 
to Payne (1982) such interviews can provide usefiil information for product positioning 
decisions. The interviews were carefully structured for consistent research (Patton 1987, 
Adams and Schvaneveldt 1991, Babbie 1992). Prior to each interview an interview schedule 
was prepared (Baker 1994). Similar to a questionnaire, an interview schedule is a list of 
questions to be asked, prepared in such a manner that the questions are asked in exactly the 
same way of every respondent. Examples of the question areas set out prior to each interview 
can be seen in appendix 5. This form of research is often referred to as standardised 
interviewing (McNeill 1990). 
A potential problem area identified in chapter one was that of language barriers. It was 
suggested that research into the area of East Europe might be hampered to some extent due 
to communication problems, particularly relevant when contemplating interviews as a method 
of collecting information, but also potentially of significance when reviewing published and 
unpublished literature. However, no such problems were encountered. All respondents were 
found to speak fluent English due to the fact that this is shipping's international language, 
whilst the large majority of literature was similarly in the English language. 
After the interviews the discourse was analysed, and the responses were applied to the 
fiBmework (Bryman and Burgess 1994). Although, as with all qualitative methods, this may 
give rise to some bias, this has been acknowledged in the research, and where possible 
accommodated - unlike quantitative methods it is transparent in its assumptions. 
Having achieved a framework analysis for POL the technique will be repeated for its 
competitors who are based in the European Community. This will then enable some form of 
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positioning comparison to be made. The comparison will be carried out using a ftirther 
variation of the matrix approach which has been developed by the author as no suitable 
technique exists. There will be no attempt to quantify any positional movement, rather a 
display and interpretation of the results. The use of qualitative approaches, and particularly 
matrices is supported throughout this thesis, and hence maintains consistency. 
For reasons discussed earlier, and again to maintain consistency throughout the research, we 
will use the seven Fs of the marketing mix to provide structure to the comparison. The seven 
P's for POL will form one axis on the two dimensional matrix, whilst the seven P's for the 
European Community competitors form the other. Having input information for POL in 1988 
and the end of 1992, and the position of European Community competitors for the later date, 
we can then look at the comparison within each cell in turn until every combmation has been 
achieved. For reasons of simplification and comparison a single general position will be 
provided to represent the majority position of all of the European Community competitors. 
This will enable us to display the resuhs and will help to indicate the position of POL relative 
to the European Community competitors as well as showing any movements which have taken 
place by using arrows. Major anomalies in European Community position will be discussed 
in the text. 
The complete research outline can be seen in figure 4, showing the models to be used at each 
stage. Having discussed the methodology for this research we can now look to 
operationalising each area, which will begin in the following chapter with the contextual model. 
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The economy of Eastern Europe 
before recent political, 
social and economic change. 
East European Change 
The industrial and -*-
commercial impact 
Assessment of main impacts 
on the maritime industries 
Shipping industry response 
to change 
f 
Competition framework in the — 
new environment - with 
particular reference to the 
European Community shipping industry 
A comparison of European Community -*— 
and East European shipping strategies using a 
case study market 
Model One: 
Contextual Model 
Model Two: 
Contextual Matrix Model 
Model Three: 
Framework One 
! 
Model Four: 
Framework Two 
Model Five: 
Positional Comparative 
Matrix Model 
Figure 4: The Research Outline - showing model structure and interrelationships 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE CONTEXTUAL MODEL 
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In this chapter we will develop the contextual model to help identify the main issues affecting 
Polish shipping. Before this, we will examine the economic background to the Polish situation. 
Abroad analysis of Polish economic developments formed part of chapter two, but it is helpfiil 
here to examine the country's recent economic trends in a Uttle fiirther detail. The following 
figures of key economic indicators provide an essential background to the maritime 
developments which have occurred since the mid to late 1980's. 
1982 
84.82 
1987 
265.08 
1988 
430.55 
1989 
1439.18 
1990 
9500.0 
1991 
10576.0 
1992 
15500.0 
Exchange rate / US$ (average zloties) 
Source: Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) April 1992 
These figures represent a dramatic fall in the value of the zloty and mean that foreign goods 
have become increasingly expensive and Polish demand for them has fallen. The resulting 
decline in imports and hopefiiUy, rise in exports, has had a consequent impact upon the 
shipping industry, amongst a number of other effects. 
1985 
29.7 
1986 
33.5 
1987 
39.2 
1988 
39.2 
1989 
38.9 
1990 
46.6 
1991 
46.5 
Gross Hard Currency Debt ($bn) 
Source: Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) 1992 
1982 
25,900 
1987 
42,620 
1988 
42,146 
1989 
43,029 
1990 
49,386 
1991 
38,604 
1992 
40,554 
Total foreign indebtedness ($mn) 
Source EIU April 1992 
These two sets of figures show a considerable overall rise in Poland's debt between 1982 and 
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1992. This has placed pressure upon the economy, meaning that finance is no longer readily 
available for public expenditure - for example on improvements to transport infi'astructure 
(including vessel renewal) which are needed by the shipping industry to increase 
competitiveness. 
1989 
1-
1990 
6.6 
1991 
11.4 
1992 
12 + 
Unemployment (%) 
NB: - less than 
+ more than 
Sources: GUS, Warsawa 1990, FT 3/2/92, Guardian 6/2/92, Ind 23/4/92, ESCEC 14/5/90 
The rising unemployment figures have both positive and negative effects upon the shipping 
industry. Firstly, higher levels of unemployment mean there is greater competition for jobs. 
Companies have a wider choice of employees and workers are usually wilUng to accept lower 
wages. On the negative side rising unemployment and lower wages mean that the demand for 
products falls, and with it the derived demand for shipping. 
Poland 
1.35 
GB 
10.56 
USA 
13.90 
Czechoslovakia 
2.05 
Hungary 
1.70 
Average cost of one man hour in 1990 ($) 
Source: ESCEC 14/5/90 
In Apt\[ 1992 the average Polish wage was officially recorded as being just below $180 per 
month (Independent 23/04/92). 
The figures indicate low wage rates in relation to other countries, especially those in the west. 
This again has twofold implications for the shipping industry. Firstly low wages mean low 
demand for products, particularly those which are imported and therefore comparatively 
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ejqjensive. This in turn means low demand for domestic shipping. Alternatively, the shipping 
companies need only pay their employees low wages, which keeps costs down and may 
provide some competitive advantage in the international market. 
1980 
9 
1981 
21 
1982 
105 
1983 
21 
1984 
15 
1985 
15 
1986 
18 
1987 
25 
1988 
61 
1989 
244 
1990 
585 
1991 
60 
Prices (percentage change on previous year - rounded to nearest figure) 
Sources: GUS Statistical yearbook, various years. EIU 1990 
1989 
700 - 1000 
1990 
180 
1991 
60.4 
1992 
45 
Inflation (%) 
Sources : Independent 6/3/92, Financial Times 6/4/92, ESCEC 14/5/90 
The price and inflation figures indicate substantial price rises throughout the 1980's and into 
the 1990's, with at times evidence of hyper-inflation. These mean a reduction in the demand 
for products and a consequent fall in demand for shipping and an erosion of standards of living 
through a fall in the value of savings and real wages. 
Output by industry, 1991 (% change on previous year) 
Private sector 25.4 
State sector -24.1 
These figures for 1991 indicate a substantial growth in the private sector which is newly 
emerging since the introduction of privatisation laws. This would produce positive benefits 
for shipping as it likely represents a rise in exports. However, the fall in state sector 
production may mean a fall in exports. It is possible here that the figures may be partly due 
to the privatisation of some state industries so that the net change in production is less 
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significant. 
1987 
2.0 
1988 
4.1 
1989 
0.2 
1990 
-12.0 
1991 
-2.0 
Real GDP - year on year percentage changes 
Source: EIU 1990 
The GDP figures denote year on year percentage changes in the market value of the Polish 
economy's domestically produced goods and services (Barro 1990), and represent in this case 
a decline in the economy (and associated standards of living) in Poland particularly during 
1990. Most recent indications are of a slight rise in standards during 1992, the first in East 
Europe since the changes. 
This selective economic data is not intended to produce a full picture but helps to provide a 
broad backgroimd against which other developments and particularly those in the maritime 
sector can be analysed. 
The methodology of contextual modelling was described in chapter three, and it is to the 
operationalisation of this model that we now turn our attention. For the purpose of this 
research the following contextual submodels can be identified as areas of change in East 
Europe which will have impacts upon the shipping industries:-
1. Political - examines the political changes taking place both in and outside Poland and 
their subsequent effects upon the shipping industry. 
2. Economic - looks at new methods of business, material prosperity and general 
economic changes taking place in Poland and the Polish shipping industry. 
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3. Spatial - concerns the geography of Poland and its hinterland and its influence upon the 
operation of the shipping industry. 
4. Technical - related to Poland's industrial condition and the effects upon and condition 
of the shipping industry. 
5. Managerial - examines levels of and attitudes towards management skills available in 
Poland, which affect the Polish shipping industry. 
6. Sodal - looks at the social changes in Poland, the effects of the recent political changes 
upon the Polish people, and subsequent social and economic effects upon the shipping 
industry. 
7. Legal - concerns changes in Polish law, which will have a direct effect upon the 
shipping industry, as well as changes in international maritime and non maritime laws. 
8. Organisational - related to changes within Polish institutions and their relationship with 
shipping. 
9. Environmental - examines the increasing pressure for shipping to take account of its 
environmental impact, particularly in the context of rising East European awareness. 
10. Logistical - concerns the requirement of shipping to adapt to changes in production 
techniques and delivery requirements, as part of a complete through service. 
Each of the above contexts is inter-related to varying degrees, and the relationships between 
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the various contexts must be logical and pragmatic in order to present a realistic analysis. In 
order to reveal and understand those interrelationships and to identify the most important 
issues and constraints it is necessary first to examine each context in greater detail. 
POLITICAL CONTEXT 
The pohtical situation in Poland is changing, with most movements towards a form of 
democracy recognised in Western Europe (The Economist 1/2/92). Consequently, this implies 
that those involved in the shipping industry cannot be ignored by government, as they not only 
make up part of the electorate, but also take decisions that affect the electorate both directly 
and indirectly. Perhaps more importantly, democracy involves a transfer of decision making 
to place authority with individuals, groups and shipping companies, which will call for 
fundamental changes in day to day operations. 
The other political impacts of shipping such as in employment, and satisfying industrial 
requirements will be key issues when considering future changes. Shipping is not only a major 
employer but also serves a multitude of other industries which will be affected by any changes 
to the shipping industry. 
In the political context shipping is also in competition with numerous other sectors of the 
economy. Shipping is not always seen as a key issue and often has a low public profile. It may 
suffer a lack of recognition and attention, as the government is more likely to want to be seen 
concaitrating on issues that are more popular with or precious to the electorate, such as health 
care, education and housing. Hence shipping may suffer firom neglect in terms of investment, 
and this combined with shipping's diminishing role in earning hard currency and enforcing state 
security will reduce the significance of the sector even further. 
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The ronoval of security / spying issues relating to shipping is an important political issue. The 
European Community believed that Eastern bloc shipping had a common purpose of serving 
its own markets and that it performed dubious defence exercises (Bergstrand and Doganis 
1987). All vessds had a defence bias or alternative defence purpose, but with the removal of 
Communist state control this is no longer the case, and shipping is now able to concentrate on 
commercial activities. 
External political influences such as those from the European Community, Group of Seven 
(G7), European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), and the US, and national 
rejection of the ex-USSR, are encouraging Poland to follow a free market model which has 
both direct and indirect effects upon shipping, - one such example involves the US and the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) financial plans and encouragement to devalue the zloty. 
Political constituents of a new government and the relationship of shipping to the government 
will also have an impact upon the shipping industry. In 1991 Poland became divided between 
a multiplicity of small parties with little prospect of forming a stable coalition able to sustain 
an agreed programme (Financial Times 28/10/91 & 29/10/91), a problem that has continued 
through 1992. Changes therefore will be slow and chaotic affecting the shipping industry's 
rate and effectiveness of transition. For example to date there have been slow changes in laws 
relating to subsidy, prices, bankruptcy and privatisation as a direct consequence of the election 
results. 
The political decision of state withdrawal from many sectors including shipping both financially 
and from administration is intended to lead to increased competition between individual 
shipping companies and it is expected that a wide divergence in performance standards and 
services will emerge. (Lloyds List 11/10/91). 
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The need to relate market demands to shipping needs is a problem previously dealt with by the 
cfflitral planning organisation of the CMEA. Political withdrawal from the market means that 
in fiiture this will become a commercial issue, and shipping companies must learn to meet and 
react to market demands to survive in a competitive environment. 
OthCT political changes rdate to the formation of joint ventures. Examples of these from East 
Europe include deals between SeaLand and ex-Soviet transportation authorities (Fairplay 
31/5/90), Petromin and United Dutch Shipping Co (Lloyds List 31/10/91) as well as western 
ventures with Romline (Fairplay 12/7/90) - although there are few from Poland itself There 
are a number of reasons behind the formation of a joint venture; Western firms may look to the 
East to reduce costs, enter new business areas, share or obtain new expertise, acquire means 
of distribution, and penetrate domestic markets; East European objectives are diverse but 
include obtaining new technology, import substitution, access to modem production and 
management techniques, earning hard currency through exports and helping satisfy home 
demand (BOTE 1989, Seatrade Business Review 1989, Lloyds Shipping Economist 1990). 
Also joint ventures are seen as a good move politically both in the east and west, and the 
European Community and East European governments have encouraged their creation. In 
October 1991 Lloyds List reported that setting up a joint venture has been one of the only 
ways for cash starved Eastem bloc shipping companies to slow down the shrinking in the size 
of their fleets (Lloyds List 11/10/91). However as well as both sides seeing it as on one hand, 
a way forward, on the other it may be viewed as a "selling off of companies to the west" for 
little in return. 
Privatisation is considered in the organisational context (see below), but may also be used as 
a political tool. Privatisation is seen as being popular with the electorate and hence is publicly 
supported by the PoUsh government. It is however, argued that privatisation in the shipping 
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industiy is unlikely to occur for some time. Polish people do not have enough money to buy 
into such a capital expensive industry, and if foreign companies were allowed to buy, it is 
unlikely that they would want to, due to the lack of profits being generated in an industry 
v/h&e at present losses are being made. Despite this, Warsaw has included Polish Ocean Lines 
(POL), Polska Zeghiga Morska (PZM),the ports of Gdansk, Gdynia and Szczecin, ship repair 
yards and fishing companies, in a list of 400 companies throughout Poland which will be 
privatised as a priority (Fairplay 15/8/91). When, or if privatisation does occur in the maritime 
sector it will have direct effects at every level. 
ORGANISATIONAL CONTEXT 
One of the major organisational changes faced by the shipping industry involves the 
introduction of privatisation. Privatisation has implications for every level of operation. For 
example it may mean higher levels of company investment and increased competition leading 
to greater eflSciency. 
Internal shipping company structure is related to competition and co-ordination between 
departments, which are affected directly and indirectly by economic, social and administrative 
changes. Recent East European reforms will move towards eliminating cross subsidy between 
departments in state firms so that each must operate independently and thus eflBciently. Free 
maricet, privately owned companies will have to adopt similar, Westem style structures in order 
to survive. 
The organisational context also looks at the internal organisation of bodies related to shipping; 
these include shippers and industry, government ministries, freight forwarders, local 
authorities, unions and the labour force, ports, transport companies as well as banks and 
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finandal institutions. Changes to these organisations will have an effect upon the organisation 
of the shipping industry at the company and broader industrial levels. Any such changes will 
be rdated to issues ^ ch as privatisation, mergers, competition, and reorganisation along fi-ee 
market lines, each of which will have a direct organisational effect. 
Shipping must fit into the fi'ee market organisational model proposed for and imposed upon 
Poland in general by both outside and inside forces. Temporal issues must also be considered, 
which include the need for short term adaptation, the need for long term major structural 
change, political timescales and elections, social timescales concerning for example price 
inflation and consumer and electorate patience, shipping company timescales relating to profits 
and bankruptcy, as well as international debt, all of which have organisational implications 
within the firm. 
ECONOMIC CONTEXT 
Recent changes in Eastern Europe generally, and Poland in particular, have involved economic 
restructuring, with the introduction of fundamental changes to economic policy. 
The introduction of fi'ee maricet pricing policies will affect the maritime industries, as they will 
encourage a competitive environment for shipping and other sections of the economy, which 
should enhance eflBciency and may lead to cost cutting exercises as seen in the west, as well 
as the possibility of bankruptcy. The reduced costs likely to emerge due to competition are 
unlikely to outweigh cost increases caused by inflation as prices rise to a true level (for 
example in the CIS and Poland between 1990 and 1992). 
Inflation as an economic issue is likely to have an overall negative effect on shipping. 
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Increasing costs for example caused by reduced subsidy, the use of hard currency to pay for 
imports, and raised interest rates, will lead to price increases and a fall in disposable incomes. 
Subsequently demand will fall, followed by a fall in demand for shipping, due to its derived 
nature. Inflation has an indirect effect on shipping activities, as well as a direct impact in 
raising costs such as labour, fuel and maintenance. The cost increases Avill again mean that 
there is less capital available for investment. 
AnothCT economic policy involves the removal of subsidies from many industrial sectors. This 
will place new economic pressures upon shipping companies - for example they will have to 
finance new vessels from their own revenue, especially once privatised, and they will therefore 
need to be both competitive and profitable. Similarly the removal of indirect subsidies such 
as those related to building and power provision will push up costs. Also the removal of 
subsidies from goods will mean an increase in prices for items used by the shipping industry 
(Ernst and Young 1990). 
The economic issue of hard, convertible currency also needs to be considered. Shipping is a 
hard currency earner at present; it is used to buy foreign goods, which cannot be paid for using 
the soft currencies of the Eastern bloc. However the Polish zloty is moving towards 
convertibility and it has been suggested that it will become a fiilly convertible, hard currency 
by 1995 (ESCEC 1990) although most commentators think it unlikely to occur this quickly. 
If this is achieved foreign goods could be purchased using zlotys and businesses will be able 
to charge for Polish goods in zlotys. This will have two main impacts upon shipping - first it 
will no longer be interested in earning dollars at any cost by undercutting western competition, 
and second, prices will rise due to the zloty floating on the international exchange rate market; 
this in turn will lead to falling demand for goods and hence for shipping. Such a level of 
convertibility in other East European countries seems unlikely in the foreseeable fixture, 
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although some progress may be seen to be made in Hungary or the Czech Republic. 
Another economic change has been the slow introduction of privatisation, which looks likely 
to continue. Shipping could be affected relatively early because it may be one of the easier 
areas to privatise. Reasons for this include its attractiveness to westerners as it involves large 
capital assets with maikets attached; also shipping is in less financial difiSculty than many other 
industries. However, privatisation of the shipping industry may not occur in the immediate 
fliture for the reasons mentioned eailia* - that it is a capital intensive industry and there is little 
money available within Poland to invest. However, it is believed that privatised shipping 
companies would be more willing to invest in new technology needed to raise eflBciency and 
enhance competitiveness (Lloyds Shipping Economist 1990). Examples of privatisation 
schones in the maritime and related industries within Poland so far include deals at the Gdansk 
ship yard (Fairplay 10/5/90), Corona Ferry Lines, Euro-Afiica (Szczecin) and some road 
haulage operations (eg. Pekaes, Warsaw). 
Shipping is believed to be a major potential area for joint ventures and will be restructured to 
attract western investment. Polish objectives in joint ventures have been outlined above and 
should lead to improved shipping standards (BOTH 1989). 
Competition externally on cross-trades provides an economic challenge. Having to operate 
on the same principles as western companies for the first time means that Polish shipping 
companies will find it harder to compete on the cross trades. They will no longer be able to 
operate at less than cost with prices subsidised by the state, as it was widely believed they did 
under the old regime, but will have to operate commercially gaining profits through more 
eflBcient practices and lower labour costs. 
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Economic competition with other sectors for resources causes further problems. Shipping is 
increasingly likely to face competition for resources from other sectors of the economy such 
as manufacturing and energy. This has not been experienced in the past as the direction of 
resources was centrally controlled, artificial in its execution, and benefitted shipping which was 
seen as a profitable hard currency earning venture. 
Oil resources from the ex-Soviet Union have caused economic problems for Polish shipping. 
Since December 1989 the CIS has been delivering only 80% of the oil it has contracted to 
supply to Poland because of production diflBculties (ESCEC 1990 Poland). Trade relations 
between the CIS and Poland need to be reorganised, but the two countries are not prepared 
for the process, and the political and economic situation in the CIS is too chaotic at present. 
Initially the reorganisation will have an adverse effect on the Polish economy. Both the 
problans of oil supply and any reorganisation of trade would affect shipping both directly and 
indirectly through pushing up prices of oil and derived commodities. Also, oil must now be 
paid for in hard currency which will create a fiirther drain on the aheady low resources. 
Changes in economic policy are also directly affecting coal and other exports. Producers can 
now export in whatever way they wish. However, the Polish authorities have imposed a 
provisional limit on 22 agricultural and industrial commodities to ensure supplies to the 
domestic market during the transition period (ESCEC 1990). This has a direct effect on 
shipping companies who will now be dealing with individual producers as well as the many 
trading agencies; also, limitations imposed upon exports will have a direct impact upon the 
level of demand for shipping. 
Another major economic issue is that of international debt and repayments. In 1990 the Polish 
economy provided the security for the national debt of $4 bn and roubles 6 bn (ESCEC 1990). 
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The level of repayment that these debts require will mean little finance is available for 
programmes such as port or road development. This will affect the development of the Polish 
economy and the speed at which "westernisation" and improvements to the shipping industry 
can take place. In parallel, Poland's trade balance with the west has been in the black since 
1982. It is possible that this may deteriorate as the low level of competition in the Polish 
economy is gradually opened up (ESCEC 1990). 
New economic demands and practices of banks and financial institutions, for example the 
application of true interest rates, tighter lending regulations and reduced availability of finance 
for loans will all have direct and perhaps negative affects upon the shipping industry. 
On the positive side, the introduction of fi^ee market principles should mean companies 
becoming fi-ee to operate commercially, which may improve the economic condition of Polish 
industry. For example businesses will be able to retain profits and use them for modernisation 
programmes and to enhance competitiveness. Also there will be opportunities to gain 
expertise and finance fi^om the west, which should benefit shipping in the long run. 
Economically, the general shipping market should become more open, more level and more 
competitive as Polish shipping companies adopt western principles including fi'ee trade and fi"ee 
pricing. 
TECHNICAL CONTEXT 
Within the technical context the state of Poland's fleets and ports in particular need to be 
considered. In 1990 the average age of Polish vessels was fairly high at around 12 years, and 
by 1992 had risen to over 15 years; meanwhile the state of the ports was relatively poor (Ernst 
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and Yoimg 1990). However, allowing companies to retain their own profits, together with the 
establishment of joint ventures, may enable greater levels of renewal and general improvements 
to take place in the long run. Privatisation means that efficiency must rise, whilst joint ventures 
and retention of company profits should mean that money and expertise are available for 
improvements to occur. Port improvements would benefit shipping; for example increasing 
efficiency and decreasing turnaround times will offer greater scope for profits to be made. 
The state of ship and port equipment must also be considered. Again new investment 
opportunities may eventually lead to improvements being made to existing equipment. This 
should increase the level of shipping efficiency and again could lead to increases in profit 
levels. 
Another technical consideration is the standard of inland transport infrastructure which by the 
early 1990's was poor with a long history of low investment and little government finance 
available to make improvements. This caused problems for shipping by inhibiting the 
movement of goods to and from the ports leading to increased transport costs by delaying 
vessels, interrupting traffic flow, and contracts being lost. On one hand, new economic 
policies may lead to more finance being available to improve the situation. However, on the 
other, a reduction in State subsidy will mean that less money is immediately available and there 
will be a time lag before any improvements can be made. 
On a similar theme, the technical condition of most Polish industries is outdated by western 
standards but if this improves through joint ventures, privatisation and western involvement, 
it could lead to increased productivity which will subsequently benefit shipping. However, this 
is likely to be preceded by a downturn as state subsidies are withdrawn and finances dwindle. 
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Information technology availability - both soft and hardware - and the extent of related 
knowledge was low in 1991 compared to more developed countries but is likely to improve 
with western intervention and expertise, which will raise the level of eflBciency in shipping. 
Again, this is likdy to take some time to achieve due to the withdrawal of subsidies in the state 
sector, lowering the amount of fiaiance immediately available for improvements and awaiting 
an economic upturn accompanying growth in the private sector. 
Likewise, telecommunications are poor at present; for example with very poor standards for 
national telephone calls, and few fax machines. The introduction of Western expertise and 
finance, for example through joint ventures, may improve services which in turn would greatly 
benefit shipping amongst other industrial and commercial sectors. 
MANAGERIAL CONTEXT 
The recent political and economic changes which have taken place in Eastern Europe have 
necessitated dramatic changes throughout the woikforce, and especially in the decision making 
role of management. Managerial skills presently available in Poland were not designed to cope 
with a fi"ee market economy. Management needs to acquire western style skills, which may 
be facilitated through a number of joint ventures, or through training programmes largely 
provided by the West. The new style economy places new demands on the entire workforce 
and this requires a change in education as well as training programmes, many of which - for 
example marketing training - are already available. 
Mariceting awareness, skills, and its related infrastructure, in Poland and by Polish companies 
internationally, require some development. Although production was centrally dictated, now 
that this is no longer the situation, the Poles will need to market their products and services 
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in a more competitive fashion. Marketing skills are most likely to improve with expertise 
coming from the west, pertiaps in the form of joint ventures. In order to undertake these joint 
ventures new Polish skills and alterations to present methods of organisation are needed in all 
industries. Indeed, one of the reasons quoted by East Europe companies in support of joint 
ventures, was to gain some experience and understanding of western management styles. 
The attitudes towards management and organisation, and the basic decision making methods 
need to change considerably in order to cope with and facilitate the more western style 
businesses that will develop. Ideally there should be a move away from the present downward 
form of decision direction - where top management push decisions toward the shop floor and 
customers - toward an upward decision making process, as often occurs in western companies. 
Already it has been recognised that basic organisational structures within the shipping industry 
have had to change to suit new methods of operation. Polish industry and employees are used 
to central control, the majority of which has been removed by the demise of the CMEA and 
the decline of state influence. Some companies may need to decentralise fiirther to be able to 
compete with western companies. 
Organisational structures outside the shipping industry, for example in government and in the 
wider transport sector are also changing as the whole political and social situation changes. 
These structural changes will have a direct effect on maritime businesses. As an example, 
levels of government involvement and interference have altered. With the adoption of new 
economic policies, the Polish government is becoming less and less involved with industries 
which are increasingly left to their own devices. This has a direct effect and requires a new 
style of industrial management. Similarly, the adoption of new economic policies has meant 
diminishing interference in shipping companies from regional organisations, and local 
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interference is now largely obsolete. 
Management will also need to adapt to be able to collaborate with related organisations such 
as shippers and freight forwarders and to commimicate with them in a competitive 
environment. In previous years, central control meant that this was not necessary. The 
removal of state monopoly privileges has also undermined many established operations. Ship 
brokers and agents are finding new companies setting up overnight in direct competition. Only 
a few will survive, but as a market economy all will be givai increasing chances to try (Fairplay 
15/8/91). 
In order to negotiate foreign business deals and to compete on a world wide scale, shipping 
companies must gain some understanding of how other countries and competitors carried out 
their business. Such understanding was not previously necessary and again this will require 
the development of entrepreneurial skills. 
The role of unions and labour force have changed in recent years, and they are now allowed 
greater freedom and power which they are beginning to exercise. Workers are exhibiting more 
militant tendencies and are becoming less willing to accept decisions outright. As mentioned 
previously, this is increasing pressure for a reorientation of the decision making direction which 
will strengthen worker participation and contribution to company management. It is 
interesting to note that this was the ideal of the old regime, but not often the reality. 
Another issue to be considered within the managerial context is the rising level of 
unemployment. As this occurs labour availability is increasing which may lead to lower 
anployment costs for shipping companies. However, the quality and skills of labour available, 
particularly at the management and entrepreneurial levels may not match with those in demand; 
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this relates back to the basic issues of management culture, education and training. 
A separate issue concerns vessel registration. Solidarity (the Polish trade union) is against 
Polish owners flagging out their vessels, arguing that protection against poor technical and 
working conditions would be lost. The government is sympathetic to this, but puts the case 
that Polish owners needing to approach fordgn banks to win credit are often required to reflag 
their vessels to countries such as Cyprus (Fairplay 15/8/91). 
SOCIAL CONTEXT 
The reforms taking place in East Europe will have numerous social consequences. Beisic issues 
such as democracy, together with freedom of speech and movement need to be considered. 
The transfer of the role of decision making to place authority with individuals and companies 
will have a large social impact which vwll affect the shipping industry both directly and 
indirectly. For example, Polish workers will need to acquire new skills in order to cope with 
a free market economy rather than central control, which has a social as weU as a managerial 
impact. 
The level of acceptability of change is also an important social aspect. So far the Poles have 
suffered the problems of transition with "remarkable stoicism" (Financial Times 20/11/90). 
However, if this did not continue, sodal unrest might lead to strikes or other action which may 
interfere with the transition of the shipping industry. It may also lead to changes back toward 
a more traditional Communist style government through the electoral process, as a reaction 
to the hardships - with clear social implications. 
The eventual success of the reform programme depends on the support of the unions and the 
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labour force, but social repercussions such as mass redundancies, tougher discipline and 
limitation of union rights will be difficuH to accommodate (ESCEC 1990) and may cause 
problems or setbacks for the shipping companies. 
Commercialism in Poland has led to severe and novel social problems such as unemployment, 
which in 1991 was expected to rise to 2 million or 14% of the workforce. Increasing 
unaiq)loyment figures will mean less money is available to purchase goods and subsequently 
there will be less demand. Ultimatdy this could lead to a fall in demand for shipping. Perhaps 
less important is the fact that unemployment leads to lower wages and could therefore benefit 
shipping by lowering costs, although lower wages will again mean that demand for goods and 
hence shipping falls even further. Hence, unemployment will have indirect and most likely 
overall negative affects upon the shipping industry. 
Aggravating unemployment problems is the fact that fi^ee market pricing policies have led to 
large increases in the price of both Polish and foreign goods. This again is likely to lead to a 
fall in demand for goods and subsequently for shipping. In 1989 inflation reached an annual 
rate of 700 -1000%, and led to a drastic erosion in real incomes. This not only led to falling 
demand but also meant a subsequent rise in domestic costs of the industry. Inflation is likely 
to continue as a problem as it was still relatively high at approximately 40% per annum in 1992 
and still far fi-om stable. 
At the same time shipping faces pressure fi-om other domestic sectors and fi"om abroad. With 
reference to broader social competition with other sectors, shipping is likely to suffer in that 
it has difficulty in competing with issues such as health, housing and the environment. 
European Community and other external demands - for example encouraging democratic 
progress and full free market pricing - will have direct and indirect affects on the shipping 
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industry in social terms. 
LEGAL CONTEXT 
The present legal fi^amework in Poland is changing constantly, as a consequence of the legal 
inadequacies of the old regime and the changing social and economic situation. This means 
that shipping companies need to keep up to date and adapt to many new requirements. 
Reliable sources of information concerning new laws and regulations must be available to 
participants in market activity, as well as systems for eflBcient registry of businesses, property 
and legal encumbrances. This need is increased by the fact that fijrther changes are likely as 
other economic, poUtical and social reforms are carried out. 
Reform proposals call for the creation of equality of economic opportunities in an environment 
in which market forces are able to operate. Perhaps the most important step that could be 
taken in regard to the equalisation of conditions for business activity would be the passage of 
a clear and detailed law concerning the relationship between the state and its employees and 
agencies and any business, enterprise, or commercial organisation in which the state has an 
ownership interest. Such a law could clearly define the permissible and impermissible 
relationships between state-owned entities and state bodies, providing a management structure 
with specific safeguards against interference in the financial or business affairs of the enterprise 
(OECD 1990). 
Laws are undergoing constant changes which will affect shipping directly. Recent legislation 
introduced in Poland has enabled privatisation, and other new business activities such as joint 
ventures to be carried out (BOTB 1989). Also, the creation of bankruptcy laws has meant that 
theoretically, bankruptcy of both state and private companies is now possible. Each new law 
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places increased pressure upon shipping companies and ofren requires a frmdamental change 
in operations and management techniques, particularly following privatisation and the removal 
of subsidies. 
The accounting system also needs to be revised. Accurate and timely information is an 
essential input into economic decision making in a market economy. The system must provide 
the information necessary to present a fiill and fair view of the financial position of an 
enterprise to allow management to evaluate performance and take key decisions. Audited 
financial accounts, incorporating a proper valuation of assets and liabilities, will need to be 
published for the information of shareholders, creditors, and those entrusted with supervisory 
authority. This will require a number of relatively straight forward changes to the present 
accounting r^julations. Getting managers to apply the new concepts may take time and effort, 
and it will be necessary to train accountants and auditors as well as financial commentators 
(OECD 1990). 
Problems have arisen in the fact that recent Polish goveminents have been very fragmented 
which creates difficulty when attempting to develop and improve laws. Also, the current 
political chaos makes enforcement of laws more difficult for all industrial sectors. 
On a widCT scale international law is gaining greater recognition and true acceptability, rather 
than token acceptance under the old regime, partly due to pressure from organisations such 
as IMF (International Monetary Fund) and BIMCO (Baltic and International Maritime 
Conference). This will have direct and important effects upon the shipping industry, impacting 
upon both operations and practices. 
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SPATIAL CONTEXT 
The spatial context concerns the variation in economic activity and the population distribution 
of Poland, \^^ch although mainly fixed, especially in the short term, will help to identify some 
of the main constraints within the model, and may be subject to some eventual modifications 
due to the changes taking place in Eastern Europe. 
One of the main spatial constraints upon Polish shipping is its proximity or otherwise, to the 
m^or international shipping routes. Poland's only access to the sea is along the north coast, 
at the Baltic, which presents some problems when compared with the more accessible 
con^)eting ports, of Bremen and Hamburg for example. It is along Poland's Baltic coast that 
the main Polish ports of Szczecin, Gdansk and Gdynia are all located. Gdansk is located on 
Dead Vistula, a tributary of the river Vistula; Gdynia is approximately 32 km north west of 
this, in the Gulf of Gdansk; Szczecin is situated on the west bank of the river Odra 61 km fi^om 
the open sea. Port location will be a key factor affecting shipping movements, and clearly has 
a notable impact on the routes chosen for the import and export, of commodities, especially 
following the removal of controls by the state on port usage. 
Within this section the location of internationally competing ports serving East European 
markets for example Trieste, the Baltic states, Hamburg, and Rostock, will each have an 
influence upon Polish shipping activities, the ports chosen for operation and the 
competitiveness of the Polish maritime industry (for example the move of the majority of 
Polish Ocean Lines' vessels to a base in Hamburg fi-om Gdynia). 
Another spatial consideration is the population of Poland, which stands at approximately 37.7 
million, of which 60.8% live in urban areas. Poland is divided into 49 provinces and 2365 rural 
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communities which contain about 40,000 villages (BOTE 1988/89). Principal cities are:-
Warsaw - population ^ proximately 1.7 million, the capital and an important centre for 
light industry. 
Lodz - (847 400), textile centre. 
Krakow - (744 000), scientific industry, railways and steel. 
Wroclaw - (640 000), engineering, railways and electrical industries. 
Poznan - (578 000), engineering and railways, trade fairs. 
Gdansk - (468 400), shipbuilding industry. 
Szczecin - (395 000), shipbuilding mdustry. 
Katowice - (367 300), heavy industrial centre, coal, steel and chemicals. 
Bydgoszcz - (369 500), light engineering. 
The location of industry and centres of population will have direct eflfects upon shipping 
opoations, for example by dictating the type and amount of labour available in various regions, 
and by controlling the amount of produce for export and the number and type of imports 
required. Also the changes taking place in Eastern Europe generally are Ukely to have some 
impact upon these industries and may lead to movements towards new locations for industry 
or for the population in general - for example increased migration towards the towns. Any 
such impacts would have consequent, if indirect, effects for the shipping industry. 
Within the spatial context, the location and economic and political progress of transit areas, 
for example Hungary and the Czech and Slovak Republics, will also place constraints upon 
Polish shipping activities. It is also important to note here that Poland occupies a key position 
between East and West Europe (Financial Times 20/11/90), and hence is likely to play an 
increasingly important transit role as the economies of the region - especially that of the ex-
Soviet Union - develop or decline. 
Finally, it is necessary to consider the supply of other modes of transport and the extent and 
standard of competition to the maritime sector, for example the move towards private trucking 
and away fi^om state directed shipping. Similarly the infi-astructure provision for these modes 
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may act as a constraint. This was generally agreed as poor by the early 1990's, and acts as an 
inhibitor to shipping development. However it is felt that developments in the new economic 
policy may mean finance is available to improve the situation to the eventual benefit of 
shipping. 
LOGISTICAL CONTEXT 
The logistical context refers to the role of shipping within the overall flow of goods fi^om 
production to consumption. As East European shipping operations come more into line Avith 
those of western companies they will have to learn to react quickly to modem developments. 
The recent emphasis upon improved production techniques such as Just-in-time (JIT), means 
that shipping companies face changes in delivery requirements for raw and part manufactured 
materials. Shipping companies need to Uaise with manufacturing and warehousing nationally 
and internationally, and they need to integrate to become part of newly required door-to-door 
services. These problems will become notably apparent as state direction of logistics and 
intermodal operations is gradually removed. 
New logistical requirements will affect shipping companies' ports of call, and feeders and 
demand improved reliability. Other aspects which need to be considered here include fleet 
decline and its impact upon the ability of Polish companies to provide an efficient and flexible 
service, and over tonnaging internationally. 
ENVIRONMENTAL CONTEXT 
The changes taking place in Eastern Europe generally, require most industries to develop a 
greater awareness of environmental issues. Within this context environmental pressures come 
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from frinding sources, such as the World Bank, the Group of Seven (G7) and foreign 
companies thinking of investment or joint venture activities who are concerned about their 
international image. There is also pressure from the European Community who insist that their 
legislation - including that concerning the environment - is adopted before Poland can obtain 
associate or fiill membership. Further pressure comes from within Poland, which has seen a 
substantial growth of the green movement in recent years. 
In shipping, environmental pressures relate particularly to fiiels, coatings, cleaning of holds and 
dumping of garbage overboard. However, shipping is well used to operating in an 
international environment where international regulations apply - although the old regime 
sometimes failed to comply frilly with international legal standards. 
Overall Discussion 
Within each of the above contexts, it should be noted that the majority of issues involved occur 
at different levels, these being international, national and regional. Although some of these 
have been noted individually, for example the sources of pressure for environmental awareness, 
they relate to many issues and this is demonstrated in figure 5. The arrows on the diagram 
indicate the direction of impacts taking place between the contexts. This activity at differing 
levels may result in contradictions and conflicts in pressure which present problems for Polish 
shipping in terms of adapting to change. 
For the purposes of the research each of the ten contexts is related to a greater or lesser extent. 
The contextual model provides the mechanism through which an understanding of these 
interrelationships may be achieved. The model places constraints upon the research 
development in that it helps to define its boundaries, as well as helping to identify the major 
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Figure 5: The Contextual Model 
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issues involved. However, it is suggested that the overlaps can be drawn out more clearly by 
developing the model further, as we shall see in the next chapter. This in turn will help to 
reveal the more significant issues that are directing Polish shipping developments. 
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CHAPTER FTVE 
THE CONTEXTUAL MATRIX MODEL 
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In the previous chapter, we used the contextual model to identify the specific relationships 
between economic, social and political change in East Europe and the maritime sector. We 
will now operationalise the Contextual Matrix Model, discussed in chapter three, in order to 
extract the major issues that emerge and which dominate this relationship, fi'om which it will 
be possible to begin to assess the adaptation in the market place of the Polish shipping industry 
to the changes wdiich have taken place. This will be done using the concept of second order 
causes, assessing the inter-relationships of the various model levels discussed in the previous 
chapter. 
Second Order Causes within the Economic Context 
Social: 
The Polish depression has led to unemployment in the maritime sector. This has a number of 
social impacts. Firstly, the rise in unemployment will increase the demand for maritime jobs 
which will enable companies to lower wage rates. Secondly, falling wages combined with 
rising unemployment represent a decline in affluence and a consequent fall in demand for 
products and hence shipping. Thirdly, the general economic depression may also lead to social 
unrest. 
Political: 
The economic climate will place limitations upon political possibilities. One result will be that 
it will force politicians to place constraints on the maritime sector beyond those which are 
politically desirable, for example in terms of subsidy reduction, employment levels and 
development and investment. With elections in mind, such as those of September 1993, the 
interrelationship of the economic and political elements will become increasingly apparent. 
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Legal: 
Economic policy is related to the legal context - for example economic progress requires laws 
\niiich control bankruptcy, and the level of subsidy allowable. Additionally, economic reform 
requires that companies must now work within international laws which for example set ship 
standards. It costs money to maintain the necessary standards to ensure that operations are 
within the law; however, as they are legal requirements it is imperative that they are obeyed. 
Meanwhile rules concerning currency convertibility have changed as economic reform 
progresses and the need to earn hard currency has been reduced considerably. 
Organisational: 
The economic factor of privatisation has numerous organisational impacts. For example it 
leads to industrial restructuring, competition and diversification. Similarly the closure of many 
state owned loss making companies will lead to restructuring and rationalisation within 
companies. This in turn will change markets and change focus within companies. 
Managerial: 
Internal company structure will be affected by privatisation, new market orientation, 
unemployment and redundancies, competition, the need to survive, and the reduction of 
subsidies and hiving off peripheral activities. Similarly, the decreased need to earn hard 
currency will affect company structure and internal operations. 
Environmental: 
There is an economic cost involved with raising environmental standards which will constrain 
realistic decisions. This involves considerations such as fijel, port pollution, water pollution 
and lorry controls (noise, air pollution, safety etc). Monetary grants are often used as an 
incentive by international organisations such as the World bank. International Monetary Fund, 
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and the European Community to encourage countries such as Poland to raise their 
environmental standards. 
Spatial: 
The economic movement of markets from East to West has recognisable spatial implications. 
Economic demands have caused a spatial movement of industrial locations - for example 
economic changes in market demand have caused POL to move their base port from Gdynia 
to Hamburg. 
Logistical: 
The new competitive economic environment has lead to the requirement for new logistic 
contexts such as JIT. This, combined with the need to improve reliability creates fiirther 
economic costs. Generally, market economies require higher standards to survive and 
integrated services such as warehousing, logistics and quality control. There are also costs 
involved with entering new markets, and in altering fiiel and maintenance sources, necessitated 
by a new pattern of services. 
Technical: 
The technical aspects of the economic context include the costs of rebuilding and 
refiubishment. The lack of capital combined with bank controls and diflficulties in borrowing 
finance place severe limitations upon technical development. In Poland the depression has 
meant that there can only be limited improvements to infrastructure such as roads, railways and 
ports. 
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Second Order Causes within the Social Context 
Political: 
The social problan of unemployment has political implications in the maritime sector. Changes 
in maritime industrial conditions such as job and working condition alterations may affect 
voting patterns and thus the outcome of elections. These aspects are all particularly relevant 
in specific maritime geographical areas including those around and in Gdynia, Szczecin, and 
Gdansk. 
Legal: 
Sodal unrest constrains formation of new legislation, for example on bankruptcies and working 
conditions in the maritime sector. There must be a balance between that which is feasible and 
that which is socially acceptable. Another significant issue is the fact that flagging out is now 
both legal and occurring, and will have considerable social implications for the maritime 
workforce. 
Organisational: 
It is inq)ortant that organisational changes are socially acceptable. For example privatisation 
will resuh in closures, rationalisation, changing prices and increasing competition. Polish 
society also needs to accept fi^ee market principles generally in the workplace and that the 
result may be job losses for some, whilst others will earn higher incomes. f" 
Managerial: 
Changes to the decision making process will give companies greater independence and 
individuals greater power and control, although they will be constrained by their social 
acceptability. Managers will have increasing and differing control over workers and all 
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employees will have new roles within the company. This will present many employees with 
new opportunities. Unions and worker's councils' roles are likely to be depleted and have 
reduced political impact. 
Environmental: 
The increasing importance given to the green issue means that socially the shipping and ports 
sector must be seen to be environmentally sensitive. However, environmental improvements 
will be limited according to society's willingness and ability to pay for a clean environment in 
competition with financial demands elsewhere. 
Spatial: 
Socially, the workforce will have new mobility requirements and impositions which involve 
spatial implications. Poland's changing markets will involve new origins and destinations for 
newly demanded goods. This in turn has implications for port usage and for transport links 
including shipping, rail and road. 
Logistical: 
Changes to logistics will only be possible if society can cope with, and agrees to, new working 
practices. The amount of progress made will relate to the willingness of the workforce to 
accommodate new concepts such as JIT. Another social element with a logistical impact is the 
practice of hiring out seafarers to foreign shipping companies. 
Technical: 
Poland needs to develop technically to improve its chances of competing in a truly fi^ee market. 
Socially the required construction woric may be unacceptable on the grounds of its location or 
its conflict with environmental interests. Society may also find it unacceptable that Polish ships 
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are to be built, for example, in the Far East. They may increase the pressure for new buildings 
to be completed in Poland which may have implications for current and proposed joint 
vaitures. It is also questionable that the use of foreign vessels will be acceptable to the Polish 
people, and to the Polish maritime workforce in particular. 
Economic: 
Economic policies are constrained by what is socially acceptable, for instance regarding 
unemployment, and the distribution and level of incomes. Society may also demand the 
continued subsidy of certain companies in order to help them survive, and successful private 
companies may be resented to some extent. Foreign companies entering Poland for example 
through joint ventures may be seen as "invading" Poland. There is also the complex issue of 
the relationship between the World Bank/ EC/ International Monetary Fund (IMF) demands, 
Poland's needs and society's expectations within the maritime sector. 
Second Order Causes within the Political Context 
Legal: 
Certain aspects of new legislation may be politically unacceptable, for example bankruptcy. 
State industries may need to be given some legal protection to satisfy the electorate. There 
is added political pressure to pass legislation to satisfy the requirements of international 
organisations such as the World Bank/EC and the IMF in order to gain much needed loans and 
grants. 
Organisational: 
Privatisation requires organisational changes within a company which may have indirect 
political consequences. For example rationalisation leading to job losses and income reduction 
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make privatisation a difficult political choice. Hence political issues may constrain 
organisational decisions. 
Managerial: 
Changes in the managerial element will have small scale political connotations and may create 
local voting issues. Tho-e may be political power struggles within companies as management 
and woiker structures change thus affecting, and potentially constraining, managerial change. 
Environmental: 
The aivironment may be used within the maritime sector as a political issue which influences 
voting. Politically it may be seen as important to promote environmental awareness and to 
control emissions, fuels and safety. However, reaching and maintmning new standards may 
prove costly and could lead to job losses. The political and environmental pressures need to 
be carefiilly balanced at every level. Internationally the requirements of the World Bank/ EC/ 
and IMF will create extra pressures. 
Spatial Overlaps: 
Political persuasions and votes usually follow a spatial pattern. In Poland the maritime sector 
is a major employer in restricted areas and as such is of political significance spatially. 
Changing markets will change spatial impacts in terms of port usage and rising or falling 
production levels in different regions. 
Logistical: 
New logistical practices will have political impacts depending upon their acceptability, for 
exan^le, new working practices required by new logistical standards may prove unworkable. 
They may mean votes being lost or won so that logistical changes may be influenced to some 
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extent by political considerations. 
Technical: 
Partial concurrences between the technical and pohtical contexts depend upon whether 
technical changes - such as upgrading road and rail links, building ships abroad, revamping or 
closing ports and shipyards and reducing the workforces - are politically acceptable. 
Economic: 
There is a clear economic impact within the political context. PoUtics dictates what is 
acceptable in the Polish Parliament, to the electorate, to workers and management, and 
internationally with regards to economic issues including closures, subsidy, investment pricing, 
privatisation and bankruptcy. Politics and voting patterns dictate economic progress. 
Social: 
Changes in the political context have an impact upon society. Recently these have included 
unemployment and the level and distribution of income which have altered partly through the 
introduction of privatisation and joint ventures. Partial convertibility of the zloty and dramatic 
exchange rate fluctuations have also had social consequences, eroding savings and making the 
acquisition of hard currency unnecessary. 
Second Order Causes within the Legal Context 
Organisational: 
Changes in the legal context will have organisational impacts. Such legislation will include the 
creation of competition, foreign investment, bankruptcy, joint venture and privatisation laws, 
as well as laws concerning state involvement and subsidy. There will be adjustments to the 
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current banking and international trade law and the introduction of laws which govern aspects 
concerning hard currency such as exporting, importing and rates of exchange. 
Managerial: 
Legal aspects \^^ch will have impacts upon the managerial context include changes to internal 
company law, for example governing workers councils and the involvement of workers in 
individual decision making. There will also be new private company law controlling items such 
as accounts and reports. The appointment and responsibilities of directors will also change 
considerably. 
Environmental: 
The legal system provides the basis for environmental control. New legislation has already 
been developed but this needs to be expanded and developed further. The new laws set new 
environmental standards which must be adhered to. These will concern the setting up of 
monitoring systems. Progress on the environmental issue can only occur as quickly as 
legislative progress is made through parliament. 
Spatial: 
Laws define spatial maritime aspects such as port boundaries and territorial waters. Other 
aspects which might be taken into account here are the boundaries of various constituencies 
and the potential effects of any changes to them. 
Logistical: 
The legal context defines allowable levels and types of relationships between companies 
through, for example, monopoly legislation, thus encouraging or inhibiting vertical or 
horizontal integration which is a major feature of modem logistical practice moving into 
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Poland. 
Technical: 
Technical aspects must also come into line with l^al requirements. These aspects include ship 
condition, port activities, safety rules - especially as regards manning, ports, road and rail 
vehicles. Legal constraints require more technically than is feasible in the short term. 
International law has legal coimotations - for example regarding vessels. Pressure upon 
maritime operators to raise technical standards needs to be backed by law to ensure that action 
is taken. 
Economic: 
Laws control the pace of economic reform. Economic progress takes place in line with the 
introduction of for example bankruptcy laws, banking laws, subsidy laws, and privatisation 
laws. Other legal aspects with an economic impact are the controls over wages and laws upon 
joint ventures and foreign investment. 
Social: 
Laws directly affect social issues by imposing conditions relating to unemployment, wages, and 
standards of living. Similarly, the freeing of markets, prevention of subsidy and the enabling 
of bankruptcy have direct and obvious social impacts. 
Political: 
The legal framework affects politically sensitive issues, such as unemployment and wages. 
Laws must reflect political ideals and take into account the reaction of the electorate. 
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Second Order Causes within the Organisational Context 
Managerial: 
Privatisation in the organisational context influences management structures by altering 
responsibilities and targets for achievement. It also affects the numbers and roles of workers, 
types of work, as well as unions and worker/government relationships. Organisational changes 
have enabled management to diversify into other industries. Changes in the marketing 
environment have created the need for new management styles and skills which can be 
achieved through training. 
Environmental: 
New organisation of the market system affects environmental considerations and highlights the 
contradictions of profit motives and environmental protection. Removal of state control from 
many industries will have environmental implications. Private companies are in business to 
make profits, and are usually less concerned with pubUc environmental issues than the state. 
Also the introduction of a free market will create a multitude of small companies with a lack 
of coordination on broad issues such as pollution. 
Spatial: 
Changes in organisation structures and markets will change the spatial distribution of 
activities. This may involve a change in the choice of mode, infrastructure and ports. Further, 
the introduction of joint ventures with foreign interests and collaboration with other industries, 
such as warehousing, will have spatial impacts. 
Logistical: 
Organisational changes will allow new lo^stical patterns to emerge as new objectives are faced 
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such as JIT and integrated services. There will be no state direction of traffic as the 
coordinating function of the state is removed and industry acts independently. 
Technical: 
New organisations will be required to maintain technical improvements to achieve success in 
the maritime market place. The technical improvements necessary are likely to include better 
ships and equipment to foster greater reliability and faster turnaround times. The potential 
change in the reliance upon certain modes would also require considerable technical alteration. 
Joint ventures and foreign investment may facilitate change though the provision of capital, 
unavailable domestically. 
Economic: 
The organisational change of privatisation has major economic impacts. Foreign and Polish 
shareholders needs must be taken into account. Sources of investment both foreign and 
domestic are changing rapidly. Other economic impacts of organisational change will include 
changes in income, the introduction of competitors, and bankruptcy. Further concerns include 
the formation of joint ventures and the ensuing drainAmput of capital and profits and the flow 
and direction of hard currency earnings. 
Social: 
Privatisation involves a number of social impacts. These include job losses, creation of new 
but different jobs, changed incomes and new responsibilities. Joint ventures will introduce 
similar social impacts but in addition will create social concerns over the invasion of foreign 
companies. Further organisational change with social overlaps include the effects on seafarers 
of using flags of convenience. There will likely be changes in attitudes towards part time 
workers, and women, and a possible loss of social facilities. 
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Political: 
The organisational issue of privatisation v ^ have a political impact in terms of its acceptability 
to the work force. Joint ventures and foreign investment will have a political impact as will 
the degree of acceptance of state withdrawal from industry and the consequential threat of 
bankruptcy and drive towards efficiency. 
Legal: 
Organisational changes such as joint ventures, hard currency earnings and foreign investment 
require enabling le^slation. International bodies such as EC/ World Bank/ IMF create further 
pressure for legislation to be passed to encourage privatisation. This will require laws on take 
over, director responsibilities, ownership, dividends and numerous other issues. 
Second Order Causes within the Managerial Context 
Environmental: 
New managerial needs and demands may lead to environmental neglect, especially as 
privatisation will focus management on profit earnings. Further problems emerge as staflf 
numbers are reduced conflicting with the introduction of the environment as a new issue 
perhaps requiring more staflf with new specialities. 
Spatial: 
Managerial change will have a spatial impact in terms of reductions and alterations in services, 
routes and oflSces, with some of the latter moving abroad. Consolidation of locations is also 
likely. 
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Logistical: 
Managerial and logistical contexts integrate with respect to the ability of new management to 
cope with the logistics concept, and their level of understanding of JIT needs. More 
spedfically, they will need to have the ability to negotiate new contracts and to cope with joint 
vaitures, foreign investment, and competitors. The ensuing new logistical requirements may 
necessitate management training. 
Technical: 
Management needs to recognise new technical apparatus and techniques and their necessity. 
They must be able to cope with technical change emerging from such areas as information 
technology development. This will require some extensive training and education. 
Economic: 
Management must have the ability to conduct the economic side of business within the new 
climate. They must cope with new accounts and negotiate contracts. New management skills 
made necessary because of economic change include decision making, understanding of profits, 
markets, niches and competitors' economics. There will be new economic opportunities, 
especially through the creation of joint ventures and foreign investment, as well as a need to 
understand foreign partners' economics and deal with changes regarding the hard currency 
issue. 
Social: 
Socially, workers will need to cope with new roles, new management and new workmates. 
Control and responsibilities in the workplace will alter and changing incomes will have further 
social implications. 
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Political: 
Managerial change resulting in new roles for the workforce will have political implications in 
terms of voting. The political power of workers within companies generally is reducing due 
to the falling membership and fading control of unions. This results in a corresponding loss 
of influence over local and national government decision making and policy. 
Legal: 
Laws are influenced by previous management arrangements and need to change in the context 
of the new environment. Eventually there will be new laws relating to worker power, party 
control, state influence, bankruptcy and management responsibilities. 
Organisational: 
The potential of organisational changes to be effective, for example privatisation, joint ventures 
and foreign investment, are constrained by workers, managers, directors and the company's 
internal hierarchy. 
Second Order Causes within the Environmental Context 
Spatial: 
Companies such as POL may be under pressure to change feeder modes - for example fi^om 
truck to rail - to improve their image environmentally. There may be environmental pressure 
to change port locations or to change fuel sources, and environmental awareness may lead to 
demands for new products or new product sources. Each of these changes will have a spatial 
impact. Alternatively, demands for greater environmental awareness through spatial change 
may come fi"om abroad, or for example fi"om joint venture partners or foreign investors. 
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Logistical: 
New routes, chosen for environmental reasons, direct or indirect, will aflFect logistics. 
Environmentally there may be pressure to change warehouses used, to change modes or to 
improve current modes of transport such as lorries. Each of these aspects will have a logistical 
impact. 
Technical: 
Environmental pressures are likely to have considerable technical unpact, for example on ports, 
ships, and related transport modes in terms of operations, fuel, and maintenance. Pressures 
to liaise environmental standards will come from foreign investors, joint venture partnerships, 
EC, World Bank, IMF, and other international bodies, and from within Poland. However, the 
amount of progress that can be made in the short term is limited considering Poland's starting 
point. 
Economic: 
Higher environmental standards generally result in higher prices which may be reflected in 
fuels, ship condition, maintenance, port and other operational issues. Pressures for 
improvement come from numerous sources including foreign bodies such as the World Bank/ 
IMF/ EC who will only supply grants and loans if green standards are being met. However, 
these pressures have to be balanced with the limited amount of finance available. 
Social: 
Environmental issues change job requirements within the maritime sphere, but the increased 
costs involved with raising standards may lead to cost cutting exercises which include job 
losses. New standards of workmanship will require training, new ideas and new 
responsibilities. Local environmental improvements will provide societal benefits, but will raise 
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the price of goods. 
Political: 
A poor environment has political repercussions. Nationally it may mean loss of popularity with 
the electorate, and internationally it may damage the country's reputation and possibly delay 
entry to the EC even fiirther. 
Legal: 
New environmental standards require new national laws. Compliance with EC laws places 
new demands on shipping. Port and other infrastructure is directly affected by the 
environmental context. Laws restricting other industries' choice of resources to green 
products will affect imports and exports. 
Organisational: 
Where these two contexts integrate it must be considered whether environmental needs can 
be incorporated into new, free market industries without the central control and 
encouragement of government. 
Managerial: 
New environmental issues require new management techniques, skills and training and will 
involve new jobs with new roles. 
Second Order Causes within the Spatial Context 
Logistical: 
Logistical patterns are partly determined by the location of sites of production and 
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consumption, and by infrastructure, ports and markets. Ship types and the constraints upon 
thdr usage and the availability of equipment in differing locations may determine the potential 
of logistical improvements. Other areas include the new emphasis on western markets, EC 
border controls, location of competitors and warehouse availability. 
Technical: 
The location of ports and infrastructure within the spatial context may affect the ability to 
improve maritime and transport technology. The distribution of existing technology and the 
availability of land for its improvement provide fiirther examples of technical and spatial 
ovwlaps. Also, the origins of joint ventures and foreign investments will affect the technical 
standards required and the availability and extent of investment. 
Economic: 
Economic development and change will occur according to where investment is placed. 
Spatial factors with an economic overlap include the location of new road and rail links, port 
location and development. Spatial changes in the market will result in economic benefits and 
costs in new areas. There may be spatial changes in the location of industry as sources of 
consumption and production are moved to areas of greater economic advantage, for example 
less expensive sources of fuel. 
Social: 
Spatial and social factors occur where the creation of new opportunities leads to a change in 
the distribution of OTiployment. Incomes will vary according to where investment takes place 
which also has impacts upon consumption and production. Socially, companies such as POL 
need to retain presence m certain areas, such as Gdynia, for political reasons. Other issues for 
consideration include flagging out, the spatial impact of seafarers fi^om elsewhere and in 
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particular overseas, movement of ships to other ports and changes to routes. 
Political: 
Politically the decline of the maritime industry in certain areas such as Gdynia, may not be 
accqjtable and hence there may be spatial constraints on political developments. Other spatial 
changes such as changing modes, closure of ports or production facilities vM be affected by 
their level of acceptability, poUtically. Foreign investment and joint ventures will also have 
spatial impacts with political implications, as will moves towards the EC and changes in the 
routes served. 
Legal: 
The spatial movement of shipping into foreign markets will affect the legal requirements of 
ships in terms of quality, condition and manning. The use of foreign ports has further legal 
implications. Poland's moves away from East Europe generally and towards becoming a 
member of the EC will have a significant legal impact at every level of maritime operation. 
Organisational: 
Organisational changes such as privatisation, joint ventures, and foreign company involvement 
may lead to closing down of branches, with some movement of responsibilities abroad. This 
may result in new routes and changes in ports of call as companies aim to serve new markets 
and find new sources of goods. 
Managerial: 
Spatial and managerial aspects occur where there are new job locations and the work force 
generally needs to be more mobile and flexible. Other changes have been created by the use 
of flags of convenience, new routes and other infrastructure and by varying crew origins. New 
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managerial skills are required to cope with the spatial changes. 
Environmental: 
Environmental pressures vary between areas. The spatial changes in terms of new ports, and 
new routes may create new environmental stresses and problems. The use of rail as opposed 
to roads invokes numerous environmental arguments and redistribution of impacts. 
Second Order Causes within the Logistical Context 
Technical: 
New logistical practices demand new facilities such as specialised warehousing, as well as 
improvements to existing technical facilities such as ports, road, rail, lorries and ships. With 
improvement these facilities will enable greater reliability and better levels of service to be 
achieved. IT and communications play a vital role here. 
Economic: 
The adoption of new logistic practices should have economic effects in terms of improved 
incomes, reduced waste, reduced costs and improved cash flow. General industrial and 
economic improvanent could lead to greater demand. However, logistical improvements also 
lead to job losses causing higher unemployment and falling incomes which in turn lead to lower 
demand. Similarly, the transfer of economic investment abroad perhaps through joint ventures 
may lead to loss of activity within Poland. 
Social: 
Increasing use of modem day lo^stical techniques can lead to reduced manpower, less income 
and consequential social problems. They also call for changed working practices, roles, 
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responsibiUties and new skills, all of which are social impacts. However, some workers may 
benefit from extra income and there may be price reductions and more flexibiUty in the 
markets. 
Political: 
A number of the logistical changes which take place will have poUtical impUcations, for 
example changing sources of production and consumption and the use of different modes of 
transport. The falling availability of jobs, combined with their changing roles and locations 
also have poUtical and logistical impacts. Further, foreign influence over logistical changes 
may not be poUtically acceptable. 
Legal: 
There is a requirement for the introduction of new laws to allow the market to become free 
enough for new logistical practices to develop fiilly. These include laws allowing foreign 
investments and joint ventures as well as facilitating easier currency movements and governing 
repatriation of profits. 
Organisational: 
Logistic development places demands upon various industries to coordinate with one another 
in an organisational context. This raises questions as to whether newly privatised companies, 
joint ventures and foreign companies working in Poland will coordinate fully within new 
market conditions. 
Managerial: 
Management needs to be able to cope with new logistical operations and this may require 
training to develop the necessary skills. New internal structures and a flow of information are 
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required, as is an ability to cooperate with personnel in other companies. 
Environmental: 
Logistic changes such as the likely move toward road transport have significant environmental 
implications. There are several environmental arguments concerning the use of rail versus 
road, and the use of ship versus road. Other problems are likely to emerge where pressure 
upon finance encourages short cuts which are detrimental to the environment. 
Spatial. 
Logistical and spatial contexts occur where there are changes to the infi-astructure, storage, 
warehousing, sites of production and consumption, as well as routes and ports used. These 
logistical changes will have significant spatial effects. 
Second Order Causes within the Technical Context 
Economic: 
It is likely that existing technology will fail to allow the degree of economic change which is 
desirable. Further, technological needs, such as new ships and roads, place a drain upon the 
economy of such scale that they are unlikely to be achieved within the foreseeable future. 
Social: 
Technological development of ships, ports, roads and so forth should improve working 
conditions. It will also require changing roles and new skills in the workplace. Other technical 
and social mergers occur through the reduction in incomes and jobs leading to rationalisation 
and through a change in the distribution of income. 
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Political: 
The level of investment necessary to raise technological standards suflBciently may not be 
available if the electorate is not favourable to the idea of extra public expenditure and hence 
higher taxation. Similarly, the development of new roads and the closure of some port 
facilities will have local political impacts. Other factors include the technological influence 
from joint ventures and foreign companies, such as the introduction of new developments and 
competition, and their political acceptance. 
Legal: 
The introduction of tighter laws governing technological standards on matters such as ship 
maintenance, fiiel, roads and vehicles may prove pointless if technology is unable to keep up. 
Additionally, technological developments place a demand upon the legal process at local, 
national and international levels. 
Organisational: 
Organisational changes such as privatisation may not be feasible if the technical side of the 
industry is inadequate. This is due to the fact that investors are unlikely willingly to become 
involved in an industry which is technically lacking, and consequently, without investment, the 
company will not survive. 
Managerial: 
Management needs to be capable of coping with new technology, which is likely to require 
new skills and training, and changes to personnel. The attitude of employees is important. 
Environmental: 
The introduction of new technology should reduce environmental damage. However, if capital 
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is not available for replacement, the continued use of old equipment, now unsubsidised, will 
compound the problems. Further, technical change may mean a switch of modes to one which 
is more environmentally damaging, such as road. 
Spatial: 
Technical changes such as use of new ports both foreign and domestic, changed use of 
infrastructure (eg rail to road) and changed production and consumption sites will all have 
spatial impacts. New equipment may enable new trade routes to be opened, whilst the 
technological development of communications and IT will have further spatial implications. 
Logistical: 
Technical improvements will affect the potential of logistical developments. For example, this 
may be achieved by introducing new warehousing and enabling activities to be better 
int^rated. IT and communications development will make possible new methods of logistics 
such as JIT. 
The Contextual Matrix Model is shown in figure 6. Clearly some cells contain nimierous 
overlaps whilst others remain relatively empty. It is suggested that those issues which are most 
important to Polish shipping are usually those that occur most often within the model - ie. in 
the highest numbers of boxes. Clearly this is not always the case, as some issues may occur 
only rarely and yet be fimdamental to the development of Polish shipping - and vice versa. As 
a result, some qualitative interpretation had to be used to ensure that other major issues are 
not overlooked. 
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Whilst recognising that there remain difficulties with prediction in the shipping sector, in 
Poland and worldwide, by using a model based upon a pragmatic philosophy it is suggested 
that the main changes in the political, social and economic areas might be identified in a 
contextual parameter and fi^om the matrix model as the following:-
Political context 
Democracy/ decision making 
Joint-ventures/ western involvement and investment 
Competition policy/ state withdrawal 
Privatisation/ state withdrawal 
Economic context 
Hard currency 
Joint-ventures/ western involvement and investment 
Removal of subsidies 
Privatisation/ state withdrawal 
Technical context 
State of Poland's fleets 
State of infi^ astructure 
Communications network 
Managerial context 
Decreasing government involvement 
Labour - availability and level of skills 
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Social context 
Unemployment 
Free market pricing 
Legal context 
Polish law changes eg. bankruptcy 
Application of international law 
Organisational context 
Privatisation/ state withdrawal 
Logistical context 
Changing production techniques 
Increasing western influence 
Environmental Context 
Increasing pressure fi'om foreign interests and mtemational bodies 
From this summary several main issues stand out which will have a serious and significant 
intact on commercial and operational activity in the Polish shipping sector and which are both 
complex and interrelated. These may be summarised as :-
Privatisation / state withdrawal 
Joint ventures/ western industrial intervention and cooperation 
Technical condition - ie. fleets and their renewal, infrastructure and communications 
Democracy and labour issues 
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We now turn to greater detail of these issues in the context of the maritime sector of Poland. 
PRIVATISATION 
Privatisation or denationalisation is the removal of at least the majority part of state control or 
ownership from industry. Although far from exhaustive or all embracing this definition is 
adequate for our purposes. 
Reasons for adopting a privatisation policy in any economy are often varied but can include 
the following (Foreign Trade Research Institute 1992):-
1. It promotes economic freedom. 
2. It enhances eflSciency. 
3. It eases the problems of managing public sector employees and m particular pay 
demands. 
4. It reduces the need for public sector borrowing. 
5. It is often seen as a politically attractive policy with the electorate. 
For East European countries, privatisation is seen as the linchpin of transition to a market 
economy (International Management 1991), and although it is progressing slowly, it looks 
likely to continue. The motivation for privatisation in East Europe is slightly at variance with 
the reasons given above and includes the rather more specific need to raise cash to pay pressing 
foreign and internal debts, and the behef that privately owned companies will be more willing 
to invest in the new technology needed to raise eflBciency and enhance competitiveness (Lloyds 
Shipping Economist 1990). 
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According to Lloyd's Shipping Economist, Oct 1990, problems with privatisation include:-
lack of viable frmds (ie. transferable currency) within East European countries to buy 
state companies. This problem is exacerbated by the extensive international debt of the 
region. For example, in 1990 Poland's debt stood at $43.4bn, Hungary's at $20bn, ex-
Czechoslovakia's at $6.8bn, the then Soviet Union's debt being $54bn; 
difiSculties in valuing companies where there is no history or tradition of meaningful 
valuation of assets, although new accounting procedures should help; 
suspicion of foreign capital; 
level of western interest remains to be seen; the slow rate of privatisation up to 1990 
may have been partly due to feelings of political or economic distrust; 
Despite these problems East European countries appear to be continuing actively with 
privatisatioa Examples of progress can be found from each of the East European states (brief 
details of progress in Bulgaria, Ex-Czechoslovakia and Romania can be found in Appendix 6) 
but we will look specifically at the Polish situation. 
Poland 
As this research uses Poland as a case study, Polish privatisation progress will be considered 
in greater detail than that of other East European countries. Although a draft privatisation law 
was adopted by the Council of Ministers on 5 March 1990, enabling legislation only came into 
force in July 1991 (ESCEC 1990, Lloyds List 10/9/91). 
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According to the Polish Act on the Privatisation of State Owned Enterprises, passed on 1st 
August 1990, the privatisation of aich an enterprise is based on ofiFering to third parties, shares 
or stocks of a company evolving from the transformation of a state owned enterprise and 
owned exclusively by the state treasury, or oflfering to third parties the assets of a state owned 
enterprise or the sale of the enterprise (Centre for Privatisation 1990). According to Article 
23 of the Act, shares belonging to the state treasury could be sold in three main ways: 
1. on an auction basis 
2. on a public offer basis 
3. on a negotiation basis after a public invitation 
Article 24 adds that employees of a state owned enterprise transformed into a company are 
entitied to buy up to 20% of the total amount of shares of the company held by the state 
treasury on a preferential basis. Also shares sold on a preferential basis to employees should 
be sold at 50% discount compared to the price set for "natural persons". Article 25 stated that 
Pariiament, on a motion of the Council of Ministers, "shall pass a resolution regarding the issue 
and value of privatisation coupons which can be used to pay for: 
a) acquiring shares issued as a result of the transformation of a state owned enterprise 
b) acquiring title to participation in financial institutions which will have at their disposal 
shares created as a result of the transformation of state owned enterprises 
c) acquiring enterprises or integrated parts of the assets of state owned enterprises 
referred to in other articles" 
The privatisation coupons were to be distributed free of charge, in equal amounts to all citizens 
resident in the country. The rules concerning the usage of such coupons were to be 
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determined by the Council of Ministers. 
Also passed in Poland on 1st August 1990, was the Office of the Minister of Ownership 
Changes Act, w^ch outlined the duties of the Minister of Ownership Changes. According to 
the Act the Minister should implement the staters policy on ownership changes and in 
particular should: 
1) "prepare guidelines on state policy on the privatisation of state owned enterprise 
2) prepare guidelines on state policy on capital co-operation with foreign partners 
3) carry out tasks specified in regulations on the privatisation of state owned enterprises 
4) make analyses of the state of ownership changes 
5) co-operate with trade unions, associations, chambers of commerce and other civic 
organisations and with bodies of state administration and local government in the field 
of formation and development of private enterprises 
6) initiate personnel training and fiirther education in the fields of privatisation activity, 
capital markets and development of private enterprises, and publicise experiences and 
information in these fields" (Centre for Privatisation 1990). 
Under the terms of the Balcerowicz programme (named after the former finance minister) 
some 400 state owned enterprises were to be sold in the first wave of privatisation. Finding 
buyers for such a sizeable sell off was likely to prove difficult, although the government 
appeared keener to dispense with assets at almost any price rather than be forced to support 
loss making industries. Balcerowicz favoured management buy out as the means of 
transferring state firms into the private sector. This, he believed, would concentrate ownership 
and would lessen the dangers inherent in all-out employee share ownership. Opting for 
management buy outs was also preferable since there seemed to be few foreign investors, a 
situation which was disappointing after all the encouragement from the West to leave 
Communism. However, by October 1991 80% of the retail industry was in private hands, with 
the total number of private businesses standing at around 1.1 million. Three thousand 
companies had been set up with foreign capital worth about $400ra and it was hoped to 
privatise 40% of the economy within five years (Wall Street Journal 28/10/91). However, by 
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the«nd of April 1992 privatisation revenues had reached only Zl 600 bn, raising questions as 
to whether the Zl 10.000 bn year end sales target was attainable. The privatisation ministiy 
planned to put around eight companies on sale through public share offers linked to sales of 
large share holdings to foreign investors (Finance, East Europe, 1992), 50 - 60 enterprises 
wCTe to be privatised through trade sales and privatisation would extend to between 400 and 
600 enterprises. 
The most common method of privatisation to date has been through liquidation and the first 
taste of market forces for many state owned enterprises has proved their last. "Classic" 
privatisation on the UK model and privatisation by voucher have also been used. To these 
should be added the rent of public assets or so called invisible privatisation where concerns are 
simply taken over by those running them. 
The government's privatisation programme outlining main directions of privatisation 
undertakings in 1992 also included the following (Economic Review 22/05/92): 
(i). Commercialisation: 
The commercialisation or "corporisation" of state owned companies was to continue with 
aroiind 250 enterprises singled out for the process. 
(ii). Reprivatisation: 
Reprivatisation is the return of state requisitioned assets to their original private ownership. 
The government declared that it considered the settlement of this issue the most urgent task 
of the privatisation programme. This included creating a legal basis for reprivatisation and 
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separating assets with which to settle reprivatisation claims. 
(iii). Mass Privatisation Programme: 
Scheduled to commence in 1992 this would contmue throughout 1993 when investment share 
certificates would be distributed among dtizens. The programme was seen as having a number 
of merits. It would fiirther the restructuring of the economy, offer capital access to a sizeable 
number of enterprises at the same time, and would have the support of privatised enterprises 
workforces', as 10% of new companies' shares would be distributed among the workforce 
without payment. 
Project Sectoral Approach: 
Under one of the foremost projects promising to improve the efficiency of Poland's financial 
sector, nine state owned banks were to be privatised. Plans were also made to privatise the 
foreign trade sector. 
Jacek Siwicki, then Secretary of State at the Ministry of Privatisation, favoured the sectoral 
approach to privatisation, having decided that the advantages of this approach far outweighed 
the disadvantages. The sectoral approach leads to various privatisation and restructuring 
paths. Sectoral projects are divided into three phases. In the first phase, an analysis of a 
specific branch of industry is undertaken. In phase two, restructuring and privatisation 
strategies are developed for enterprises within the sector. In the final phase the strategy is 
implonented (see figure 7). One advantage of this approach is that the privatisation decisions 
are taken following a thorough analysis of the industry both in terms of its position in the 
domestic market and its influence on the international market. The Ministry of Privatisation 
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Choosing 
a sector 
Choosing 
an advisor 
Phase One: 
Analysis 
Phase Two: 
Strategy 
Development 
Government identifies sector to be privatised. 
Criteria used for sectoral privatisation: 
Positive potential of sector 
Investor interest 
Pressure from firms eager to privatise 
National economic importance of sector 
Sector assigned to project manager, member of Ministry staff 
Project manager drafts Terms of Reference outlining the broad goals and questions to be addressed 
Competitive bid is organised which tai^ets investment banks and consulting firms. Frequently the 
form a consortium and/or pair with a Polish counterpart 
Firm submit written proposals. Selection process begins. Talks held to clarify aspects of proposals. 
Ministry ciiooses sector advisor. 
Ministry chooses tirm and decides on financing. Project may be financed by Ministry budget or aid 
sources (eg PHARE, USAID or World Bank). If financed by PHARE, USAID or Worid Bank, their 
selection processes have to be observed. 
Sector advisor compiles a compressed version of the kind of comprehensive analysis which is 
characteristic of a sector study. 
Rough overv'iew of the individual companies includes on site visits to substantial portion of 
companies. _ _ ^ 
Fhe I'ollowing activities occur simultaneously: 
On iJic basis of the understanding of the sector developed from preceding steps in Phase 1 the sector 
aONisor develops on a sector level a rcstructuring'privaiisation policy. 
Based on above policy considerations, the advisor works on concrete strategies and action plans for 
companies. 
Choosing beween: 
Trade sales 
IPO's 
Management/employee buyout 
Sector advisor contacts potential investors to ascertain extent of their interest in this sector and help 
ihem understand the privatisation process. 
•\dvisor reports to Minisir\\ 
Phase Three: 
Implementation 
The I'ollouina activities occur simultaneouslv: 
.Advisor conducts privatisation of major companies in sector. 
Advisor assists smaller companies in liquidation eg management/employee buyout 
.Advisor works w ith goveminent agencies to develop ideas for restructuring other companies. 
.Advisor makes available his knowledge to interested parties and funding onzanisations. 
Figure 7: The Basic Steps of the Sectoral Approach to Privatisation 
Source: Centre for Privatisation, Warsaw 1991 
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also has more control over the future of the entire sector because this approach enables them 
to package weaker companies with stronger ones. Another plus is that the industry appoints 
one advisor to work on the group of enterprises. This has benefits as there is a transfer of 
exp&ieacc fi"om each case and unit cost is cheaper. The sectoral approach gives the Nfinistry 
the opportunity to assess the impact of individual privatisation transactions on the industry as 
a whole (Pole Position 1991). 
Proceeds of privatisation by sale of equity were estimated at Zl 1.2 trillion. Privatisation by 
liquidation was expected to generate Zl 2.8 trillion and privatisation of banks Zl 1.2 trillion. 
However these estimates of revenue deriving fi-om the sale of the Treasury's assets were 
difiBcult to achieve and sometimes erroneous. The basic steps to privatisation through 
transformation and through liquidation are shown in figures 8 and 9. 
Maritime Sector 
In the maritime sector of East Europe as a whole it is thought that shipping could be affected 
by privatisation at a relatively eariy stage because it may be one of the easier areas to privatise. 
Reasons for this include its attractiveness to westerners as it involves large capital assets with 
markets attached; also shipping is in less financial difficulty than many other industries. 
However it is sometimes argued that privatisation may not occur in this sector in the immediate 
fijture as East Europeans generally do not have enough money to buy into such a capital 
expensive industry, and where foreign companies were allowed to buy it is doubtful whether 
they would want to, due to the limited profits being generated. 
Despite this, examples of privatisation of the East European shipping industry do exist in 
Poland, where the Government has included POL, PZM, the ports of Gdansk, Gdynia and 
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Step 1 
Iniiiauon 
Usually tlie eniennise approaches the govenunent and expresses an interest Alteniaiiveiy the Prime 
Minister can order privatisation on proposal from Minister of Ownership Changes. 
Step 2 
Feasibilty 
Study 
Step 3 
Decision 
Step 4 
Complete 
Documentation 
Usually this is done by a consulting tirm 
Privatisation llirouah translbmiationi Privatisation through liquidation 
A. .Vlanagenicnt applies lor privatisation 
B. Workers Council applies for privatisation 
C. Opinion of Workers' Delegation 
D. Opinion of Founding Body (eg Ministry of Industry) 
E. Proposal by Workers' Council on Employee Share Ownership Scheme - up to max. 20% of total 
shares or average workers salary in the state sector multiplied by the number of workers. 
F. Drart of company's statutes and proposed capitalisation. 
Step 5 
Additional Appoinunenis 
(as required) 
Step 6 
Minisicnai 
Decisions 
Step 7 
TranslbiTTiation 
Steps 
Slraiec\' 
Step 9 
Impicmcnuuion 
Advisors (chosen by tender) to work on: 
A. Auditing. 
B. Legal analysis. 
C. Business plan and valuation 
D. Privatisation options. 
Minister decides on: 
A. Translbriiiaiion uiili or wiiiiout conditions. 
B. Coinpanvs statutes. 
C. Selection of 2 3 oiihe Supervisory Board ( l o chosen by employees). 
D. Cinitai Striicturt. . 
Leading to iranslbnnation switch from a state owned enterprise to state owned corporation 
govemed b\' coinniereial code. 
Notarv' registration of company. 
Court registration of company. 
1 
Ueeision on pnvatisation strategy and pricing. 
.•\. Trade sale to one or more persons. 
B. Public olfcr for sale of shares. 
C. Management/ employee buyout. 
iinplcinciu employee share scheme 
Choice 01 one or more of A lo C plus employee scheme. 
1 
.Advisers assist on: 
A. Sales documents advertisements 
B. Conlroiled auction 
C. Selection of short listed bidders 
D. Contract negotiations 
E. Due diJisicnce 
.Appoint additional advisers as necessary. 
Advisers prepare 
A. Prospectus 
B. Public relation campaign. 
C. Share distribution system. 
D. Marketing to large investors. 
J__L 
'illVATISATION 
Figure 8: Privatisation througli Transformation 
Source: Centre tor Privatisation. Warsaw 1991 
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Step 1 
Initiation 
Step 2 
State Owned 
Enterpnse's 
decision 
Steps 
Founding 
body's decision 
Step 4 
Ministerial 
Decision 
Step 5 
Implementation 
Step 6 
Methods 
Enterprise OT founding body considers stq>s necessary to privatise and decides to initiate 
the process often with a consulting finn 
Workers' Council presents opinion on whether to privatise. State Owned Enterprise 
(SOB) chooses its preferred method - (asset sale, contribution into company, buy out). 
Business plan is drafted and Ministry of Ownership Transformations' questionnaire 
regarding fmancial and legal data is completed. Consulting firm is used for valuation 
of company. Documents are given tofoimding body. 
1 
1. Founding body appoints preparatory team to examine documents and renders an 
opinion on the application If preparatory team is not satisfied with valuation a different 
consulting firm is hired by the founding body. 
2. Preparatory team opinion is discussed if necessary with SOE. Preparatory team can 
choose a method other than one preferred by SOE. 
3. Founding body examines results of documentation submitted by preparatory team and 
renders an opinion and drafts decree on liquidation of enterprise. 
4. Documenution and decree is submitted to Ministry of Ownership Transformations. 
Minisuy of Ownership Transtbrmations reviews documents and evaluates the financial 
and legal status: approves or disapproves of privatisation plan. 
YES NO 
Founding body administers 
liquidation process. 
Problem resolved in 
cooperation with 
Founding bodv. 
Asset Sale Contnbution into company 
A new company is created 
between treasur\' and 
domestic or foreien investor 
ManagaDai/^ anployse 
buy out 20% capital 
test sale on instalment 
Figure 9 Privatisation througti liquidation 
Source: Centre for Privatisation, Warsaw 
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Szczecin, ship repair yards and fishing companies in the list of 400 companies which will be 
privatised as a priority (Fairplay 15/8/91). It is believed that privatised shipping industries 
would be more willing to invest in new technology needed to raise efficiency and enhance 
competitiveness (Lloyds Shipping Economist 1990). 
The Polish shipyard Stocz Gdanska has been partially privatised and 20% of the shares sold 
to the workforce. The Polish Minister for Industry announced on 10th April 1990 that the 
yard would be an e9q>eriment in privatisatioa It had turned into a public limited company, with 
80% of the shares held by the government. The 20% of the shares offered to workers was 
initially rejected causing the government to revalue the share offer at 30% less. By May 1990 
about one third of the work force were reported to have bought shares (Fairplay 10/5/90). 
Szczecin shipyard was given two years in which to complete a sale, having worked out a 
privatisation strategy. Its position is much better than many Polish companies as the 
commercial manager Mr Zamoch pointed out "shipbuilding could always earn valuable foreign 
exchange and it was treated favourably by Warsaw". Another attraction for investment is the 
yard's ©ctensive order book, which covered 75% of the shipbuilder's available capacity for the 
next three to four years and was valued at around $800m in September 1991. 
Centromor, the main state held ship export agency, is likely to be the first organisation among 
Poland's shipping industry to be sold off, having made the first move towards privatisation in 
September 1991. The floatation method favoured by managing director Mr Ferwom, would 
be for a foreign owned bank or financial institution to take a controlling stake in Centromor 
(Lloyds List 10/9/91). 
Privatisation schemes such as these will have lasting effects upon East European shipping 
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companies and the maritime sector in general. For example they will mean increasing 
competition and higher levels of company investment, both leading to greater eflBciency. Also 
t h e ^ e of industry will raise cash which might help to pay internal and external debts, perhaps 
reducing the current pressure placed upon the Polish people. Overall, the privatisation process 
has clear social, political, economic, technical, logistical, managerial, and legal implications, 
for the shipping industry in Poland, which have led to its selection as a main issue and one 
which implies that sustainable changes within shipping operations might follow. 
JOINT VENTURES 
Joint ventures are an increasingly important form of co-operative arrangement. Virtually all 
sectors of industry now trade internationally and this has led to growing awareness of the 
advantages of commercial links between partaking countries who see joint ventures as a 
particularly practical business tool. The most important reason behind the launch of a joint 
venture is generally that neither party alone has at its disposal all the elements necessary to 
realise the objectives of the venture. Therefore each party relies on the other to supply the 
missing element or elements. 
The possible motives for a joint venture are numerous. However they fall into five major 
categories - commercial, technological, legal, political and financial - and may include the 
following examples (ICC 1989):-
a. to use complementary technology or research; 
b. to raise capital; 
c. to spread the risk of establishing an enterprise; 
d. to achieve economies of scale; 
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e. to overcome entry barriers to domestic and international markets; 
f to acquire market power; 
g. legal and/or political considerations. 
The potential advantages of forming a joint venture relate to the realisation of these five 
motives and include; spreading risks, sharing fixed costs, capturing economies of scale, the 
pooling of knowledge and sharing of research efforts. 
However there are also possible disadvantages of joint ventures such as their ability to 
eliminate or decrease actual competition between parent firms. Also it is possible that joint 
ventures may lead to the foreclosing of particular markets and may even reduce potential 
competition. 
The negotiation phase of the venture involves the discussion and agreement of the main issues. 
These usually include the partners' individual and collective goals, the process of decision 
making, the measurement of progress, accounts, legal and fiscal regimes, share and 
measurement of inputs and outputs, and steps to be taken by partners during unforeseen 
circumstances. Negotiation must be thorough to ensure that problems do not arise in the 
operation phase. It has been found that it is especially important to resolve the underlying 
issues of power sharing, timescales for measuring success/failure and renegotiation, and to 
establish a clear "divorce" clause (OECD 1986). 
The potential problems which might arise during the operation phase of a joint venture are 
numerous and can include the following:-
a. an unhappy marriage between unsuitable, inadequate or incapable partners 
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b. unclear objectives or hidden objectives by one partner 
c. insufficient input of know how and management and insufficient attention to detail 
d. under capitalisation and lack of financial support 
e. faulty decision making mechanism 
f insufficient supervision and auditing 
g. expansion of joint venture defeating other activities of partners and external activities 
of partners reducing their commitment to the joint venture 
h. competition between partners may defeat the joint venture 
i. unforeseen circumstances 
j . dissolution of the venture 
k. resolution of disputes 
1. political changes in partners' national governments or political interference m the 
venture 
m. devaluation and changes in exchange rates 
n. changes in profits / investment repatriation rules 
o. psychological problems - eg 50% share in venture deserving only 50% of attention 
p. socio-economic pressures to maximise/minimise employment 
(Moreby 13/12/90, Ramberg 1984) 
In East Europe, economic reforms have led to recognition of the need for a restructuring of 
industry and for increased access to Western production technology and expertise. However, 
East European currencies are without exception non-convertible, and shortage of hard 
currency combined with a reluctance to rely too heavily on Western credits has limited the 
ability of Eastern Europe to make purchases from the West. East Europeans have sought to 
overcome these problems by opening up their markets to Western investment, by allowing 
Western companies to participate through joint ventures in new or existing enterprises based 
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in East Europe. Most East European countries have allowed foreign investment for some 
time, but since 1986 the idea has taken wing with Poland, Hungary, the majority of states 
forming the ex-USSR, ex-Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria all introducing legislation allowing or 
modifying the conditions under which Western firms may take shares in certain enterprises and 
participate in their management. There are two exceptions: Romania has had joint venture 
legation in force since 1971 but has seen no need to modify this since 1976 and the former 
GDR showed little interest in this area prior to German reunification (BOTE 1989). 
In the initial euphoria following glasnost and perestroika, a spate of joint ventures calculated 
to revitalise moribund industries, were created in what was formerly the Soviet Union (Lloyds 
List 03/01/92). By the end of March 1991 3,200 joint ventures had been registered in the ex-
Soviet Union, nearly three times as many as a year earlier. However, for a long time the 
number of joint ventures registered bore no relation to the number operating because, in the 
earfy stages. Western companies tended to register businesses without committing any money 
to them - by August 1991 the number actually operating was still only 948. But this also 
seemed to be changing. The volume of sales fi-om joint ventures in the first quarter of 1991, 
adjusted for inflation was double that of the year before - at a time when Soviet output as a 
whole fell, on official estimates by 8% (The Economist 31/08/91). 
Hungary adopted the joint venture stance fi"om the Yugoslavs in 1973, acting as an example 
for the rest of the CMEA. Some 300 joint ventures were set up in the country, with a foreign 
complement of $300m, by January 1 1989, and another 330 with just $63m foreign 
complement in the first half of 1989, as the development of democracy in Hungarian politics 
got under way; yet economic uncertainties grew and may have reduced this growth as a result. 
In Poland, 820 so-called Polonia firms were set up fi^om the start of the 1980's by Polish 
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e)q)atriates with a foreign capital contribution of $ 130m. Some 51 joint ventures with a total 
capital of $220m were established fi-om December 23,1988 - when a much more attractive set 
of joint venture laws was released - until June 27, 1989. In fact there is little difference 
between the Polonia firms and the joint ventures except that the latter are believed to be better 
funded - though the foreign share in their capital has not been revealed. 
Overall by late 1989 there were supposed to be about 2,000 joint ventures operational in the 
European ex-CMEA countries with more than a hundred in the transport sector and 41 in the 
shipping/ports sector. However many were not operational but in a state of suspended 
animation or just proposals (Seatrade Business Review 1989). Possibly the best publicised of 
those existing are those of the car manufacturers including Skoda (Czechoslovakia) and 
Volkswagen (Germany) (Economist 07/03/92), and General Motors (US) deal with the Polish 
government and FSO, the Polish state owned car market (Financial Times 01/03/92, 
Independent 29/02/92). 
The importance of joint ventures to shipping is evidenced by the Caracas Conference back in 
1981. The essence of the Caracas Declaration was: -
a. international co-operation at business level; 
b. transfer of maritime know how - technology - in its widest sense through for example 
joint ventures; 
c. continuing and continual analysis of the elements for successful joint ventures, the' dos' 
and 'don'ts'; 
d. re-examination of ship financing schemes in the light of changing circumstances. 
In short, a form of practical co-operation between nations at individual business level based 
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not on 'charity or government decree, but mutual self help and commercial principles' 
(Farthing 1985). 
At another conference on joint ventures in 1984 Garden stated that "one, and maybe the only 
method of reconciling the basic requirements of both the shipper and the shipowner is for the 
lattCT to combine all or part of his functions with those of one or more other owners similarly 
placed, and thereby offer jointly a rationalised service capable of fiilfilling shippers 
requirements in a way that no individual owner could do on his own" (Garden 1984). 
Joint ventures in the liner trade may take any of the following forms (listed here with increasing 
degree of integration) and represent facets of the traditional conference and consortium 
system:-
a. 
b. 
c. 
d. 
e. 
f 
g-
h. 
Rates agreement 
Gonference agreement 
Joint scheduling 
Slot/ space exchanges 
Sharing ship costs 
Sharing cargo and freight earnings 
Gonsortium 
Joint company 
Each joint venture in any sector is unique and requires that it meets its own conditions for 
success. In the maritime sector these conditions could include :-
mutual trust: understanding own and partner's reasons for the joint venture 
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political stability in partners' countries 
international acceptability of legal regimes in partners' countries 
adequate financial support 
secure cargo flow / ship utilisation 
properly structured, binding contract 
ideally partners of equal size, age, financial strength, diversification 
ideaUy similar organisational and managerial styles 
partners same degree of commitment 
maximising use of ships and equipment 
similar rewards to partners representatives 
actual or perceived benefits accruing to each partner 
(Moreby, 1991) 
Having noted the importance of joint ventures both to the countries of Eastern Europe and to 
shipping in general, we now turn to a combination of the two themes. In the maritime sector, 
setting up a joint venture has been one of the only ways for many financially stricken ex-Soviet 
shipping companies to slow dovm the shrinking in the size of their fleets (Lloyds List 
11/10/91). The following are just a few examples of joint ventures involving shipping in the 
former Eastern bloc as a whole - indicating both their importance and wide usage in this 
sector:-
a. Nippon Express Co. and Primuvatu Trans reached an agreement to serve as each 
other's agents. The agreement will allow Nippon Express to extend its door-to-door 
transport networic to the Soviet Far East - the ultimate aim of both firms being to build 
up a network capable of handling a door-to-door service between the two countries 
(Lloyds List 2/11/91). 
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b. Petromin and United Dutch Shipping Co. agreed to operate jointly six 65,000 dwt 
panamax bulk carriers in the international market. The vessels will be placed under the 
management of UK's Bolton Marine. United Dutch Shipping is to provide around 
£20m towards the upgrading of the vessels to bring them up to operational standard 
and make them competitive on the international market. The vessels were built in 
Romania between 1981 and 1989 and have been laid up recently awaiting finance to 
carry out repairs (Lloyds List 31/10/91). 
c. Ex-Soviet Union and Greek ship owners, for example the Lavina Corporation which 
by the end of 1991 was managing more than 20 vessels under its joint ventures with 
ex-Soviet interests (Lloyds List 29/10/91, Lloyds Ship Manager 1991). 
d. Romanian state owned line Navrom has been restructured as a joint venture company. 
Under its new name of Romline, the company is actively seeking joint ventures with 
western companies (Fairplay 12/7/90). 
e. SeaLand Service Inc. has announced a series of co-operation ventures with Soviet 
transport authorities. One protocol called for the improvement of the Trans-Siberian 
Railways. The land bridge would link the USSR with Europe, Asia and North 
American trade routes, increase utilisation of ex-Soviet ports and improve distribution 
within the former Soviet Union (Fairplay 31/05/90). 
f Finnish ABB Stromberg Drives and subdivisions of the ex-USSR Merchant Marine 
Ministry, the Ministry of Shipbuilding and the Ministry of Electrical and Electronics 
Industries signed an agreement to cover the manufacturing of marine automation 
systems by a joint venture company based in Leningrad. The object of the company 
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will be to supply state-of-the-art automation systems to merchant vessels imder 
construction for CIS owners, as well as organise service activities for these systems. 
ABB Stromberg Drives will have a 30% holding in the new Company (Fairplay 
,15/03/90). 
g. One of shipping's largest joint ventures, involving three of the leading forces in bulk 
shipping, has been finalised between Russian, Chinese and Norwegian interests. They 
are to operate 10 new, high specification combination carriers - ordered fi^om South 
Korea's Hyundai facility at around $600m - in a pool to be managed fi^om London. 
AKP Sovcomflot, which ordered the ships for Liberian nominee Fiona Trust and 
Holding Corporation, is to sell an unspecified number of the 96,000 dwt ore/bulk/oilers 
to China National Chemical Import and Export Corporation (Sinochem) and to 
Kristian Gerhard Jebsen Skipsrederi of Bergen. All 10 ships will go into the pool. The 
three m^or names will be 33% shareholders in the pool company, to be known as SKS 
Obo Ltd, which will trade the vessels under the Liberian flag (Lloyds List 06/03/92). 
h. Jurinflot International, set up in August 1991 whose partners are the Anglo-shipping 
Co (now Morline), Sovfi-acht Moscow and the UK and west of England P&I 
Associations (Lloyds List 03/01/92). 
i. A joint venture tanker owning company was established by Norway's Anders 
Wilhelmsen group and the Polish Steamship company. The new venture, called 
Steamco, planned to acquire or charter a number of tankers in the 80,000 - 100,000 
dwt range for long term trading purposes, with commercial management provided by 
Wilhelmsen and crewing and technical management by Polish Steamship (Lloyds List 
10/07/93). 
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Although there are surprisingly few taking place in our case study area of Poland as yet, the 
potoitial of joint vaitures such as the examples listed above are likely to have numerous lasting 
effects upon the shipping industries of all of Eastern Europe. For example, they may provide 
some of the capital necessary to revitalise the maritime sector, as well as introducing advanced 
technology, and more modem production and management techniques by Western standards. 
The clearly significant political, economic, technical, managerial, and legal implications of 
potential joint ventures in the shipping sector have led to their selection as a major issue. 
TECHNICAL CONDITION 
The term "technical condition" refers to the state of Poland's ships, ports, inland transport 
systems, communications and other infrastructure. As the state has begun to withdraw fi"om 
industry it has left behind technical standards which generally are poor and inadequate by 
western measurements, for example:-
In 1990 the average age of Polish vessels was fairly high and increasing, at around 13 
years (Ernst & Young 1990) 
The standard of inland rail and road transport infi^ astructure is generally poor due to 
under investment, with little government finance available to make improvements 
(Kolankiewicz and Lewis 1988). The situation has improved only slightly since 1982, 
when there were 27,157 km of railway, of which just 7,410 were electrified, and there 
were 254,037 km of road, of which only 15,000 had hard surfaces (East European 
Economic Handbook 1985). Persson and Backman (1993) support the view that there 
is a need for investment in new roads, railways and environmental protection. They 
point to the shortage of highways surrounding the larger cities and the increasing 
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frequency of traflSc congestion. They continue:-
"There is normally no information about repair works being carried out on roads or 
bridges Mviiich can make it difficult to foresee transport dehvery times. Parts of the two 
important motorways in Poland (the West-East which is the shortest route from West 
Europe to Russia, and the North South route from Scandinavia to Southern Europe) 
have already been constructed but await foreign capital before they can be completed. 
Rail transport is slow and expensive. The system for cargo transportation is inefficient. 
The number of employees is extremely high reflecting labour intensive practices and 
burdensome decision practices. The changes needed have to involve the adoption of 
technologies introduced in the West some 20 years ago, such as container traffic and 
combined transport, and they have to involve the simplification of frontier crossings. 
Crossing borders represents a bottleneck, particularly between Germany and Poland. 
There are physical lines of waitmg trucks and it is difficuh to predict how long an 
individual truck will spend at the border. The major reasons for these are inadequate 
border facilities and complicated and rapidly changing custom formalities". 
Information technology availability - both soft and hardware - and the extent of related 
knowledge is generally low compared to the more developed countries of western 
Europe. Very few companies use computerised systems and if they do it is mainly for 
accounting purposes. They do not have computer-based production plaiming and 
control systems, nor do they have computer based inventory management systems 
(Persson and Backman 1993). 
Communications are poor at present; for example national telephone calls can take up 
to several hours to connect. Poland has the fewest number of telephones per head of 
population of any European country, with 1.2 million subscribers waiting to be 
connected to the telephone system. Much of the central switching equipment is old 
and needs replacing. 
The banking system is another problem. All money operations are time consuming. 
Any transfer of money takes several weeks, and can vary greatly from one operation 
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to the next. The banks are hampered by much manual control and handling of 
documents. 
Meanwhile, Poland has a large proportion of ageing industrial plant and unfinished 
infiBstructure projects, the replacement and completion of which needs to become an 
economic priority. 
The condition of technology dictates how shipping companies may proceed and the speed at 
v^ch they can develop and progress. Its inadequacies therefore present them with a number 
of problems. 
In view of its substantial external debt, the Polish government has little finance available for 
investment in infi-astructure. In order to compete with western companies Polish companies 
must first invest in infi-astructure and technology; for example they need new ships and 
equipment before they can provide a service which is efficient enough to make some profit. 
However, as mentioned previously there is little capital available in Poland, especially as 
government subsidies - both direct and indirect -are withdrawn. Perhaps the most feasible 
method of investment would be to attract capital fi^om the west, for example through joint 
ventures. However, western enterprises are unlikely to want to invest in Polish companies 
with poor technological standards, especially shipping companies which are highly capital 
intensive. 
The problems of poor technical condition faced by the PoUsh shipping industry have been 
fiirther compounded by the economic, political and social changes which follow:-
(i). The decline of the taxation base 
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(ii). The removal of guaranteed cargo - Polish shipping is no longer guaranteed Polish state 
cargo and that of other ex-CMEA countries, which has meant a fall in capacities 
carried, and consequently, less profits available for reinvestment. 
(iii). The general Polish depression has led to a fall in the demand for goods and therefore 
the derived demand for shipping, restricting the inflow of fiinds. Also, the depression 
has meant that there is less income tax available to the government for reinvestment. 
(iv). The increase in competition, both real and potential, due to freer markets has decreased 
the amount of capital available for investment. 
(v). The removal of subsidies from the shipbuilding industries has increased the price of 
new buildings, which consequently are even less affordable. 
(vi). The shipping industry has been exposed to a free market situation with equipment of 
low technical quality inherited from the old regime along with its market failures. 
(vii). The removal of protection from bankruptcy has meant that investments have to be 
made wisely. This whole situation is new to Polish shipping, and will be difficult and 
timely to adjust to. 
The technical problem has ramifications for shipping company marketing policy. Overall the 
problems are likely to lead to 
(i). Industrial inefficiency 
(ii). Increasing prices and falling demand 
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(iii). Changes to routes, modes, and companies used 
(iv). Day to day logistical problems 
(v). Companies seeking joint ventures as a solution to the problems faced. 
The general position as regards technology is one of a paradox - Polish companies need to 
invest in infi:astructure before they can compete and become profitable, but they need to earn 
the money before they are able to invest. The best chance of improving infi-astructure is to 
obtain western aid, or to barter with western companies, possibly offering services in return 
for investment. 
Technical condition cleariy has significant economic, managerial, and legal implications which 
have led to its selection as a major issue. The technical condition of Poland's companies will 
help to determine the position that they occupy in the market place. For example, as 
improvements look unlikely to occur in the near future, shipping companies may only be able 
to offer low quality service, counteracted by charging low prices. 
DEMOCRACY AND LABOUR ISSUES 
Most discussions on the fiiture of Poland have centred upon the issues of democracy and 
capitalism. This is because of the commitment of new politicians precisely to these twin 
goals, and in some instances it may reflect the conviction that the transition of Poland will 
entail a democratic capitalist outcome (Millard 1994). 
Poland has a number of characteristics which seem beneficial to bringing about or supporting 
a democratic policy. First, the Poles have a strong sense of national community and common 
culture. Second, those who took power fi-om the communists moved immediately to alter the 
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constitutional fi-amework, eliminate prior censorship and the agencies of communist control 
of the media, dismantle the secret police, hold fi"ee elections and re-establish property rights -
all necessary mechanisms of democratic development. The final factor facilitating democratic 
development is that of geographical location. Western Europe has economic, political and 
strategic interests in the emergence of a stable, democratic and prosperous Eastern Europe. 
The European Community in particular is formally committed to assisting change, and the post 
communist government of Poland immediately expressed a desire to join the Community 
(MiUard 1994). 
The introduction of democracy will have implications at every level. The following indicate 
areas where the most notable changes are likely to take place:-
(i). Employer/ employee relationships. 
It is likely that democracy will mean a move away fi-om central control towards more 
western style management. Instead of directives automatically coming downwards 
fi-om the top, there is likely to be scope for ideas generated at lower levels, in line with 
western style relationships. There is also likely to be corresponding increasing 
emphasis on the importance of the customer. 
(ii). Unions. 
Poland has already witnessed a general decrease in the power of unions, and falling 
levels of membership, as people reject that which reminds them, possibly unfairly, of 
the old system. 
(iii). Votes/voting 
There are clear relationships between political will and voting power. 
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(iv). Government stability. 
The introduction of a new democratic system is likely to lead to a decrease in 
government stability, coupled with emerging divisions of parties. 
(v). Central government direction 
The removal of central government direction will have implications such as the likely 
reduction of guaranteed cargo, removal of subsidy and problems of raising investment. 
(vi). Vote winning issues. 
Democracy may also bring about a government that concentrates upon vote winning 
issues such as health and housing, causing problems for competing industries such as 
shipping. 
(vii). Organisational changes. 
Examples here include the likely fall in union membership and power, and changing 
managerial roles 
(viii). Market forces. 
The market will become subject to the forces of supply and demand in line with those 
of the West. 
(ix). Free choice. 
Democracy will increasingly mean that companies are free to chose modes, sources, 
exporters, ports, and contracts. This in turn will mean less stability and no guarantees. 
Linked to these issues, Persson and Backman point out that to further their economic 
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development. East European companies must become more competitive, and to do this they 
need some critical management skills. Generally firms lack the experience and the systems to 
handle a geographically dispersed organisation or a multi warehouse system and western firms 
looking into joint ventures find that the biggest challenge is management know-how, skills and 
attitudes. Topics such as logistics were not on the agenda at academic institutions or in 
companies. They report that a majority of managers have been trained in an era in which 
logistics was useless. For example many companies built up inventory extensively as this 
reflected an 'eflBcient' and reliable enterprise. It was against the basic rule of western logistic 
practice but it was wise (Persson and Backman 1993). 
Overall, democracy in Poland is likely to develop in some form, but much will depend upon 
the 'educative capacity of those in positions of power, their skill and their probity* (Millard 
1994). 
In summary, the main social, political and economic changes affecting Polish shipping have 
been established as:-
Privatisation 
Joint ventures 
Technical condition 
Democracy and labour issues 
Company adaptation to these major issues will constitute in marketing terms, a repositioning 
exercise. In the next chapter, we will go on to examine the concept of repositioning in greater 
detail. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
POLISH OCEAN LINES' FRAMEWORK 
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The main issues which have emerged fi^om the social, political and economic changes occurring 
in East Europe, and which had an impact upon the Polish shipping industry, have been 
identified as privatisation/state withdrawal, joint ventures, technical condition, and democracy 
and labour issues. These changes can be viewed as helping to create a series of substantially 
new market environments for the operation of Polish shipping, which is likely to force the 
industry to undertake a process of repositioning, if it is to survive. However, before the 
concept of repositioning can be examined in any detail it is first necessary to narrow the broad 
research area fiarther. 
It was discussed in chapter three that the research needed narrowing to one sector (the liner 
industry) and hence one major company - Polish Ocean Lines. POL's involvement in the liner 
shipping industry would still provide an unmanageable study area, and so for fiirther 
simplification the research has been narrowed to the North Atlantic trade. This trade was 
chosen because it was one of the most important of Polish Ocean Lines' operations. Cross 
trade has played a crucial role in POL operations and its share reached its highest level in 
1985-6. Since then the share has declined, coinciding with the expanding servicing of Polish 
in^rt and export flows and transit connections (ie trade through Poland). In 1988 an analysis 
of cargo carried on the major routes and types of trade revealed that the highest percentage 
of all POL's cross trade - 39.2% - was being carried on the North America Line, the second 
highest being 12.9 % on the Australia Line (Ernst and Young 1990). The North Atlantic 
service is a major global trade and it is an area of considerable interest for European 
Community operators, for example P & O Containers Ltd, Hapag Lloyd AG, Maersk and 
Nedlloyd Lines. TEU figures for 1990 and estimates for 1997 indicate the size and importance 
of the trade for all operators (Drewry Shipping Consultants Report 1993): 
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Cargo demand (westbound) 
Cargo demand (eastbound) 
Capacity 
1990 
1,258,000 
1,233,000 
1,944,000 
1997 
1,600,000 
1,300,000 
2,177,000 
Table 11 shows the relevant capacities for each of the years between 1990 and 1997 and the 
corresponding figures for demand which oiable percentage utilisation figures to be calculated. 
Notably, in 1990 westbound edacity utilisation was only 64.7% whilst eastbound was 64.2%. 
By 1997 Drewry estimate that westbound utilisation figures will rise to 73.5% whilst 
eastbound the figure is expected to fall to 58.8%. 
Year 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1997 
Capacity (M TEU) 
w ^ 
1.944 
1.914 
1.917 
1.856 
1.877 
2.027 
2.177 
2.177 
e/b 
1.922 
1.930 
1.900 
1.839 
1.860 
2.010 
2.160 
2.210 
Demand (M TEU) 
w/b 
1.258 
1.150 
1.200 
1.150 
1.300 
1.400 
1.500 
1.600 
e/b 
1.233 
1.334 
1.375 
1.400 
1.400 
1.400 
1.350 
1.300 
Utilisation (%) 
w ^ 
64.7 
60.1 
62.6 
62.0 
69.3 
69.1 
68.9 
73.5 
e/b 
64.2 
69.1 
72.4 
76.1 
75.3 
70.0 
62.5 
58.8 
Table 11: Capacity, Demand and Utilisation on the North Atlantic 1990 - 1997 
Source: Drewry 1993 
The specific trade area is defined as being between North West Europe and the east coast of 
the United States of America fi"om Boston to Cape Hatteras - a widely used definition of an 
identifiable and distinct market - hence it does not include Canada or the Gulf coast. 
202 
Transhipments, such as via Canada or Icelandic ports, have also been excluded. 
Elevai of the North Atlantic operators belonged to the Trans Atlantic Agreement (TAA), and 
to understand Poland's activities in this market at the end of 1992/ beginning of 1993, it is 
necessary to assess the TAA agreement itself This agreement was entered into on 15 April 
1992 and when the US Federal Maritime Commission (FMC) approved a rewritten draft of the 
TAA in August of that year it was established immediately. The TAA was preceded by a web 
of agreements including Agreement 1237, the North Europe - USA Rate Agreement 
(NEUSARA) the USA-North Europe Rate Agreement (USNERA), Gulfway Agreement and 
Eurocorde I and Eurocorde Discussion Agreements. According to the minutes of a meeting 
on 8th October 1992 described as a "Gulfway meeting", the TAA's members are divided into 
two groups as follow (TAA minutes of Gulfway meeting, 8th October 1992): 
Structured members 
This group includes lines previously members of various conferences on the trade, these being 
ACL, Hapag Lloyd, P&O, Nedlloyd, Sea Land, Maersk and OOCL. NOL and NYK have 
entered the trade as structured members of the TAA, as part of a tri-continent service, but only 
in association with Hapag Lloyd on a vessel sharing basis. 
Unstructured members 
This second group, similar to the previous tolerated outsiders, consists of Mediterranean 
Shipping, POL, Cho-Yang, DSR and Senator. The latter two have worked closely together 
during the period of the research, recently (1994) merging to form one company. 
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One of the differences between the two groups is that the structured members form a rate 
committee with voluntary attendance from the unstructured group. The aim was that all lines 
would be in one group as from 1 January 1994, although this failed to materialise, partly due 
to continuing problans over relations between TAA operators and the European Conmiunity. 
TAA members collectively have a market share of over 83% (1991), whilst the remaining non-
TAA member offer little or no effective competition. Of the few remaining non-TAA carriers, 
Evergreen has an 8.6% Westbound market share (Westbound market shares on TAA Trade 
and Eurocorde market shares 1991). Of the other non-TAA shipping companies, Lykes Lines 
(market share 1.7% approximately) and Atlanticargo (with a share of less than 2%), ABC and 
ICL (minimal share), are of insuflBcient size to present any real effective price or service 
competition to the TAA. 
The aims of the TAA were outlined by Karl Heinz Sager, Head of Senator as (Lloyds List 
23/6/92):-
providing the incentive for carriers to manage individual vessel capacities in such a way 
as to ensure there is always space available for all containers in the trade to be shipped 
with monitoring of carryings carried out on a monthly basis; 
greater degree of flexibility in pricing; 
members exchanging slots on their vessels; 
The principal mechanism of the TAA was a capacity management programme, which requires 
that the signatories keep an agreed percentage of their slots unused on the weaker westboimd 
1^ of the market place. The TAA tariff introduced on 1st January 1993 represents a radical 
restructuring of the former conference ones, with a far smaller number of categories; yet more 
204 
base ports have been eliminated; and "multifactor" rates, which split the through rate on door 
to door shipments into its separate components have been introduced. Pre TAA, companies 
operating on the North Atlantic were generally offering low rates for competitive purposes, 
and were mainly loss making; these losses could not be endured for any long time period so 
that prices had to rise. The TAA increases were considerable, with rates rising well above 
those for 1992 for both service contracts and tariffs, but the lines argue that when compared 
to 1989 they are lower overall. The TAA has realigned service contracts on a January to 
December basis, and stipulated a minimum of 250 TEU for the period, compared with a more 
usual 100 TEU. 
The TAA established the following objectives, amongst others, in support of the creation of 
a new tariff:-
General user fiiendliness - leading to less errors in quoting rates/ documentation 
SimpUfied rules and regulations 
Port/ port rate transparency 
Harmonisation of the present rating structures amongst TAA parties 
To support joint rate setting by TAA parties who wish to act in that manner 
Reduced costs in administration 
TAA members have also reduced capacity on the trade in a recent rationalisation programme. 
The withdrawal of four ships by OOCL following its tie up with the VSA, and the merger of 
Hapag Lloyd's Pacific coast service into the new "pendulum operation" with NYK and NOL 
havie removed 2500 TEU a week. This has decreased available TAA capacity by 10-11% to 
21,000 TEU a week. Westbound capacity has been reduced by TAA lines agreeing not to use 
75% of idle slots for commercial cargo, cutting westbound overcapacity fi^om 30% to 20%, 
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and westbound capacity to approximately 18,000 TEU (Seatrade April 1993). 
Rationalisation attempts are complicated by TAA parties who operate round the world (RTW) 
or pendulum services. Cho Yang/DSR/Senator operate one eastbound and one westbound 
round the world service; whilst Maersk operates a pendulum service between the Far East/ 
North America/ North Europe. The operation of such services limits the ability of those 
carriers to rationalise by entering into arrangements with other carriers providing "end-end" 
SCTvices. The operators of RTW and pendulum services will determine capacity deployment 
by reference to the heaviest leg, namely dther the Europe/Far East (RTW) or the Trans-Pacific 
(pendulum). Such services therefore bring more capacity onto the Transatlantic leg than is 
required by the carriers on that leg. 
The objectives of the TAA envisage horizontal price fixing and market sharing, and the 
agreement generated a complaint to the EC Commission by European and British Shippers 
CouncUs (BSC) on the grounds that it infiinges Articles 85(1) and 86 of the EEC Treaty in so 
far as the TAA and the conduct of its members:-
1. limit, control or share the supply of sea, inland transport and other services and 
markets, technical development and investment to the prejudice of shippers; 
2. directly or indirectly fix, and unfairly impose, transport and other rates and conditions 
or any other trading conditions in respect of such services; 
3. apply dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties thereby 
placing them at a competitive disadvantage; 
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4. in so far as the TAA and its members' conduct infiinge Article 85(1), there is no 
automatic exemption available under Council Regulation 4056/86 as correctly 
interpreted; 
5. in so far as the TAA and its members conduct infiinge Article 85(1), the agreement 
may not qualify fiar individual exemption under Article 85(3), in that none of the four 
conditions for exemption are satisfied; 
6. in so far as the TAA and its members conduct infiinge Article 86, there is no 
exemption available under Article 86 or Article 8 of Regulation 4056/86. 
It is also argued by the BSC that the TAA capacity management programme will not increase 
eflBciency or provide any cost benefits. In particular, existing and planned vessel sharing or 
pooling arrangements as described earlier provide a better opportunity of genuine 
rationalisation of resources and cost savings provided tonnage overall is reduced. 
It remains to be seen whether the TAA will be accepted by the EC's Competition Directorate 
DGIV, and whether the FMC will maintain its current position. The BSC have requested that 
the EC Commission:-
adopt interim measures under Article 10 and 11 of Regulation 4056/86, and any other 
appropriate regulation, requiring the TAA members to cease all tariflFrate fixing and 
to return to or maintain the tariflF rate or the service contract rates and conditions 
operated by each TAA member in relation to all BSC shipper members in 1992 until 
the date of final decision by the Commission 
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require the TAA members to terminate the TAA agreement pursuant to Article 11(1) 
of Regulation 4056/86 on the ground that the TAA agreement infiinges Articles 85(1) 
and 86 of the EEC Treaty and to refuse any individual exemption under Article 85(3) 
alternatively, to withdraw any block exemption which may be enjoyed by the TAA 
agreement pursuant to Article 7 and 11(2) of Regulation 4056/86 
immediately to inform the TAA members that after preliminary examination the 
Commission is of the opinion that Article 85(1) of the Treaty applies and that 
application of article 85(3) is not justified with the consent withdrawal of immunity 
from fines accompanying notification, pursuant to Article 19(4) of Regulation 4056/86. 
One of the changes which may occur should the TAA's higher rates remain is that those global 
carriers which have expressed the intention of entering the Atlantic trades but have not yet 
done so largely due to the rates situation, would finally be tempted in - reducing the TAA share 
to more acceptable proportions. An alternative viewpoint is that the collective dominance of 
the TAA in the North Atlantic market may deter potential new market entrants who could 
increase available capacity. The fact remains that TAA lines are willing to sacrifice market 
share to maintain higher rates. 
Having established the broad background to the North Atlantic trade we can now look 
specifically at details of POL's operations. As discussed in chapter three, the comparison of 
past and present operations of POL is an exercise in assessing repositioning - a theory 
supported by Trout and Ries (1986) and Shostack (1987). The use of a framework enables 
this exercise to be carried out within the structure provided by the 7 P's of service marketing. 
As explained earlier it is a display technique which has been used successfiilly in situations 
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where more quantitative techniques have proven to be inappropriate (for example, UK 
Department of Transport 1977, 1979, Wind and Robinson 1972). The use of qualitative 
research is further supported by Walker (1985) as well as Chadwick, Bahr and Albrecht 
(1988). Additionally, the application of a display technique maintains consistency throughout 
the research, as the contextual model used earlier was also of this type. 
The framework will provide a year on year comparison of POL's operations within the context 
of the North Atlantic market. As described in chapter three most of the information within the 
framework has been gained from interviews with top level professionals at POL in Gdjmia and 
London - Usts of contacts and an example of the structured interview can be found in 
appendices 1 and 5 respectively. The framework (figure 10) shows the relative positions of 
POL in 1988 and late 1992/ early 1993 on the North Atlantic trade in terms of the 7 P's. 
These are broken down into their respective elements derived from the work of Booms and 
Bitner (see figure 3);- selected to represent measures of the seven Fs in the context of liner 
shipping operations and specific to that market area. 
PRICE 
1. Rebates 
Rd)ates constitute a major element of liner shipping pricing structures and are usually oflFered 
as a sales incentive or as a method of gaining customer loyalty. They may be deferred and are 
usually calculated as a percentage of the total price as in this research. POL did offer 
negotiable deferred rebates in 1988. This is because rebates are standard practice in the liner 
shipping industry and POL had to offer them in the same format as competitors in order to 
compete in an international market. However, on the North Atlantic trade, the formation of 
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the Trans Atlantic Agreement now prohibits their existence, except in the rare occasion of 
'independent action'. In tarns of position there has been a noticeable change where rdjates are 
concerned - but one forced upon POL as a member of the TAA - and not one reflecting 
company positional strat^r as such. HOWCVCT, membership of the TAA itself was a positional 
choice, reflecting a company desire to become part of the established shipping community in 
that market. 
2. Discounts 
Discounts are frequently oflFered to shippers who use the service regularly or who need to 
transport large quantities. They are usually calculated as a percentage on orders exceeding a 
set level. Although it is known that POL offered discounts on a negotiable basis in the past, 
exact figures are not available as they are regarded as commercially sensitive information. It 
may be presumed that they were offered in the same format as competitors' discounts. In 1993 
POL was generally imable to offer discounts on the North Atlantic trade as the TAA prohibited 
them. The exception occured where a shipper solely using POL wished to switch to a 
company independent of the TAA. This independent action was permissable at director level 
only. This presents a second recognisable change in terms of position, although once again a 
change driven by TAA membership and a desire to be part of the established market. 
3. Price for transporting one TEU 
This measurement provides basic information on price. It is estimated as the average cost of 
transporting one standard TEU from North America to North Europe. In 1988 POL was only 
able to charge around $940 per TEU (Conference statistics - BSC 1993). By 1993 this price 
had risen to $1035 which was the fixed TAA price for an unstructured member. This 
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represents a significant change for POL's position. In 1988 they were competing mainly on 
price, but by 1993 the price was standardised to two preset levels for all TAA members, 
placing POL in the same position on price as the majority of other operators on the North 
Atlantic and in competition with non members (eg. Evergreen) who were pricing noticeably 
lower. Overall price change, however, was small (an increase of some US $95) reflecting a 
depressed and oversupplied market, struggling to maintain price levels; rather than a deliberate 
intention to undercut others, or keep prices low . 
4. Market Segmentation 
Market segmentation within liner shipping operations has become increasingly relevant to 
pricing policies in recent years. Bases for market segmentation include mainly commodity, 
customer, season and quality of service. POL did segment the market in the past but this was 
on the basis of commodity, and more significantly, nationality. The market was segmented into 
Polish and foreign custom and prices oflFered would have been lower for Polish customers and 
those from other CMEA countries. The setting up of a free market in Poland has led to market 
segmentation on a much wider basis, with the market divided into an increasing number of 
sections. As experience of the free market increases, segmentation generally is likely to 
become more extensive. On the North Atlantic trade however, this will have to take place 
within the guidelines of the TAA Generally, the degree and basis of market segmentation has 
changed significantly between 1988 and 1993, reflecting an internal company desire to 
compete on the free market, and an external pressure to survive financially and commercially 
within the context of TAA membership . 
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5. Subsidy 
Subsidy was and remains a major issue for all Eastern bloc shipping. In the past shipping was 
very heavily subsidised, although the exact amount of subsidy to POL is not known and is 
unlikely ever to be estimated accurately. Subsidies were direct and indirect, including for 
example new buildings, power and land. By 1993 cash subsidies still existed, provided through 
the Ministiy of Shipping, but to a much lesser extent, and the intention was that there should 
be a gradual move towards zero subsidy to create a free market. Some indirect subsidy also 
remained, particularly in the form of charges for land, buildings and other capital equipment. 
Subsidy is also directly related to the labour issue. In POL labour must still be retained at 
centrally specified levels as the state will not allow full and free redundancies, but the finance 
for these uneconomic policies must be found from within the company. 
The reduction of subsidy from POL necessitates repositioning of products within the market. 
The company will not only be operating on a new basis but will have to increase profits, 
perh^s by raising prices, in order to fimd new buildings and other previously subsidised items. 
This repositioning is likely to include expansion into new markets, and withdrawal from others. 
The financial inadequacies of operating on the North Atlantic in recent years are clearly 
relevant here, as are the pricing constraints imposed by the TAA. 
6. Currency Convertibility 
Currency convertibility is another major issue for East European shipping which can and did 
act as a hard currency earner for countries with non convertible currencies. In the past the 
Polish zloty was not convertible in any way and Westerners had to pay POL in conventional 
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convertible currencies, whilst for CMEA countries there was no charge as such, as they 
operated a form of barter system or payment was in transferable roubles. By 1993 the zloty 
was partially convertible and POL would accept zlotys as well as all convertible currency. This 
has some effect on company positionmg in the market as it affects the emphasis within POL's 
operations. In the past one of POL's main concerns was to earn hard currency and 
consequently the company concentrated on the US$ dominated cross trades. In 1993 POL 
found that they still needed to concentrate upon these trades but for different reasons. 
Although there was less need to earn hard currency the cross trades provided the greatest 
opportunities for generating profits, especially as trade to the former CMEA countries declined 
steadily. Hence the company had repositioned in its attitude to cross trading and consequently 
its approach to the same market also has needed to change. 
7. State Control 
State control is an important element in this context as the price charged may be fixed or 
controlled to some extent by the state. In 1988 state control of POL was total, affecting all 
areas of operation including price setting. In late 1992/ early 1993 the company was still state 
owned and so controlled to some extent. However, it had been joint stocked into separate 
companies ready for privatisation. Hence, there was greater independence; for example POL 
was now responsible for prices, income, stafl^  and vessels. This left POL free to determine the 
locations, number, frequency and share of markets served and quality of service. However on 
the North Atlantic trade POL was now restricted on price by the TAA. In terms of positioning 
POL has moved away from state control on prices charged on the North Atlantic to TAA 
control. Although POL is still restricted, it is suggested that the TAA is better placed to make 
commercial decisions regarding price on this service, and POL feel that the only way to raise 
price to a profitable level is to join forces with other companies operating on the service, as 
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part of the TAA. 
8. Profits 
Prices may be diarged with a profit level in mind, or a profit margin may be added to the cost 
of the service in order to calculate the price charged. Price charged has a major effect on profit 
levels and there must be a balance between charging a low price to generate high sales and 
charging higher prices for fewer sales. Past profits for POL's activities on the North Atlantic 
cannot be established as figures remain unknown with no accounting system to provide the 
details. In 1993 POL would give no exact profit figure but did admit that profits were poor. 
The Coastal Times (16/10/94) revealed POL's recent overall losses as follow:-
Year 
Loss (mhi US$) 
1990 
6.2 
1991 
62.2 
1992 
75.0 
The figures indicate severe increases in loss and represent heavy loss over a relatively short 
time period. In April 1993 the company was placed in the hands of a Commissioner to save it 
fi^om bankruptcy. The losses were partly due to removal of subsidies, probably partly to 
company inefficiencies and partly to poor returns in the liner market at that time. In 1992, 
after POL was joint stocked into separate companies ready for privatisation, only Pol Levant -
serving the Mediterranean - made any profit and this was used to subsidise the other sections. 
If POL is to survive in the free market it will have to improve profits substantially and this may 
require repositioning on price which will also have to maintain competitive levels. The 1988 
position of POL was to charge low prices in order to gain market share. In fixture they may 
need to raise price in order to improve the quality of service and use the profits to replace ships 
in order to stay competitive. However, on the North Atlantic trade, price is largely controlled 
215 
by the TAA and profits generated on this service would be improved or even sustained only 
by keeping costs down. 
9. Competition 
Competition plays a large part in pricing. Setting prices with regards to competitors' prices 
for any particular service is a form of positioning in the market place. In the past there was 
no competition to POL fi"om within Poland and none was allowed although there was much 
fi-om abroad. By 1993 free maricet conditions meant that competition in Poland was allowed. 
However, none had been established due to the capital intensive nature of the industry 
combined with the lack of finance available within Poland. This situation looks unlikely to 
change so that there will be no need for POL to reposition on this front. Potential new 
competition due to the encouragement of free market principles in Poland might include Polish 
Steamship Company and shipping companies in other ex-CMEA member countries setting up 
services on the North Atlantic. 
PROMOTION 
1. Sponsorship and Hospitality 
The amount of sponsorship and hospitality carried out by POL was low for 1988, and even 
lower for late 1992/ early 1993. The limited amount of activity in this area - which 
concentrated upon dining with important customers - had to be reduced by early 1993 due to 
financial constraints caused by heavy company losses. 
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2. Advertising 
Advertising is a major method of promotion. The extent of advertising carried out will be 
affected by the budget, and the depth of advertising reflected in the media used as well as the 
frequency and types of advertising carried out. POL have always advertised to promote the 
company and to gain customers and this looks likely to continue especially as they are 
increasingly working on a western basis. In 1988 the advertising budget did not exist as such; 
the state would have paid all expenses incurred in advertising in the general and shipping press. 
In 1993 this was the responsibility of the company and would have to be paid for from the 
profits. The shortage of funds within the company led to greater targeting and more selective 
advertising; for ©cample POL withdrew from advertising in the general press and limited their 
chosen media to the shipping press. Advertising in 1993 was carried out only occasionally and 
was related to special reports and surveys. Throughout their advertising campaign POL have 
continually concentrated on making their presence felt within the market, and have attempted 
to provide information rather than use persuasion in their advertising strategy. Changes on the 
advertising front include the reduction in budget leading to more selective advertising which 
reflects a repositioning exercise concentrating attention to specific markets where short term 
returns are likely to be higher. 
3. Image 
The development of the corporate image is one of the underlying concepts of positioning. 
POL have always had a corporate image and this strategy is likely to continue to keep in line 
with western operators. The corporate image is in keeping with the styles of the other Polish 
shipping companies, and was established by the state when the companies were formed. 
However in recent years there has been the opportunity to change and although no action has 
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beai taken as yet, dianges are planned, particulaiiy following privatisation at some fiiture date. 
As the company splits, the new joint stock companies created from POL are likely to want to 
project new individual images. However, there is a paradox here as POL needs to project a 
new image and dispel the old state related one for commercial reasons, but this will involve 
considerable expense, currently unavailable, so that much needed changes may have to be 
delayed, postponing commercial/ financial viabiUty of the company. 
4. Representatives 
Shipping companies often use representatives as a means of projecting their company into 
foreign parts of the world. The number of representatives employed provides a measure of the 
attention given to the promotional element. This number may then be used for comparison 
purposes. Another measure will be the spread of location of the representatives and similar 
information for agents if applicable. POL have always used both representatives and agents. 
In early 1993 they employed 37 representatives based in the following countries:-
Austria, Belgium, Canary Islands, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany, Italy, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, UK, Russia, Egypt, Ghana, Libya, 
Morocco, Nigeria, Tunisia, Brazil, Peru, USA, Canada, Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, 
Japan, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Syria, Thailand, Vietnam, New Zealand. 
At this time POL also used 247 agents spread worldwide. Although there are no specific 
changes planned, numbers and locations of representatives and agents are to be reviewed at 
a future date. The locations are likely to alter as markets do. The situation again presents a 
paradox as more representatives are needed for greater market penetration yet there is no 
money available to employ them. 
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5. Market Research 
Market research is an increasingly important method of facilitating promotion, used in 
numerous industries with great success. The extent of market research carried out will be 
indicated numerically by the market research budget and by the number of people employed 
in the marketing department. In 1988 POL carried out market research in collaboration with 
the University of Gdansk. This was entirely state fimded so that the actual budget figure is not 
available, if any transaction of money occurred at all. In 1993 market research was still being 
carried out although the budget was now a company responsibility. Although no figures could 
be produced it was clear that the amount of funds available was highly restricted. In the fiiture 
it is likely that research will be fiirther reduced due to money shortages, although this conflicts 
with the planned privatisation which will require increased market research, thus presenting 
another paradox. The only solution in the short term has been greater targeting of market 
efibrt and more selective research priorities. 
6. Public Relations (PR) 
A fijrther method of promotion is through the use of PR. This may be measured in terms of 
a PR budget, and for example through the variety and number of promotional items produced. 
In the past this was entirely state funded so that the budget remains unknown if one existed. 
In 1988 there were a wide range of promotional items, such as wallets, clocks, ties and scarves 
and these were produced in large quantities. With the introduction of fi^ee market operations 
the company has become responsible for the budget which consequently has been considerably 
reduced. The variety of promotional items has been rationalised and numbers distributed are 
much more limited. PR material is now only presented to VIPs. The amount produced can 
only fell in the foreseeable future, at a time when PR might play a valuable part in promoting 
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company activities and image in a free market situation. 
7. Directories 
Directories are widely used in the shipping industry as a method of promotion. The number 
and spread of entries vwll vary between companies and from year to year, depending upon 
previous success rates, marketing strategies and market climates. POL have appeared in major 
world shipping directories such as Lloyds Shipping Directory, Fairplay, and Containerisation 
International, whilst daily shipping movements are shown in Lloyds Loading List. This 
remained unchanged between 1988 and 1993 and is unlikely to change - with no positional 
impact. Entry in such directories is standard practice for all international shipping companies. 
8. Literature 
The production of marketing literature provides a tried and tested method of promoting the 
company and is widely used in competitive industries. It may be produced in various forms 
and languages and sent to a range of destinations. The basic form of measurement is a mix of 
quality and quantity. The situation as regards POL's literature remained mostly unchanged 
between 1988 and late 1992/ early 1993. POL continued to produce literature in the form of 
brochures and booklets detailing the broad range of services, plus details of representatives and 
agents. These are all written in English - as it is the international shipping language - and they 
are distributed worldwide to all representatives and agents. Possible changes are that despite 
the pressure from privatisation to increase promotion, money shortages will lead to a reduction 
in the quantity of literature produced. There may also be greater targeting of the literature, 
new styles and the inclusion of advertisements from other companies to help cover costs. 
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9. Agencies 
Advertising and PR agents are often used to promote the company as they have the necessary 
experience and expertise within the specific market. Various types of agency exist and their 
usage is reflected in the budget set aside for agency expenditure. POL have never used 
advertising or PR agencies and this looks unlikely to change especially with increasing pressure 
upon capital resources. There are therefore no impacts m terms of positioning. 
10. Exhibitioneering 
Exhibitioneering is sometimes used as a method of promotion in the maritime industries. 
Where this is carried out it may be quantified by counting the numbers of exhibitions attended 
and their locations. In 1988 POL attended numerous exhibitions on an international basis. 
With the company's severe financial problems in early 1993 this practice was suspended, 
although the suspension may be temporary with privatisation placing pressure on promotional 
activities to be resumed. 
11. Press Releases 
Press releases provide a form of promotion frequently utilised by the shipping industry. Again 
the number, languages and destinations of these may vary and basic measurements and details 
provide comparable data and information. POL's policy as regards press releases remained 
imchanged between 1988 and early 1993. Press releases have always been widely issued and 
this looks set to continue. They are generated in variable numbers, and are produced in Polish 
and English. This is standard shipping company practice and is unlikely to change even with 
the advent of privatisation and exposure to the free market. There are therefore no impacts 
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for the company's positioning strategy. 
PHYSICAL EVIDENCE 
1. Containers 
Containers are an easily recognisable form of physical evidence for a liner company. Records 
of the number and types owned by the company will enable year to year comparisons, and 
suggest to some extent the changing position of the company. Many companies hire containers 
which may be painted in the company's own colours to increase physical evidence and aid 
promotion. Here records of numbers and types will also help to create a picture of company 
policy. In 1988 POL operated 32,374 TEUs, of which 14,260 were owned, the remainder 
leased. By 1993 this figure had almost doubled as POL operated some 60,000 containers, of 
wdiich 85% were standard TEUs. Rented and leased containers made up approximately 40% 
of the total, the rest being owned outright. In the fijture POL expect to reduce the number of 
containo^ owned and to increase short term leasing in the light of more competitive and fi'eer 
markets. All owned containers were painted in company colours - but none that were leased 
or rented. 
2. Vehicles 
Vehicles provide another element of physical evidence that may be simply measured by 
counting numbers owned by the company and noting the types and manufacturers. In 1988 
POL's fleet of vehicles comprised a mixture of Eastern and Western manufactured lorries in 
substantial numbers, details of which remain unknown. In 1993 the company owned 120 
Swedish made Volvos only, noted as a substantial reduction in the total numbers from 1988. 
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In the future with the advent of privatisation POL may purchase western rather than eastern 
manu&ctured lorries because of their superior quality and their ability to raise the company's 
profile. As the company is no longer controlled by the state it is no longer required to buy East 
European goods. However, one of the drawbacks of privatisation and the withdrawal of the 
state will be the reduction in finance available for investment in new (western) goods -
particularly in the short term. It is plaimed that the advent of privatisation will see the inland 
transport section of POL sold oflf as a separate enterprise so that POL will be fi"ee to use other 
trucking companies, within a competitive environment. By 1993 there were akeady plans to 
form a joint venture between POL lorries and a Danish enterprise. Company position is thus 
one of moving fi^om a state driven mixed vehicle fleet of mixed quality, to one western 
dominated but of a higher image - but financial constraints may delay this move. 
3. Company Offices 
Company offices are perhaps the most recognised form of physical evidence. Measurement 
of these involves looking at numbers, sizes and locations. In 1988 POL had one company 
office which was their Head Quarters in Gdynia, and they owned a number of depots and 
warehouses. By 1993 there were two offices, the main office at Gdynia and the office for 
Euroafiica at Szczecin, as well as the other warehouses and depots. In the future, with 
privatisation, the company is expected to split into various sections so that the number of 
independent companies will increase although the locations for these companies' offices 
remains unknown. It is likely that some locations will close and new ones will open up, with 
a diversification of activities at each. Although not reflecting a deliberate policy of positional 
change, changes elsewhere (for example through company diversification and privatisation) 
will have an impact upon company office location in the market. 
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4. Ports Served 
The ports served by a shipping company provide another form of physical evidence within the 
market place. These may be measured by counting the number served and looking at their 
locations in order to provide comparable year on year information. In 1993 POL served over 
100 ports throughout the world. In the past the number of ports served was higher as POL 
was obliged to serve CMEA ports such as Havana (Cuba) which commercially are no longer 
profitable enough to warrant serving at all, or as frequently (eg Vietnam). The company is 
likely to rationalise services further as it concentrates more fiilly on the most profitable areas. 
These significant changes represent positional change through physical evidence. On the North 
Atlantic trade POL by 1993 called at the ports of Gdynia, Bremerhaven, Le Havre, Halifax, 
New Yoric, Baltimore, Wilmington, New York, Le Havre, Rotterdam, Bremerhaven, Gdynia. 
They could also provide a through transport arrangement to/from any point in the USA/ 
Canada/ Europe and they laid on feeder vessels from Gdynia to Hamburg and Bremerhaven 
return, and from Le Havre to Tilbury return. This did not in itself reflect any real change from 
1988 - and it is in other markets, such as South America and the US Gulf, that the company 
has shown the majority of port positional change. 
5. Routes served regularly 
The routes served regularly provide a form of physical evidence in a similar manner to ports 
served. They are most easily "measured" by looking at their number and details. In 1988 POL 
offered services in eight categories these being, services for America, Australia, Europe, West 
Africa, Asia, South Pacific, Mediterranean, and Red Sea. More specifically these included 
opCTBtions between the Baltic/ North Europe and EC^ STA, ECSA, Mid East/India/Pakistan, Red 
Sea, N Afiica/ Near East, and Mediterranean/ Near East. From North Europe services ran 
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to and from WCSA, Australia, Mid East/ India - Far East/ Japan, and South Pacific. POL also 
offered some landbridge/ minibridge services as well as providing a number of services 
between Poland and North Europe and Scandinavia, and one service between Baltic/ N Europe 
and West Afiica. 
In 1993 POL regularly served 11 routes, these being:-
North Atlantic Con-Ro Service - one sailing per week 
US Gulf, South Atlantic Container Service - every 11 days 
South America West Coast Line - every 3 weeks 
Central America, Caribbean and US Gulf Line - every month 
East coast and South Afiica Line - every 8 weeks 
Mediterranean Service-Mars Line - every 10 days 
South America East Coast Line - every 3 weeks 
Asia - JOS Service - every 7 days 
South Asia - Indonesia/ Vietnam Line -1-2 every month 
South Asia - Bengal Bay Line - every month 
Australia Line - every 15 days 
Pre 1988 the number of routes served was higher as POL regularly served CMEA routes which 
have been dropped as they are not commercially sound. However, changes in ports served 
both in 1988 and early 1993 reflect better the route changes. This movement is likely to 
continue which reflects a significant and deliberate positional change. 
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PROCESS 
1. Conference and Consortia 
Conference and Consortia membership is a significant aspect of the process element of the 
marketing mix. In order that year on year comparisons might be made, they may be measured 
in terms of which conferences or consortia the company is a member of and at what level of 
membership. In 1988 POL was a full member of one Far East and two South American 
conferences, and notably not a conference member on the North Atlantic. By 1993, 
conference membership had been dropped generally due to market conditions. This included 
membership of the two South American conferences and suspension of the Far East 
conference. However, when the TAA was formed in 1992, POL became an unstructured 
member - reflecting their previous non conference membership in this market, but also their 
desire to move up market from the lower image of an ex-CMEA operator and their freedom 
from state requirements. 
2. Guaranteed Traffic 
In 1988 a considerable amount of the services sold for POL involved the state's guaranteed 
traffic and that for other CMEA governments. By early 1993 guaranteed traffic was 
considerably reduced with less coming from the state and the CMEA market lost entirely. 
Although there are likely to be fiirther reductions some guaranteed traffic will always remain 
(eg military equipment and state sensitive goods). POL will need to compete for other cargoes 
to make good the shortfall of traffic from its operations, requiring positioning through process 
change, more agency activity and moves towards more indirect methods of sales, plus more 
active marketing, better computer systems and higher quality services. 
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3. Collaboration 
Collaboration is another process element which can be "measured" by examining the types of 
collaboration taking place, the modes and the extent of their operations. POL has long owned 
a trucking company which comprised 120 Volvos in 1993. Future plans include privatising this 
company so that POL will no longer have any direct road collaboration. Collaboration with 
rail has continued through from 1988 and looks set to continue, although there is likely to be 
a change of emphasis as the transport maiket as a whole becomes freer and the need for a more 
flexible service emerges - particulariy related to JIT issues. In the past all elements of transport 
were state owned and there was forced collaboration. By 1993 companies/modes had some 
independence, but collaboration was continuing to some extent due to continued practices of 
tradition. In the foture, collaboration is likely to continue, but this will be due to market forces 
so there will be variations emerging. These changes affect the process element of the 
marketing mix and will force POL to reposition to some extent. For example there may be 
better collaboration with private road industry and less domination of rail - reflecting the 
moves towards a more industrially responsive transport network. 
PLACE 
1. Origins and destinations served 
Origins and destinations served are an element of place that may be measured by number, but 
they will also vary in frequency, location, and in other factors. In 1988 POL called at 
^proximately 100 ports, operating 17 different liner services. In late 1992/ early 1993 POL 
regularly called at a similar number of ports, although policy dictated that their exact number 
and locations were related to demand. They operated 21 Uner services including 14 trans 
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ocean lines. Although they operated on a worldwide basis, their main trades were the North 
Atlantic and the Far East. In the past, POL services would have been controlled by the state. 
In 1988 POL still operated on a worldwide basis but they also served CMEA and associated 
countries' ports. In future further rationalisation is likely to decrease the number of places 
served and service frequency will alter according to market demands. These changes in the 
place element both require and reflect significant repositioning by POL. 
2. Computer Reservation Systems 
The presence of computer reservation systems will provide another indication of positional 
change in place. In the past POL had no computer reservation systems but by 1993 they were 
used by the m^ority of representatives and agents. This represents an alteration to the method 
of selling space on board vessels and makes access to the market at home and abroad easier. 
It also enables POL to provide a better quality service for example through faster, more 
accurate bookings. This in turn has enabled POL to alter significantly its place position in the 
market, with more flexibility in sales location and more accuracy and speed in confirmation. 
PEOPLE 
1. Qualifications and training 
Qualifications provide a usefiil measure of the quality of personnel employed by a company and 
an indication as to the company's position. They can be compared by looking at the level of 
qualified staff within the company, the sources and types of qualification and the importance 
attached to them. In the past the only requirement for POL management was seafaring 
experience and managers would usually have been ex-seafarers. For seafarers employed by 
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POL, Polish government controlled qualifications have been required throughout the 
company's histoiy. In 1992 seafarers still qualified at nautical school in Gdynia but POL also 
had begun to provide in house training such as management courses with consultancy 
con^anies, and some out house training courses. There has also been some progress towards 
foreign training using money from sources such as the European Community, and many 
employees have attended short courses on Information Technology at the University of 
Gdansk. In future employees are just as likely to be non seafarers who are management 
business trained to University level and non shipping specialised. The new training techniques 
will bring new perspectives into the company and present a company with an image of higher 
quality. POL has already begun to reposition on the qualification and training aspects of the 
people element to a radical extent in comparison with the approach before 1988. 
2. Employees 
En )^loyee numbers present the most basic picture of the people element of the marketing mix 
and the company's position. In 1992 POL employed 5,800 staff, 4,500 of these worked at sea 
and 1,300 ashore. In the past these figures were notably higher, as approximately 8,000 people 
were employed by POL in 1988 with around 6,500 at sea. Figures have fallen due to the 
creation of a freer market which has emphasised over employment within the company and 
necessitated rationalisation. However, when full privatisation takes place and the company is 
allowed to make its own decisions about dismissals, then it is expected that approximately 
2,000 further redundancies will take place. In 1992 POL was still forced by the state to 
employ staff for which it had Uttle need and could ill afford to pay. Future rationalisation, 
albeit forced upon them from external forces, will leave POL as a leaner and fitter company 
that can occupy a more competitive position in the market place. 
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3. Management Structures 
Management structures within a company are an integral aspect of the people element and have 
^gnificant impacts upon the operation and success of a company. Their details can be noted 
to provide year on year comparisons and to indicate change within the company. In 1988 POL 
was state managed through an overall state appointed board. By 1992 the control was held 
by a company board, and the state POL department with specific responsibility for shipping 
operations was abolished. Although still state owned the company had much greater 
independence. In fixture, disaggregation is expected as the company is gradually privatised and 
split into a number of profit centres. Generally there is an overall move away fi^om one of 
administrative management towards capital management. In early 1993 a completely new 
management structure was established giving even greater company and departmental 
independence in terms of budgets and decision making. This created major changes in 
attitudes and approach which directly affect decision making and the ability of staff to react 
to changing market situations. 
4. Unions/ Workers Councils 
Unions often play a very significant part in the people element and are best measured by 
examining their membership levels and their role within the organisation. In 1988 the majority 
of POL workers belonged to a union. These were mainly Solidarity and OPZZ, with some 
workers belonging to the Polish Officers and Crew Members Unions. The unions were seen 
as having an important role within the company decision making process, to the extent that 
they formed a highly significant element of the management process. By 1992 membership 
levels had fallen to approximately 50% and unions were becoming less popular due to their 
association with the old Communist regime. In fiiture membership is expected to fall fiirther, 
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and the unions are likely to decline in importance as market forces take over. This will leave 
greater power with the company management and will enable them to react more quickly to 
new situations. Workers Councils - representing the employees within the company, remain 
a significant part of the decision making process in state owned companies such as POL -
where decisions on pay, redundancies and working conditions all need their approval. 
Privatised companies have no Workers Councils and thus are freer to react to market needs. 
PRODUCT 
1. Speed 
The product of a liner shipping company is the transport of goods from origin to destination. 
One way in which this may be quantified is to measure the speed of the service. In 1992 
POUs North Atlantic operations included services from Gdynia to New York in 10 days at a 
maximum speed of 21.65 knots. In 1988, despite similar vessel capabilities - 21.7kts - the 
service was notably slower, crossing the Atlantic on average in 12 days, and it was a more 
variable service reflecting the lower price image. In the fiature the speed of service will vary 
in direct relation to areas such as demand and fiiel costs, as the company is fiirther exposed to 
market forces. 
2. Safety 
The examination of the safety records for a shipping company provide another measurement 
of the product. No data is available concerning past safety records and container losses. In 
1992 POL maintained that they had adopted all international regulations and that they had 
good safety and casualty records, a view supported by Lloyds List (15/01/93). This record will 
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have to be maintained if not improved upon in order to attract new customers and expand 
maricet share. However, due to limitations upon information, few conclusions can be reached. 
3. Reliability 
Reliability is an important element of liner shipping's product. It may be measured in terms 
of number of late delivaies within a given space of time. No data is available on the reliability 
of POL's services due to the commercial sensitivity of such information. However, now that 
POL is operating in a truly fi-ee market reliability of service will be of greater unportance to 
the company and will take on a greater significance in the company's external image and 
therefore position. 
4. Frequency 
The frequency element of product is most simply measured by looking at the time between 
services. In the case of this research the service is between North Europe and the US east 
coast. In 1992 POL ran one service per week on the North Atlantic trade - which had not 
varied since 1988. Thus no positional change. 
5. Quantity 
The quantity aspect examines the amount of cargo capacity provided by POL on the North 
Atlantic trade. To enable comparisons to be made a standard measure of TElTs is used. In 
late 1992 POL was using 4 sister vessels of 1,424 TEU on the North Atlantic trade, which 
represents little difference over the 1988 position when four vessels of 1,417 TEU were used. 
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6. Ship Types 
Ship types are another element of the product. They can be divided into basic categories, and 
counted to provide numbers of each type as well as a total fleet number and dead weight 
tonnage (dwt). In 1988 POL owned and operated 107 vessels with a total dwt of 1,199,589. 
As shown earlier in table 1 these consisted mainly of DCs (40), DlSTs (37) and WA's (15). 
By early 1993 POL owned and operated just 23 vessels with a total deadweight tonnage of 
273,884. These can be broken down into the following categories:-
Type 
DC 
Disr 
WA 
PM 
CL 
WL 
Others 
1988 
40 
37 
15 
2 
3 
2 
8 
1993 
11 
2 
6 
2 
1 
1 
0 
Table 12: POL Fleet 1993 
Source: Fairplay World Shipping Directory - various years 
Key to vessel types - see appendix 4 
Polish Ocean Lines' statistics show a dramatic decline in the size of the fleet from 107 vessels 
in 1988 to 23 vessels in early 1993. This is partly due to the initial privatisation processes 
taking place which have split the company into a number of sectors leaving the core of POL 
both limited and speciahsed. The changes are aimed at greater eflSciency. 
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The main changes planned for the future are an increase in container vessels, especially in 
larger capacity types, namely 3,000 TEU. The general cargo vessels are gradually being 
replaced by container vessels. These changes are a reaction to changes in the market demand, 
but are feirly long term and will not have a positional impact for some time. Coupled with the 
changes forced upon POL by the privatisation process, we can see a notable positional change 
reflecting a need and desire to improve quality and eflBciency. 
7. Ship Ages 
Studying ship ages helps to give some indication of the quality of the product. In 1988 POL's 
vessels had an average age of 13.46 years, and a number of vessels were over 20. By early 
1993 the average age of vessels was down to 8.65 years due to restructuring processes taking 
place as noted in (6) above; reflecting the same moves towards quality and eflBciency. In 
future the average age is likely to increase as financing problems prevent suflficient renewals 
and new buildings. Ageing vessels will lower the quality of the service and POL may have to 
reposition further in the market in order to compete on a diflferent basis. 
8. Flag 
The flag under which the vessels sail is a further element of product in shipping. In 1988 all 
of POL's vessels sailed under the Polish flag, as the state provided no option. By late 1992 
POL had flagged out 6 vessels to Cyprus. In future this practice is planned to increase to 
satisfy the requirements of financiers such as western banks. Flagging out has impacts in terms 
of quality of service, and may affect other aspects such as safety. 
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9. Cross Trades 
Cross trades are an important part of liner shipping operations, especially in East Europe where 
hard currency remains and has always been a significant issue in company positioning. For 
comparison purposes they may be measured as a percentage of the company's total activities, 
but the details of the trades are also relevant and should form part of the records. In 1992, 
45% of POUs container activity occurred on the cross trades. In 1988 cross trades made up 
a slightly lower percentage and the routes would have varied as CMEA members would have 
beai served. In future the volume of cross trade activity is expected to rise to compensate for 
a decrease in domestic trade as an increasing amount of goods are carried by road and rail 
through Germany, and as the recession continues to bite. 
10. Computer Tracking for Containers 
Computer tracking systems are another element of product. It is not readily measured but the 
details may be noted for comparison purposes. In early 1993 POL operated a limited 
computer tracking system for its containers which enabled it to provide customer information 
on the approximate latest known location. This was not used in 1988, but in the future it is 
likely that its use will be expanded to provide a better quality of service. 
11. Trading Terms 
This is an important element of product for East European liner shipping companies. In the 
past Poland and other CMEA countries sent all exports CIF (Carriage, insurance and fi^eight) 
and received all imports FOB (Free on board). This meant that Poland controlled all transport 
of goods entering and leaving the country. This had a major impact for companies such as 
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POL who were consequently guaranteed cargoes. Since 1989 the state has given up its 
enforcement of this, and operations are run on a purely commercial basis. The impacts of this 
require POL to reposition within the market place as they Avill have to compete for cargoes on 
a western style basis. 
From the framework a number of main themes stand out which have produced noticeable 
positional changes in POL on the North Atlantic market over the period between 1988 and 
1993. Firstly there have been changes in the general shipping market which have seen many 
companies such as POL drop the majority of their conference memberships. There has also 
beai a change in the profitability of routes and the greatest gains in 1993 were to be made from 
the cross trades - not just in terms of hard currency, but also in broad commercial terms. 
Secondly, POL became an associate member of the TAA. This prevented the company from 
offering rebates and discounts to customers on the North Atlantic trade as it had done in the 
past. However, it did enable POL to raise the cost of its North Atlantic service to a fixed price 
set by the TAA. 
Pertiaps the most significant changes in POL's liner shipping operations have been produced 
by the events occurring in Poland in recent years. These events have caused fijndamental 
changes at every level. The collapse of the CMEA means that POL services to ex-CMEA 
members are no longer part of a barter system but are paid for by bank transfer in convertible 
currency. It also means that POL has significantly less guaranteed traflBc, which is added to 
by the fact the trade terms are now negotiable and Poland will not be automatically responsible 
for the transport of all its imports and exports. In early 1993 POL no longer segmented the 
market merely on a basis of CMEA or non CMEA membership but had begun to work on a 
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more western style basis. The freer conditions within Poland have also presented a long term 
threat of Polish competition to POL. Significantly the changes have also meant that the role 
of the unions has become diminished and membership has fallen noticeably. The partial 
convCTtibility of the Polish currency has changed the emphasis of POL operations; it no longer 
needs to concentrate as much on earning hard currency but can focus on serving the most 
profitable routes. 
The diminishing state control over POL has caused significant operational changes. By 1993 
the company was fi'ee to chose the ports and routes it served, it was fi'ee to flag out, it was 
able to purchase western products such as vehicles and computer equipment, and it had 
responsibility for prices, mcome, and staff including qualifications and training. 
Reducing state control has also had significant impacts for management and training issues, 
calling for changes at every level, fi-om attitudes to decision making processes. 
The decrease in state control was accompanied by the removal of most subsidy to the 
company. This, combined with the decline in guaranteed traflBc meant that POL needed to 
increase its profits significantly just to survive. However, after making substantial losses in 
1991 and 1992, the company had no fluids. Although new vessels were urgently needed along 
with improvements to quality of service, the creation of a new image, increased advertising, 
representatives, agents, public relations, and exhibitioneering, POL was in fact having to 
rationalise these aspects in order to cut costs. 
It is planned that POL will be flilly privatised eventually. This is to be achieved by splitting the 
con^)any into a number of profit making centres. This will have impacts upon the company's 
management structures, and the number and location of oflBces. One of the main initial impacts 
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of privatisation will be the redundancies of large numbers of staff. Dismissals will only be 
allowable after privatisation takes place and POL estimate that 2,000 may be necessary by that 
time. 
In the near future, although POL may have Uked to reposition in the market place, a lack of 
funds will prevecA them from doing so in the way needed. This presents a paradox as without 
adequate repositioning POL's situation is unlikely to improve suflBciently for the much needed 
extra profits to be generated. 
To fedlitate analysis POL's 1992 position can be outlined further using a SWOT analysis to 
provide structure, derived from earlier discussion. 
Strengths 
POL's market strengths may be summarised as follows: 
- cheap labour relative to western operators, offering cost advantages 
- skilled and experienced labour, especially seafarers who gain Polish government controlled 
qualifications from the nautical school in Gdynia 
- a strong PoUsh maritime tradition 
- an existing market niche and existing cross trade market positions 
- advantages of geographical location, which include their proximity to Germany, and their 
positions between EC and East Europe, and between Scandinavia, South East Europe and 
the Nfiddle East 
- previous experience of surviving in a western world market and of earning hard currency 
- general political/social reputation in the west compared to other East European operators 
- membership of the TAA 
- good relations with the European Community, compared to other East European countries 
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Weaknesses 
The weaknesses of POL's operations may be summarised as: 
- poor general image amongst the shipping frutemity, of cheapness, low quality, and low level 
technology 
- lack of finance available to improve upon image combined with problems of financing/ 
obtaining loans 
- continued shortage of hard currency despite some improvements, affecting operational 
decisions 
- poor pohtical prospects, including instability of government and potential reversal to old 
regimes 
- banking and accounting inadequacies within Poland 
- lack of modem commercial and management skills amongst employees, as well as continued 
entrenched attitudes 
- state withdrawal and industrial restructuring leading to a loss of government coordination 
(eg. intermodalism) without a market replacement 
- peripheral infrastructure and communication problems 
- domestic financial weakness and high taxation 
Opportunities 
POL's opportunities can be summarised as: 
-joint ventures; western interest and involvement is relatively high, offering potential benfits 
such as improving management skills and technical efiiciency 
- privatisation could also lead to diversification, and the opening up of new ideas and capital 
- cheapness needs to be exploited in a way that does not detract from image 
- future European Community membership and physical integration into Europe 
- western aid (EC, IMF, WB) and relaxation of debt requirements 
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- increased East West trade as the CIS develops 
- proximity of the Scandinavian countries, especially as they move towards the European 
Community 
- Polish economic grovt/th 
- flagging out now permitted, aflEecting a range of issues including investment opportunities, 
costs and unage 
- size and quality of unemployed labour force 
Threats 
The threats to POL can be summarised as: 
- bankruptcy or western takeovers 
- political and social change, reversal and instability 
- inflation and failure of the Polish economy 
- new competition - both Polish and foreign - fi-om other companies and other modes 
- instability in the ex-USSR 
- Single European Market becoming a fortress 
- costs of increasing safety and environmental standards 
Despite the daunting combination of these threats with the numerous weaknesses - for example 
a lack of finance - POL does have a number of strengths and significant experience which may 
enable it to take fiill benefit of opportunities such as privatisation and joint ventures. 
Having established the positions for POL in 1988 and 1992 we will go on, in chapter seven, 
to make fiirther use of the fi^amework technique to establish the positions of some of Polish 
Ocean Line's competitors on the North Atlantic trade, for comparative purposes. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY COMPETITORS' FRAMEWORK 
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In this chapter we will examine the positions of Polish Ocean Lines' competitors on the North 
Atlantic west boimd trade. This will be carried out for the period of end 1992/ beginning 1993 
as it is only necessary to assess the Community company positions at the end of the East 
European transitional phase. The assumption is made in this positional comparison, that whilst 
POL's position is likely to have altered from 1988, due to external pressure as discussed 
earlier, and caused by social, economic and political change in East Europe, that of the 
European Community competitors will have remained relatively constant. Hence positional 
comparisons are only needed for 1992/1993 between the competitors based in the European 
Community and POL. Clearly each of these companies will be affected by developments in 
European Community shipping policies, and a summary of these, together with relationships 
with East Europe is provided in Appendix 7. The Community companies operating on the 
trade have been mentioned previously, and a map showing the ports of call for these operators 
is provided in figure 11. It is necessary now to examine the companies in rather greater detail, 
and in the context of all North Atlantic operations, to establish the market position they have 
taken up and to place POL's activities in the North Atlantic market into context. Positioning 
is clearly a relative concept and means little without assessment of competitors' positions. 
We will now look at a brief summary of companies from all countries involved in the 
westbound trade at the end of 1992 (a key to shipping abbreviations used in the following 
section can be found in appendix 4):-
ATLANTIC CARGO SERVICES AB 
This Swedish company was owned by Benfo BV (Rotterdam). The line utilised 4 
multipurpose vessels able to load containers, breakbulk, and heavy lift/project cargo. It 
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operated a Scandinavia/North Europe-USEC/GC service every 12 days using 4 chartered in 
vessels with the following specifications:-
Number 
2 
2 
Type 
BC 
BC 
Speed 
15 
15 
TEU capacity 
1,370 
1,434 
Ports of call on this service were Bremen, Rotterdam, Le Havre, Charleston, Port Everglades, 
Houston, Mobile. The company operated 10,450 TEU's, 4,850 are owned and 5,600 leased. 
Overall, Atlantic Cargo Services was a relatively small player in this market. 
ATLANTIC CONTAINER LINE 
Based in the United States, this company was a wholly owned subsidiary of the Transatlantic 
Shipping Company Ltd. On the North Atlantic trade it operated a weekly service calling at the 
following ports: 
Antwerp, Bremerhaven, Rotterdam, Le Havre, Halifax, New York, Norfolk, 
Baltimore, Philadelphia, New York, Halifax, Antwerp, using the vessels of Hapag 
Lloyd as part of a joint service. 
The fleet statistics were as follow: 
7 vessels in total (4 chartered in), of which 5 operated on the 
ECNA/Europe/Scandinavia service which are all Ro-Ro with cellular space, speeds of 
18kts and capacities to carry between 2,911 and 2,915 TEU. 
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The company operated 50,778 TELTs in total of which 92% were owned and the remainder 
leased. 
CGM 
In 1992 the French CGMF holding Company controlled the groups' four major subsidiaries 
which included 99% of Compagnie Maritime Generale (CGM). CGM was involved in 
contain^- services independently and through various space charter agreements. The company 
fonnerly operated two North Atlantic services through a slot charter agreement with the ACL 
consortium in coordinated sailing agreement with Hapag Lloyd, before it launched its own 
operation. CGM were forced to withdraw from the four North Atlantic routes it operated 
before the end of 1992 due to continuing losses (Containerisation International 1992). As a 
result CGM have been eliminated from the study, but clearly its previous operations need to 
be recognised to assess market condition. 
CHO YANG 
Registered in South Korea, Cho Yang worked in conjunction with DSR-Senator, to run the 
following services which covered the North Atlantic :-
N EuropeAJK/Far East/Japan/USWC/Panama/USEC (weekly eastbound) calling at 
Bremerhaven, Hamburg, Rotterdam, Antwerp, Felixstowe, Singapore, Hong Kong, 
Kaohsiung, Busan, Osaka, Yokohama, Oakland, Long Beach, Cristobal, Jacksonville, 
Wilmington, Philadelphia, Bremerhaven. 
N Europe/UKAJSEC/Panama/USWC/Japan/ Far East (weekly westbound) calling at 
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Bremerhaven, Hamburg, Rotterdam, Antwerp, Felixstowe, Le Havre, Philadelphia, 
Wilmington, Jacksonville, Cristobal, Long Beach, Oakland, Yokohama, Kobe, Busan, 
Keelung, Hong Kong, Singapore, Bremerhaven. 
The company operated 14 vessels of which 1 was chartered in and 6 operated on the 
Europe/Far East/USWC/EC/Europe. The latter were all fiilly cellular vessels with the 
following speeds and capacities:-
Number 
1 
1 
4 
Speed (kts) 
21 
20.5 
22 
TEU capacity 
2,650 
2,288 
2,698 
Containers operated numbered 22,870 TEU of which 17,369 were owmed and 5,501 leased. 
CONTSHIP UK LTD 
UK based Contship operated as part of its services in 1992, Ocean Star Container Line. Ocean 
Star operated a round the world service employing five BV 1000 self sustained container 
vessels of 1,000 TEU capacity and five ro-ro vessels of 1,600 TEU capacity with a nine day 
frequency. Ports of call included La Spezia, Genoa, Marseilles, Felixstowe, Hamburg, 
RottCTdam, Antwerp, Dunkirk, Le Havre, New York, Norfolk, Savannah, Papeete, Auckland, 
Sydney, Melbourne, Brisbane, Noumea, Lae, Jakarta, Singapore, Port Kelang, Colombo, 
Alexandria. Containers in service numbered 4,800 20 and 40 fl dry cargo containers. 
DEPPE LINE 
The German registered Deppe Line operated a North Europe-USEC/GC service every 6 days, 
247 
which called at the ports of Rotterdam, Bremerhaven, Felixstowe, Bremerhaven, Hampton 
Roads, Charieston, Miami, Galveston, New Orleans, Hampton Roads. This was a joint service 
with Lykes and used one chartered in SC vessel with a speed of 17.5kts and capacity of 1,095. 
Containers operated numbered 3,775 TEU. 
DSR 
In 1992 this German based company operated a wide range of services and belonged to a 
consortium, with Senator and Cho Yang, which operated an east/west bound aroimd the world 
service with ports of call as listed under Cho Yang. DSR operated a total of 55 vessels with 
ranging capabilities and reported a total of 20,000 container units in service. 
EVERGREEN 
Evergreen is a Taiwanese company which operated a fixed day weekly service round-the-world 
eastbound and a round-the-worid westbound every 6 days. Ports of call on these services were 
as follow:-
RW westbound - Tokyo, Nagoya, Osaka, Busan, Keelung, Kaosiung, Hong Kong, 
Singapore, Colombo, Hamburg, Thamesport, Rotterdam, Antwerp, Le Havre, New 
York, Norfolk, Charleston, Kingston, Panama, Los Angeles, Tokyo. 
RW eastbound - Singapore, Hong Kong, Kaohsiung, Keelung, Busan, Hakata, Osaka, 
Nagoya, Shimizu, Tokyo, Los Angeles, Charleston, Baltimore, New York, Le Havre, 
Antwerp, Rotterdam, Thamesport, Hamburg, Colombo, Port Kelang, Singapore. 
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The company owned 51 vessels of which 3 were chartered to Uniglory and 24 operated on 
round-the-world services; the latter were all fully cellular vessels with speeds of 20.5 and 
20.7kts, and capacities of 3,428 (11 vessels) and 2,728 (13 vessels). Containers operated 
numbered 215,075 TEU. 
HAPAG LLOYD AG 
This German company was involved in a number of joint space charter services and was a 
partner in the Tri Continent service operated in conjunction with NYK and NOL. On the 
North Atlantic trade Hapag Lloyd operated a weekly service calling at the following ports: 
Antwerp, Bremerhaven, Gothenburg, Rotterdam, Le Havre, Liverpool, Halifax, New 
York, Baltimore, Portsmouth, Montreal and Toronto - Hamilton and Quebec are 
served overland. Feeder services are provided to and from Dublin, Boston (Mass) and 
Portsmouth NH. This was a joint service with ACL. 
The fleet statistics were as follow: 
28 vessels (6 chartered in, 3 chartered out, 1 owned by Hapag Lloyd International 
Singapore chartered out) 
3 operated on the Europe - ECNA which were all fiiUy cellular with speeds of 20.5kts 
and capacities of 2,594 TEU. 
The company operated 110,127 TEU. 
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INDEPENDENT CONTAINERLINE LTD. 
The North Europe-USEC was the only service operated by this American based company. 
Ports of call were Antwerp, Chester PA, and Richmond VA. It used three chartered in FC 
vessels and ran every 9 days. The vessels all operated at 16kts, 2 holding 918 TELTs and the 
other holding 754. Containers operated numbered 5,470 TEU. 
LYKES LINES 
This American company was a subsidiary of the Interocean Steamship Corporation. It 
operated a USGC/EC - North Europe/UK service every 6 days calling at Houston, Galveston, 
New Orleans, Baltimore, Norfolk, Antwerp, Bremerhaven, Felixstowe, Le Havre, Norfolk, 
Galveston. This was operated through a joint/vessel sharing agreement with Deppe. Of the 
34 vessels operated, 10 were chartered in, 4 chartered out, 5 operated on the service which 
covCTS the North Atlantic, and 3 operated on various services as required. Details of the latter 
8 vessels were as follow:-
Number 
3 
2 
Type 
FC 
FC 
Speed (kts) 
18.5 
19 
TElTs 
1,093 
2,411 
Variable Operations: 
Number 
2 
1 
Type 
SC 
BB 
Speed 
17.5 
20 
TEU's 
204 
61 
The company operated 14,888 TEUs of which 14,848 were owned and 40 leased. 
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MAERSK 
The Danish company Maersk, belonged to the AP MoUer Group and operated a fleet of fuUy 
containerised and ro/ro vessels with cellular space in a global network of liner and feeder 
services. It operated a N.Europe/UK - USECAVC fixed day weekly service calling at the 
following ports: 
Le Havre, Felixstowe, Rotterdam, Bremerhaven, Halifax, New York, Norfolk, 
Charleston, Long Beach, Oakland, Long Beach, Miami, Charleston, Baltimore, New 
York, Le Havre with other American and European ports served via feederAnland 
transport services. The service was My integrated with the FE/Japan/USWC/EC link. 
The fleet statistics were as follow: 
55 vessels (16 chartered in, 2 long term leased fi-om DMK leasing, 5 bareboat 
chartered fi"om DMK leasing, 5 owned by Maersk Singapore Ltd). 
12 vessels were operated on the North Atlantic service, these were all fiilly cellular 10 
of them having speeds of 24kts and capacities of 4,000 TEU, the remaining two having 
speeds of 23kts and capacities of 3,000 TEU. 
Maersk operated over 125,000 TEU containers. 
MEDITERRANEAN SHIPPING COMPANY SA 
Registered in Switzerland, the company operated a fixed day weekly service on the North 
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Europe/UK - USEC route which called at the following ports:-
Antwerp, Hamburg, Bremen, Felixstowe, Le Havre, Boston, New York, Baltimore, 
Newport News, Antwerp. Joon Liner services Express Line has a slot charter 
arrangement with the service. 
The company controlled 35 vessels of which 2 were chartered in and one was chartered out. 
Three vessels ran on the North Atlantic service, 1 was fully cellular and could operate at 20kts 
and hold 1,300 containers, and 2 were ro-ro with cellular space with speeds of 18.6kts and 
1,146 capacity. Containers operated numbered 55,000 TEU. 
NEDLLOYD LINES 
Based in the Netheriands, the company was an operating division of the Royal Nedlloyd Group 
NV which also owned KNSM and had a 50% equity interest in North Sea Ferries. On the 
North Atlantic it operated a fixed day weekly service calling at the following ports: 
Bremerhaven, Felixstowe, Rotterdam, Le Havre, Boston, Port Elizabeth (cargo for 
New York), Norfolk, Bremerhaven. Operates in joint schedule and space charter 
arrangement with P&O containers and SeaLand. 
Fleet statistics were as follow: 
59 vessels (3 co-owned with P&O and Swire, 8 chartered in, 2 owned and operated 
by SeaLand as Nedlloyd contribution to the North Atlantic services, 2 jointly owned 
with CGM, 1 co-owned with P&O containers (Pacific), 1 chartered out, 2 operated by 
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Sinbad Lines (Hong Kong)). 
On the North Atlantic the company operated 2 fully cellular vessels with speeds of 
19kts and capacities of 3,546 TEU. 
The company operated 145,000 TEU in a combination of owned and leased imits. 
NEFTUNE ORIENT LINES (NOL) 
Neptune Orient Lines had its head ofiBce in Singapore and associate oflBces in Australia, 
Indonesia and the UK. The fleet list was as follows: 
CL 12 
WL 1 
CN 5 
CF 2 
DN 6 
The North Atlantic route was operated by NOL in conjunction with NYK and Hapag Lloyd. 
Ports of call were Antwerp, Bremerhaven, Rotterdam Thamesport - New York, Savannah, Los 
Angeles, Oakland - Tokyo/ Yokohama, Kobe - Hong Kong - Kaohsiung. Containers operated 
numbered 16,599. 
NIPPON YUSEN KAISHA (NYK) 
NYK had its head office in Tokyo, Japan. It operated 327 vessels of which 62 were owned. 
Containers operated numbered 150,451 TEU, comprising 97,632 owned and 52,819 leased. 
NYK was a partner in the weekly Tri Continent service operated with NOL and Hapag Lloyd. 
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TN 
TR 
BN 
BS 
TO 
2 
6 
2 
7 
11 
Ports of call were Antwerp, Bremerhaven, Rotterdam, Thamesport - New York, Savannah, 
Los Angeles, Oakland - Tokyo/ Yokohama, Kobe - Hong Kong - Kaohsiung. 
ORIENT OVERSEAS CONTAINER LINE 
Based in Hong Kong, this company was a part of Orient Overseas International Line Limited. 
It operated a fixed day weekly service between UK/North Europe - ECNA calling at the 
following ports:-
Halifax, New York, Norfolk, Charleston, Felixstowe, Zeebruge, Bremerhaven, 
Felixstowe, Le Havre, Halifax. 
The fleet consisted of 33 vessels of which 
1 is co-owned with Kline and CMB; jointly chartered with Neptune Orient Lines 
(NOL); operated by NOL 
4 are chartered out 
1 is chartered in 
1 is co-owned with Canada Maritime 
4 fijUy cellular vessels operated on the UK/North Europe - ECNA, these had the 
following speeds and capacities:-
Speed (kts) 
21 
18.5 
21.5 
18.5 
TEU 
2,118 
2,250 
2,116 
2,266 
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P & O CONTAINERS LTD 
P & O Containers Ltd was a British based company operating a N.Europe/UK - USEC weekly 
service calling at the following ports 
Bremerhaven, Felixstowe, Rotterdam, Le Havre, Boston, Port Elizabeth, Norfolk, 
Bremwhaven. The service operated a joint sailing and slot exchange agreement with 
Nedlloyd and SeaLand. 
Fleet statistics were as foliow:-
34 vessels - 4 chartered in 
2 chartered out 
2 jointly chartered with Ben Line 
1 part ownership through share in ASCL (18.5%) 
2 part ownership through share in AAE (37%) 
3 operated by Sealand, deployed by P & O Containers in co-ordinated 
North Atlantic service 
3 majority ownership (74%) 
1 for AJCL service 
On the North Atlantic service the company operated 4 fully cellular vessels with speeds of 
19kts and TEU capacities of 3,456. 
Containers operated numbered 127,000 of which 84,000 were ovmed and 43,000 were leased. 
POLISH OCEAN LINES 
Already discussed in some detail, Polish Ocean Lines was a state owned company which 
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operated a weekly service between the Baltic/North Europe and ECNA calling at Gdynia, 
Bremerhaven, Le Havre, Halifax, New York, Baltimore, Wilmington NC, New York, Le 
Havre, Rotterdam, Bremerhaven, Grdynia. The service utilised four sister vessels of con-ro 
type, each with a maximum speed of 21.65kts and capacities of 1,424 TEU (320 TEU in ro/ro 
spaces). The total fleet consisted of 64 vessels which included a mixture of reefers, containers, 
con-ro, general cargo, ro/ro and feeder vessels. 
SEA LAND SERVICE INC 
The American company, SeaLand, owned 47 vessels and operated services worldwide. On 
the North Atlantic run it called at the ports of Boston, Port Elizabeth, Norfolk, Bremerhaven, 
Felbcstowe, and Rotterdam. This was a weekly service using four vessels. Sea Land's fleet 
consisted of 12 Atlantic class vessels (18kts, capacity 1,700 40ft units), 12 D-9J class vessels 
(22kts 1,236 container capacity), 4 C8 vessels (21.8kt 1,025 40ft containers), and 19 other 
vessels. 
The company operated 110,754 containers of various types. 
SENATOR 
The German company. Senator, established an east/westbound round-the-world consortium 
with DSR and Cho Yang under the name Tricon, inaugural sailings commenced during January 
1991. 
Senator ran between North Europe/UK/Far East/Japan/USWC/ Panama/USEC weekly 
eastbound and between North Europe/UK/USEC/Panama/USWC/Japan/Far East weekly 
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westbound with ports of call as listed under Cho Yang. 
14 vessels were chartered in of which the following 13 folly cellular vessels operated on the 
service which includes the North Atlantic : 
Number 
4 
4 
2 
2 
1 
Speed (kts) 
18 
18 
18 
18 
19 
Container Capacity 
1,754 
2,000 
1,923 
1,743 
1,061 
The company operated 40,735 TEU of which 2100 were owned and 38,635 were leased. 
(Company information taken from Lloyds Maritime Directory 1992, Fairplay 1992-93 and 
Containerisation International Yearbook 1991). 
There were a number of joint/vessel sharing agreements in operation on the North Atlantic in 
late 1992, namely: 
* ACL/Hapag Lloyd operated slot sharing services in the North American trade. ACL's 
ro-ro capacity was not included in the agreement and the two Unes retained separate 
marketing responsibilities. 
SeaLand/P&O/Nedlloyd/OOCL - Maersk were involved in talks which centred on 
joining this joint service, the lines already chartered space on Maersk's sailings. The 
1992 annual report of SeaLands parent company, claimed that "through vessel sharing 
and asset pooling arrangements with other container shipping companies - SeaLand has 
begun to reduce its cost base, whilst oflFering customers better sailing frequencies, port 
coverage and transit times". 
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* Lykes/Deppe (noted earlier) 
* DSR/Senator/Cho Yang (noted earlier) 
* ACL/Mediterranean Shipping Company - ACL claimed that this link with MSC 
resulted in better utilisation of equipment with attendant decrease in costs (ACL/MSC 
1992). The joint service was significant as ACL was a former "conference" member, 
whilst MSC was an "independent" carrier prior to the establishment of the Trans 
Atlantic Agreement. 
* Singapore based NOL and Japanese NYK also set up new services on the North 
Atlantic in conjunction with Hapag Lloyd. 
As discussed eailier this research will compare POL's operations with those of competitors on 
the North Atlantic trade who are based in the European Community - these being P & O 
Containers Ltd (UK), Maersk (Denmark), Hapag Lloyd (Germany), DSR (Germany), Senator 
(Germany), Contship UK Ltd (UK), and Nedlloyd (Netherlands) - and a more detailed study 
of these companies' operations will follow later. 
The comparison is to be carried out by first examining the fiiU scope of each company's 
operations within a fi-amework identical to that of Polish Ocean Lines' in chapter sk. The 
companies included in the fi-amework are those noted above, ie P & O, Maersk, Hapag Lloyd, 
DSR-Senator, Contship, and Nedlloyd. This includes every European Community operator 
involved on the west bound trade within the TAA and represents both structured and 
unstructured members of the TAA as well as independent operators. Companies which are 
excluded are therefore MSC (Switzerland), Evergreen (Taiwan), Independent Container Line 
(USA), SeaLand (USA), OOCL (Hong Kong), Cho Yang (S.Korea), Lykes (USA), ACL 
(USA), NOL (Singapore), NYK (Japan) and Atlantic Cargo Services (Sweden). These are 
registered in countries other than those of the European Community in 1992/3. Although 
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Dqjpe are a German registered company, their activities have been excluded as they offer only 
a limited service through a joint agreement with Lykes. Also excluded are transhipment 
services where the North Atlantic section forms a small part of a wdder service, making the 
conditions of these markets irrelevant to this research. 
Table 13 shows more clearly a summary of the criteria which led to company selection or 
rejection for the competitors' framework. 
Figure 12 shows the European Community framework for the selected companies which 
indicates the position of each chosen competitor at the end of 1992. Information for the 
frameworic was obtained during a series of structured interviews, as discussed in chapter three. 
These were held with senior management from the companies involved (see appendix one), and 
again an example of the interview schedule can be seen in appendix 5. The framework will 
now be examined in some detail, extracting the principle trends by taking each element of each 
V in turn. It should be noted that for eventual comparison purposes the EC based 
con:y)etitors will generally be treated as one set rather than individually. This is possible due 
to their many similarities, as the majority of their operations are regulated by the same bodies, 
ie the TAA and European Community. 
PRICE 
1. Rebates 
None of the operators studied offer rebates to regular shippers on the North Atlantic trade. 
Members of the TAA are not permitted to offer rebates, whilst the independent operator 
Contship is prevented from offering rebates by the Federal Maritime Commission (FMC) in 
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Company 
Atlantic Cargo 
Services 
ACL 
Cho Yang 
Contship 
Deppe 
DSR 
Evergreen 
Hapag Lloyd 
Independent 
Container Line 
Lykes 
Maersk 
MSC 
NedUoyd 
NOL 
>fYK 
OOCL 
P & O Containers 
Sea Land 
Senator 
Country 
Sweden 
USA 
South Korea 
UK 
German 
German 
Taiwan 
German 
USA 
USA 
Denmark 
Switzerland 
Netherlands 
Singapore 
Japan 
Hong Kong 
UK 
USA 
German 
TAA membership 
Independent 
Structured 
Unstructured 
Independent 
Independent 
Unstructured 
Independent 
Structured 
Independent 
Independent 
Structured 
Unstructured 
Structured 
Structured 
Structured 
Structured 
Structured 
Structured 
Unstructured 
Select - yes or no 
No 
No 
No 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
No 
No 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
No 
No 
No 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
Table 13: Summary of North Atlantic operators in 1992 - showing country of register and level 
of TAA membership. 
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the United States under anti trust laws. Hence for this element of price, the position for each 
European Community based company is identical in that no rebates are offered due to outside 
controls. 
2. Discounts 
Members of the TAA are only permitted to offo" discounts in exceptional circumstances. This 
can occur where a shipper solely using a TAA member line such as P & O, Maersk or 
Nedlloyd, wishes to move to an outsider such as Contship. Where this is the case, 
'independent action' is permissable with the sanction at company director level and then the 
express permission of the TAA secretariat. As independent operators, Contship are able to 
offer discounts on a commercial basis, and do so according to customer. 
3. Price for transporting one TEU 
The price for transporting one TEU westbound across the North Atlantic is fixed by the TAA, 
and this price is inclusive of all surcharges, port costs, and terminal charges. For structured 
members of the TAA the price level in early 1993 was US $1085. Unstructured members were 
set a price of approximately US $50 less. Independent operators such as Contship 
consequently tended to offer a price slightly below the unstructured level to attract customers. 
4. Market Segmentation 
The companies studied all segmented the market on standard commercial bases, for example 
by customer or by commodity, within the confines allowed by the TAA. The exception here 
is Contship who provide independent competition due to their fi-eedom of segmentation. 
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5. Subsidy 
As a general rule none of the lines received any subsidy by the end of 1992. The exception 
here is Hapag Lloyd who admitted receiving some indirect subsidy and were the preferred 
carrier for state sensitive goods, and state employees. Fairplay quoted a figure of DM 50m as 
a total of the amount of subsidy provided to German shipping during 1992, although the 
amoimt received by Hapag Lloyd remains undisclosed (Fairplay 22/10/92) . DSR received 
direct and indirect subsidies under the old regime, but these ceased upon German reunification 
in 1991. Overall the position of the competitors is of independent companies operating in a 
fi-ee market with little or no subsidy. 
6. Currency Convertibility 
Each of the European Community companies are based in countries with fiilly convertible 
currencies and operationally they will accept any convertible currency as payment. 
7. State Control 
Notably DSR, formerly owned by DDR was transferred to German state ownership upon 
ramification in 1991. The position for all other Community based operators is one of private 
ownra^p with no direct state involvement. However, there is some evidence of government 
influoice and the effects of politics upon operators; witness Maersk who are Denmark's third 
biggest export carrier. 
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8. Profits 
Of the figures available for this fi-amework four companies made outright losses on all shipping 
activities during 1992, and two were profitable: 
Losses: 
Nedlloyd 
Hapag Lloyd Liner Division 
Senator 
DSR 
Fls 
DM 
DM 
DM 
58.2m 
50 m 
30 m 
19.7m 
Profits: 
P & O (Container and Bulk shipping) £ 36.2m 
Contship US$ 10 m 
Many of the losses made by the Community competitors can be attributed to poor returns in 
the liner market at that time, typified by those on the North Atlantic. It also reflects the highly 
competitive and rather curious structure of the North Atlantic market - whereby companies 
continued to underprice their services - thus making losses - whilst continuing to offer a high 
service level. This defies conventional market wisdom - which suggests that a reaction in cost 
or service level should have occurred - and provides the basis for the development and 
introduction of the TAA. 
PROMOTION 
1. Sponsorship and Hospitality 
Due to financial limitations the companies studied generally carried out little (eg Contship) or 
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no (eg DSR-Senator and Maersk) sponsorship or hospitality during 1992. There was however 
greater evidence of these activities at P & O who sponsored the Royal Ballet and the UK Jetski 
team and provided hospitality at the Grand National and golfing events. Overall the low level 
of activity in these areas can be seen as a reflection of low returns in the liner market creating 
financial limitations. 
2. Advertising 
The majority of companies studied carried out a relatively small amount of advertising in late 
1992 due to financial limitations. An outstanding example of this is the reduction of Hapag 
Lloyd's advertising budget fi"om around DM 8m in 1991 to almost zero in 1992. However, all 
companies, including Hapag Lloyd still advertised in the shipping and related press, for 
example Lloyds Loading List, and the occasional Lloyds List, International Freighting Weekly, 
Containerisation International and the Journal of Commerce. The general press was used very 
occasionally, and was usually linked to special issues. The advertising aims of all companies 
were to maintain presence in the market, and to provide information about their company and 
services. The overall position of European Community companies at the end of 1992 was 
that their financial position only permitted a minimal amount of advertising at the time that they 
needed to increase business to survive. 
3. Image 
Each of the European Community based companies had a clear and comprehensive corporate 
image. The 'images' were usually created using various styles, colours and logos, and they had 
to appear in every promotional activity. The aim of each company was to convey a consistent 
image of quality, which was readily identifiable, and which reflected the way that they wished 
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to be perceived. 
4. Representatives and Agents 
All the companies questioned employed both representatives and agents to cover as wide a 
scope as possible in their relevant areas of the world. The feeling amongst most companies 
was that owned agents and representatives were the better option. This was true at Maersk 
(195), and particularly at P & O (228) who owned all representatives and agents where 
posable, ie everywhere but Canada or Eire. The exception to the rule was Hapag Lloyd whose 
policy was to use regionally owned but independent companies. 
5. Market Research 
No specific budget or personnel were employed for market research purposes by Hapag Lloyd, 
DSR-Senator or Contship. Market research here was carried out internally by trade managers 
or representatives. The other three companies carried out this activity in specific in house 
areas, withNedlloyd claiming to have around 10% of its staff working on market research at 
any one time. Again, low levels of market research can to some extent be attributed to 
financial limitations. 
6. Public Relations (PR) 
Limited budgets have placed financial restraints upon PR activities especially at Hapag Lloyd 
where there was virtually no budget available for PR. However, all the companies studied 
provided promotional items in late 1992/ early 1993, such as pens and calendars. Although 
many referred to these items as 'throwaways' they were usually produced to the highest 
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possible standard and were in keeping with the corporate logos to further promote the desired 
corporate images of quality. More expensive gifts, such as sweaters, glass bottled ships, and 
even liqueurs, were usually reserved as loyalty bonuses for established customers, through a 
process of strategic targeting. 
7. Directories 
In early 1993 all the companies surveyed appeared in major shipping directories with world 
wide coverage, for example Lloyds Maritime Directory, Fairplay, and Containerisation 
International. This would appear to be standard practice throughout the shipping world. 
8. Literature 
All the companies in the study produced literature in early 1993. This was usually in the form 
of corporate brochures, schedules, annual reports and accounts. Maersk produced one of the 
most extensive ranges which included fleet, reefer and regional brochures. Literature is 
generally distributed on commercial and demand bases. All companies produced their 
literature in English - shipping's international language - with Hapag Lloyd also supplying 
German literature. The overall position of the Community based companies was one of high 
quality literature, with strong corporate images, reflecting quality market positions. 
9. Agencies 
The study revealed that advertising agents were rarely used by shipping companies, which 
reflected the general nature of the industry. Of the selected European Community based 
companies the only one to use advertising agents were P & O and this only applied to their 
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activities in the United States, and hence was for market related reasons rather than company 
preference. 
10. Exhibitioneering 
Five of the six companies questioned stated that they did not carry out any exhibitioneering 
during 1992, mainly due to lack of financial resources. The only exception is Contship, where 
a limited amount of exhibitioneering was carried out - mainly by the parent company. 
11. Press Releases 
All companies carried out press releases during 1992 as circumstances required. No specific 
examples were given, but press releases are standard shipping practice, and are usually 
produced in English, shipping's international language. 
PHYSICAL EVIDENCE 
1. Containers 
The companies included in the fi^amework all owned and/or leased substantial numbers of 
containers, including 85,000 at Hapag Lloyd, 185,000 TEUs at P & O to 110,000 of 27 types 
and eight sizes at Nedlloyd. 
For each of the companies studied the majority of containers are usually owned, with some 
long lease and some short lease to cover peaks in the market. All owned and long leased 
containers were painted in the company's own colours to maintain consistency of corporate 
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images. 
2. Vehicles 
The majority of companies owned or had associated trucking companies, although Hapag 
Lloyd and DSR-Senator used third party subcontractors. Other vehicle ownership ranged from 
none at DSR-Senator, Hapag Lloyd, and Maersk, to P & O owning a limited amount of port 
equipmoit, and Nedlloyd operating a wide range including rail wagons, aeroplane subsidiaries 
and offshore drilling. Where vehicle ownership was limited the European Community based 
shipping companies usually used those belonging to associated companies or those of 
companies with which they had formed strong collaborative and commercial links. 
3. Company OfiSces 
There is no standard pattern of company offices; each situation varied according to company 
policy and size. Office ownership ranged from DSR-Senator who have seven offices in 
Germany, Cyprus, Dubai, Hong Kong and USA, to Maersk with 196 oflSces spread throughout 
the world. 
4. Ports Served regularly as part of North Atlantic service 
Of the seven companies listed all called at New York, six called at Le Havre, Rotterdam, and 
Norfolk, and five visited Bremerhaven. The range of other ports visited as part of the service 
varied considerably (see figure 12) from Hapag Lloyd serving fourteen ports as part of this 
service to Contship serving seven. 
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5. Routes served regularly 
The companies listed offered a range of services, with no real pattern. Examples included: 
Nedlloyd -
DSR-Senator 
Maersk -
30 liner services world wide 
RTW (both directions), Mediterranean, Middle East, South East Asia, 
Far East 
From Europe to Far East, Middle East, MediterraneanAVest Africa, 
USA/Canada, South AmericaAVest Coast, and inter European services. 
The fiill extent of the European Community operators services are shown in Figure 12. 
PROCESS 
1. Conference and Consortia 
Of the sk companies studied, five belonged to the TAA. P&O, Nedlloyd, Maersk and Hapag 
Lloyd were all structured members of the TAA, whilst DSR-Senator was an unstructured 
member. Contship remained an independent company. 
2. Guaranteed TraflBc 
None of the companies questioned claimed to receive any guaranteed traflBc. However, 
Hapag Lloyd were the preferred carrier for state sensitive goods and state employees. 
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3. Collaboration 
Four of the companies Usted in the framework used their own road haulage companies, these 
being P&O, Nedlloyd, Contship, and Maersk. Hapag Lloyd and DSR-Senator used 
independent contractors. For rail transport, commercially based contracts with third parties 
were more usual, although Nedlloyd and Contship used their own wagons and companies 
respectively. Other collaboration involved warehousing and logistics companies which were 
occasionally in house. 
PLACE 
1. Origins and destinations - see physical evidence 
2. Computer reservation systems 
Computer reservation systems were widely used by all six Community based companies. 
Perhaps the most impressive and extensive example of this was provided by Maersk. At 
Maersk all offices were connected by a satellite computer system. They used an in house EDP 
company to provide full management information systems, and to provide details of 
shipments, among a wide range of highly varied facilities. 
PEOPLE 
1. Qualifications and training schemes 
The m^ority of companies used in house trmning schemes with only occasional use of outside 
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organisations. Only DSR had no evident in house training schemes, although under German 
law the company was required to run graduate training schemes for new employees. At the 
other end of the scale Maersk ran both internal and external schemes at their head quarters in 
Copenhagen. Training was used as a motivational issue with a range of courses offered; for 
exanq)le global sales training ran as six or seven schemes of two to three days each. The high 
profile of training reflected their position as a quality operator. 
2. Employees 
The number of employees varied widely. Contship employed a total of 900 people, while 
DSR-Senator and P&O Containers employed between 4000 and 5000. Nedlloyd's total 
employee figure was in the region of 25,000 - although this included a wide range of non 
shipping activities. 
3. Management Structures 
The general pattern within the shipping companies listed was for a "pyramid style" 
management structure. There was often an overall Executive Board under which a Managing 
Director oversaw Directors for each particular trade. Contship and P & O provide two 
examples: 
Contship 
Owner 
MD 
Contship various other lines 
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P&O 
P&O Board 
1 
Containers Ferries Etc 
MD 
FT "n 
Director for each trade 
4. Unions 
Union membership was usually regionally based. On the shore side union membership was 
often limited or not recognised at all, such as at P&O. Sea staff were more likely to belong 
to a union, such as the majority of Hapag Lloyd's seafarers. The main exception was DSR 
where due to the tradition of the old regime unions remained fairly strong - this was in sharp 
contrast to the situation of many shipping companies still situated within the Eastern bloc, such 
as POL, where union power had become diminished due to its association with the old regime. 
PRODUCT 
1. Speed 
The speed of service offered by each company varied according to a wide range of factors 
including routes taken, type of service, vessels used, fiiel costs and company policies. It would 
therefore be misrepresentative to compare the days taken by different companies to reach 
different ports. Generally, the time to reach New York from Felixstowe was between 10 and 
12 days, and to reach Boston was around 9 days. 
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2. Safety 
Due to the commercial sensitivity of this data, no safety nor container loss records were made 
available to the research, although each company questioned claimed to have a good safety 
record. 
3. Reliability 
Again no data was available for this part of the research due to commercial reasons. 
4. Frequency of services on the North Atlantic 
The range of frequencies of services reflected the v«de scope of services offered by the six 
Community based companies. These included four sailings a week by P & O fi"om Europe to 
North America and back, a weekly service by Maersk, and DSR-Senator, and a service every 
18 days westbound only by Contship. 
5. Quantity 
This proved a difficult figure to obtain for the specific market but some examples were 
provided by Nedlloyd who moved approximately 125,000 TEUs across the North Atlantic 
during 1992, Maersk who moved approximately 150,000 TEUs, and Hapag Lloyd who 
moved a total of approximately 210,000 TEUs east and west bound over the same period. No 
separate figures were available for west bound alone. 
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6. Ship Types 
The number and type of vessels operated varied between the companies. For example DSR-
Senator operated 24 vessels, whilst Maersk operated 43 vessels. Over the same period 
Hapag Lloyd operated 18 container vessels, 1 passenger vessel and a number of smaller 
vessels including tugs and launches, whilst P&O, amongst a fairly extensive fleet, ran 28 
purpose built container ships. The number and type varied according to company size, policy 
and markets served, but all vessels carried their respective company's corporate image. 
7. Flag 
Flag varied according to the country in which the company was based and the company 
policies. Flags used in 1992 were as follow:-
Maersk 
Contship 
Hapag Lloyd 
Nedlloyd 
DSR 
Senator 
P & O 
Danish 
mainly German 
mainly German 
Dutch 
German 
Liberian, Panama 
Hong Kong, Gibraltar 
Again these results indicated a position of quality, with very little use of the so called 'flags of 
convenience'. It remains to be seen whether this position will change as financial pressures 
encourage companies to flag out. 
8. Cross trades 
All companies participated in the cross trades both as part of the activities upon the North 
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Atlantic and elsewhere. This is standard shipping practice, and is to be expected in such an 
international industry. 
9. Computer tracking for containers 
Of the six companies studied, all used computer tracking for containers as standard. 
10. Trading terms 
Trading terms were usually based upon contract and were in accordance with current market 
conditions. 
The framework has provided us with an overall picture of the European Community based 
competitors' position. Summarising each element in turn: 
Price 
Each of the SK companies were in a similar situation as regarded price. The price element was 
mostly controlled by the TAA, for example in terms of level of charges, rebates and discounts. 
They each were struggling to make profits in a depressed market and each received little or no 
subsidy. However, generally it can be said that the European Community operators were 
aiming at the quality end of the market through their choice of TAA membership, and therefore 
were able to charge the associated higher prices. 
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Promotion 
It is paradoxical to note that promotion was often limited due to financial restraints, at a time 
when companies needed to increase business. However, those promotional activities which 
were carried out were of notably high quality, for example the high standard of PR items 
produced. All promotional activities were geared towards creating a clear and consistent 
quality image - reflecting the position the companies wished to occupy within the market. 
Physical Evidence 
Generally, the European Community operators attempted to create a high profile, through 
quality physical evidence and consistent and comprehensive company image. Examples of this 
include painting all owned and long leased containers in the company's own colours, and where 
appropriate maintaining a presence on routes of global importance, such as the North Atlantic, 
even if this meant incurring losses. 
Process 
Overall the companies were involved in significant process activities. Firstly, the majority -
five out of six - belonged to the TAA. Secondly, all were involved in a strong degree of 
collaboration either through ownership of related companies - for example P&O and Contship 
OAvning road haulage companies - or through established commercial relationships - which all 
companies had established with rail, logistics and warehousing interests. 
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Place 
The place element for the majority of the companies was also strong. For example computer 
resa\^on ^stems were used without exception, with Maersk providing the best example, and 
extoisive ranges of origins and destinations were offered. These examples fiirther reflect the 
required position of quality operators, with a strong position within the market place. 
People 
The quality position occupied by the European Community based competitors was enhanced 
by the issues relating to the people element. These issues included low levels of union power, 
but were perhaps best exemplified by the degree of importance placed upon issues such as 
qualifications, training and motivation, particularly evident at Maersk. 
Product 
Generally the product offered was one of quality, and most of the product elements reflected 
this, with examples existing in terms of speed, frequency and eflBciency. A number of 
companies, such as P&O, had impressive fleets, with the majority sailing under 'respectable' 
flags. Again the product element pointed towards quality conscious companies operating at 
the upper end of the market. 
Overall it can be said that the European Community competitors generally offered a high 
profile, quality service for which they could charge a higher price, and that consequently they 
occupied a relatively strong market position on every aspect - emphasised through their TAA 
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membership and collaboration. 
Having looked at each element of the framework in some detail we will go on in chapter eight 
to compare the differences in position between POL and its European Community based 
competitors on the North Atlantic trade, and in particular whether POL changed its position 
relative to the European Community operators during the 1988 -1992/3 period. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
POSITIONAL COMPARISON 
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In the previous two chapters we have established the general market positions for Polish Ocean 
Lines and its European competitors on the North Atlantic trade. The frameworks created in 
these chapters have provided a structure (using the 7 P's and their elements to assess each) 
\^ iiich will enable us to go on to compare the relative market positions, to assess whether POL 
has repositioned in any aspect. Earlier discussions have shown that it is widely agreed that 
POL's position is seen as some way behind that of western operators - for example in over 
employment, dated management structures, promotional structures and attitudes towards profit 
making and privatisation - views clearly backed by Containerisation International (1993), and 
Ernst and Young (1990). We will now also attempt to establish whether this position in the 
market place is stable or changing - that is, whether POL is moving towards the European 
competitors' position, attempting to do this, falling fiirther behind or simply changing direction 
between the years of 1988 and 1992/1993. 
This will be achieved using the matrix approach described in chapter three. As no suitable 
technique exists to enable positional comparison the method has been developed by the author. 
The use of matrices is supported throughout the thesis as a useful and useable display 
technique (Patton 1987, Friend and Hickling 1987), and consistency is further maintained by 
the use of this qualitative rather than quantitative analysis. By setting out each of the positions 
on the seven P's for POL on one axis, and the seven P's for the European competitors on the 
other, we will be able to compare and assess every possible combination of positional 
movement. The matrix will examine the 1988 and 1992 positions for POL, and the 1992 
position for the Community based competitors. This should indicate whether the positional 
changes which have taken place in POL have resulted in movement towards or away from the 
Community operators aggregated position. POL's movements toward or away from the 1992 
EC position are represented by arrows. It must be emphasised that this technique only attempts 
to create a visual display of directional movement, there is no attempt at quantification. 
282 
Although the comparison is diflScuh because it attempts to compare a diverse range of 
information, it is essential to assessing any positional movement by POL. The complete matrix 
is shown in figure 13, and it is to this that we will now turn our attention by comparing POL's 
situation for each of the seven P's in 1988 and 1992 with that of the Community based 
competitors in 1992: 
Polish Ocean Lines' Price: 
In broad terms the 1988 position on price for POL can be described as low. At that time POL 
oflEered a market led price which was below that of many other operators, and which reflected 
a cheaper, lower quality service. By 1992 POL had become an unstructured member of the 
TAA and had raised its price accordingly. This movement of raising price and bringing pricing 
structures directly into line with European operators can be seen as representing part of a rise 
in service quality generally. 
By comparison the position of the Community operators appears high in each of the seven P's. 
The competitors charge a high, TAA controlled price for a highly marketable quality service 
product. They undertake significant and sophisticated promotional activity to maintain a quality 
image. They possess significant levels of quality physical evidence. Process is a prominent 
aspect with considerable levels of collaboration and conference membership. They employ 
high levels of qualified people and promote training schemes, and they occupy distinct, strong 
and favoured positions within the market place. 
Here, it may be concluded that by a positional change in terms of price, POL has moved 
directly towards the quality position shown by each of the seven P's of the Community based 
operators. This can clearly be seen in figure 13 by looking at the direction of the arrows 
indicating positional movement within those cells which relate to POL's price element. 
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Polish Ocean Lines' promotion: 
In 1988 the position of POL in terms of promotion was low both in terms of quality and 
quantity. By 1992 this position remained unchanged. Despite plans to raise the level of 
promotional activities in terms of quantity and quality, POL's ambitions were thwarted by 
financial problems. 
Where the promotional element of POL is compared with the competitors, figure 13 again 
shows that the Community based operators remain high in each of the seven P's, as discussed 
above. 
The consistently low promotional position of POL and the high quality position of the 
competitors in each of the P's therefore remain mismatched. The lack of any arrows in this 
section of the figure reiterates the point the there has been no positional change by POL in 
promotional terms. 
Polish Ocean Lines' Physical Evidence: 
In 1988 the level of physical evidence utilised by POL was high in terms of quantity and rather 
low in terms of quality. By late 1992 POL had rationalised its level of physical evidence, 
decreasing quantity in an effort to raise quality - for example through route and port reduction, 
and vessel depletion - and the quality was consequently raised - for example by lowering 
average ship age and by changes to the routes served, for example removing some ex CMEA 
ports fi-om regular services. 
As mentioned previously, the European Community based competitors' position was one of 
quality in every aspect of the seven P's. Hence, when we compare the changes in POL with 
the competitors' situation, we can see that POL's physical evidence adjustments have increased 
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quality aiflfidently to constitute a direct movement towards the general Community position. 
Again, this is indicated by the presence of arrows on the diagram shown in figure 13. 
Polish Ocean Lines' Process: 
In 1988 process formed a prominent aspect of POL's operations, with evidence of integrated 
collaboration and membership to a number of conferences. By 1992 collaboration was 
conadCTably reduced as subsidiary companies were being sold off prior to privatisation of the 
whole, and the removal of state control meant that relationships could be formed on a 
commercial basis rather than dictated by the state. Notably, overall conference membership 
was also considerably reduced by 1992 although this was said to be due to the prevailing 
market situation. 
By way of comparison each area of the competitors' seven P's reflected their quality image and 
position in 1992, for example, process was a prominent aspect with significant levels of 
collaboration and conference membership in most companies studied. Hence POL's reduction 
of the process element can be viewed as a direct move away from the position occupied by the 
competitors. Once more, this is demonstrated by the directional arrows shown in figure 13. 
Polish Ocean Lines' People: 
The general position for POL in terms of people was low for 1988; for example POL was over 
staffed but unable to make redundancies, and there were very few training schemes. By 1992 
the position had changed with POL attempting to deal with people by reducing over 
employment, improving recruitment, increasing training and qualification levels, reducing union 
power and updating management structures. 
As discussed already, the 1992 position for the European Community based competitors was 
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one of quality in each aspect of the seven P's - as one example the companies selected usually 
employed high levels of qualified people with extensive training schemes. When comparing 
the positions it can be seen that POL has moved directly towards the Community position 
during the four year pmod. This can clearly be seen on figure 13 by examining the associated 
arrows. 
Polish Ocean Lines' Product 
In 1988 the general standard of POL's product was low, as is illustrated by the use of ageing 
vessels and variable services. By 1992 there had been some notable attempts to raise product 
quality through the selling of older vessels and some route changes, to name two examples, 
although due to lack of finances this was not completed by late 1992. As already discussed, 
the 1992 position for the Community based competitors was one of quality in every aspect of 
the seven P's, one example being that they offered a highly marketable quality product, that 
being a reliable and efficient service often employing impressive fleets. 
Consequently, with POL's attempts at raising product quality , the comparison of positions 
must point once again to a direct movement by POL towards the stance occupied by the 
Community competitors. This is clearly shown in figure 13 by the direction of arrows relating 
to POL's product element. 
Polish Ocean Line's Place: 
In 1988 POL could be described as having a relatively weak place element, for example 
sometimes serving unprofitable CMEA ports, and making little use of computer systems to 
increase product accessibility. By 1992 the situation had improved in terms of quality, by 
increasing the use of computer systems and altering the origins and destinations served, 
including withdrawal from the old CMEA market, and changes in administrative offices and 
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agent locations. 
As mentioned previously, the quality image of the Community operators is reflected in each 
of the seven P's and subsequently the attempt by POL to raise quality in terms of place 
correlates with a direct movement towards each of the competitors elements. This movement 
can be seen in figure 13 by the presence of arrows in each cell relating to POL's place element. 
It is interesting to note that the majority of comparisons shown in figure 13 indicate some 
movement by POL between the years 1988 and late 1992. Out of a total forty nine cells, thirty 
five indicate a definite movement of POL's position directly towards that of its European 
Community competitors. Only seven cells - those associated v^ dth POL's process element -
indicate a movement which is directly opposite. The remaining seven, that is, those associated 
with POL's promotional activities, show no directional movement. Despite these encouraging 
results for POL, it should be noted that on no occasion has their positional movement actually 
provided a maricet location equivalent to that of the European Community. In terms of each 
'P' broad conclusions can be drawn from the comparisons and their following discussions. 
Price 
Mainly due to its membership of the TAA, POL has moved directly towards the position of 
its competitors on the North Atlantic market in terms of price. The various price elements are 
controlled by the TAA so that POL's membership makes this movement predictable and 
inevitable once the decision to enter into the consortium has been taken. 
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Promotion 
POL's level of promotion was low in 1988 compared to its competitors based in the European 
Community - both in terms of quantity and quality. This remained mainly imchanged by late 
1992. Despite plans to improve and expand promotional activities, POL did not have the 
necessary finance available, and in a limited way promotion may even have been reduced - for 
example advertising. Promotion remains a significant and sophisticated activity of most 
Community operators, TAA or otherwise. 
Physical Evidence 
The amount of POL's physical evidence fell substantially between 1988 and late 1992, for 
example, in terms of numbers of vessels, ownership of subsidiary companies and numbers of 
ports served. If looking at quantity alone, this is a move away from the late 1992 position of 
the European Community competitors. However, in terms of quality alone the rationalisation 
improved physical evidence sufficiently to justify considering the actions as a move towards 
the competitors' position of late 1992. However despite this, one area of poor and declining 
physical evidence still remains - that of vessel age and condition. 
Process 
Process is a notable exception to the general pattern. The process element which involves 
aspects such as collaboration and conference membership, is very prominent in the operations 
of European Community based competitors, but was reduced considerably by POL between 
1988 and late 1992. This was due partly to privatisation plans leading to the setting up of 
independent subsidiaries, and the removal of forced collaboration. Process is perhaps the only 
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area where the position for POL has moved notably away fi^om the competitor's position, 
although one positive aspect is POL's membership of the TAA, albeit at unstructured level. 
People 
The position of the European Community based competitors for late 1992 is one involving a 
very high level of qualified people. POL is moving towards this position as quickly as 
company finances and Poland's economic policy vnJl allow. POL was over staffed both in 1988 
and late 1992, but was not allowed to make the necessary number of redundancies due to state 
interference. Changes in POL's company policy were beginning to make a difference to 
training and qualifications of employees by late 1992. Some evidence of changed management 
attitude was also apparent. 
Product 
Between 1988 and late 1992 POL's position on product moved directly towards that of its 
European Community based competitors. The best example of this is the selling of older 
vessels as a part of raising of the quality of service - although the fleet remains relatively old 
and in deteriorating condition. Other product aspects (such as fi^equency) remained constant. 
Place 
Between 1988 and late 1992 POL's actions regarding the place element represent a fiirther 
move towards the position of the European Community based competitors. Examples include 
increased use of computer systems and changes to the origins and destinations served, bringing 
them more into line with western operations. 
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Overall, it is clear that POL is repositioning within the market place, and is attempting to adopt 
a tack similar to its competitors based in the European Community. Generally, POL is 
attempting to move away from the old image of a lower quality cheaper service, to a better 
quality more expensive western style of operation with improved products, rationalised place 
and attempts at improvements in the use and consideration of people. This repositioning is 
likely to take some time to achieve fiilly, and as time progresses the chance of the ultimate 
company aims changing increases significantly. The reader should also be reminded that this 
research applies only in the context of the North Atlantic trade where the introduction of the 
TAA has placed controls upon the market. In terms of this research this means that the lack 
of a free market prohibits complete free positioning by POL. These points indicate some of 
the many potential areas for further research covered in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER NINE 
CONCLUSIONS 
293 
This research has proven highly topical; witness for example the continuing changes taking 
place throughout East Europe generally, the wide reaching effects of German reunification, 
and the on going debate between the TAA and the Commission of the European Community. 
Notably, the study has had to embrace a wide range of disciplines, and although this 
multi&ceted feature has made it complex to undertake, it has been necessary to ensure that its 
application and outcomes are relevant and pertinent to the existing market place and the 
problems faced by POL. Notable as well is its originality both in its coverage of a new 
situation and its new applications of the various models. Despite this it can be argued that the 
research is highly transferable as it may be applied to other areas, such as other trades, 
companies or countries and still produce meaningful and viable results. For example, an 
analysis of POL's activities in other markets could provide similar or varying results which 
would help to indicate whether the chosen North Atlantic trade was a representative case 
study. The research can further be described as stable. Despite some use of qualitative 
judgement, were the study to be repeated it is more than likely that broadly the same results 
would be achieved. As noted before a quantitative ^ proach could have been accused of being 
spuriously objective. 
The objectives of this research were outlined at the outset as: 
1. To assess the situation of the Polish shipping industry before and after the changes 
which have taken place, between 1988 - 1992 
2. To analyse the effect of East European change upon Polish shipping and to develop 
models to identify the major areas of change and the relationship of changes to the 
shipping industry. 
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3. To analyse through further model development, the significance of change in Polish 
shipping when related to European Community based companies operating in a 
competitive market. 
In the main, these objectives have been achieved at various stages of the research, through the 
use of contextual models, and the fi^amework and two dimensional models which were 
structured by the marketing mix. However, their achievement has been hampered to some 
extent due to substantial and fimdamaital changes taking place throughout East Europe, which 
in effect moved the goal posts of the research. Examples of these changes include the 
succession of elections which have taken place in Poland, POL's recent (1993) withdrawal 
fi-om direct operation in the North Atlantic market, changing politics and instability throughout 
East Europe, the formation of the TAA, the problems in Yugoslavia and the formation of two 
new countries - the Czech Republic and Slovakia, in place of the former Czechoslovakia. 
In the midst of these changes we have been able to establish a market position for POL for 
1988 and late 1992/early 1993. Chapter eight revealed that POL was operating by late 1992 
at the lower end of the marketing scale, offering few add on services, a cheap price, lower 
levels of technology, a poor image and little marketing. On a more positive note POL had 
rationalised ports and routes served, had lowered the average age of its vessels and was 
looking to improve qualifications and training. 
A number of beneficial steps have been made since 1992 including wider installation of 
computer systems and fijrther stafiBng reductions. Cuts to fleet size were continuing as POL 
drove to reduce overheads and create a viable structure for the fiiture (Lloyds List 27/05/94). 
POL was reported to have reduced its cost base by $50million in 1993 (Containerisation 
International 1995). This involved four main factors: 
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1. joint ventures with foreign companies 
2. tighter controls on accounts and invoicing procedures 
3. tighter container logistics and better repositioning systems 
4. smaller companies proving to be more efficient 
By May 1995 POL had made notable progress towards privatisation. It had concentrated its 
assets around the mother company and had released its operating divisions as quasi-
independent daughter companies (Fairplay 1994). The group consisted of subsidiary 
companies as follow (Contamerisation International 1994):-
1. Euroafrica Shipping Line - Operates and manages ro ro, semi container and 
conventional services in the Baltic, North Europe and West Africa. 
2. POL-America - Owns 32 vessels also operates semi container service to South 
America. 
3. POL-Levant - Operates and manages ro ro and conventional services to the 
Mediterranean. 
4. POL-FESA - Manages Europe - Far East service. 
5. POL-Eureka - Manages transatlantic and Mexican Gulf services. 
6. POL-Seal - Operates East Africa breakbulk liner services. 
7. Polcontainer - Container logistics and management. 
8. Polteam - Container repairs. 
9. POL-Supply - Warehouse storage and distribution. 
10. Franck & Tobiesen Poland - Road haulage. 
In 1994 POL gained the legal status of a fiilly commercial holding company and applied to the 
government to be recognised as a fully privatised entity. POL's chief commisioner Kowalski 
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stated that although POL was still fully state owned it was important to establish a private 
limited company, with the aim in the fiiture of going public. He anticipated that this process 
could be accomplished by 1998. Whatever the outcome, it is likely that the government will 
maintain some interest in POL having funded the company's asset base. 
As to the future, POL would appear to have accepted the need for long term strategic 
planning, a relatively new concept for individual companies in East Europe, as this would have 
fellen under the ambit of the CMEA, with plans being centrally controlled. In earlier chapters 
we saw that POL was repositioning towards the position of European competitors on the 
North Atlantic, but as time progresses and market conditions change so will the ultimate goals. 
There are three possible scenarios which may face POL by the turn of the century: 
The first scenario is that POL may catch up with the European based competitors and acheive 
an equivalent market position to these companies. This seems unlikely within this time scale 
given POL'S starting point and the amount of change needed. 
The second scenario is that POL will have exited the market completely. Although POL has 
had to rationalise services considerably, for example withdrawing from operating its own 
vessels on the North Atlantic, it seems unlikely that POL will exit liner shipping altogether. 
It is also questionable whether the government would allow POL to fail in the new market 
environment. Looking to the near fiiture, Lenczewski, POL's chief financial oflBcer, has 
suggested that POL's financial problems may mean that the company has to move toward 
becoming an operator rather than an owner (Fairplay 1994). 
Perhaps a more likely scenario would be for POL to continue in a similar vein to the present 
situation - concentrating upon surviving the changes taking place through crisis management. 
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Other likely future scenarios include a realignment of operations towards Germany and the 
west, particularly the European Community, of which eventual Polish membership seems 
inevitable in the long term. 
In this case study of Poland, and Polish Ocean Lines, shipping seems likely to survive whatever 
the problems, but v/bat is clear is that it will be in a very different form - smaller, more modem 
and more efficient. Although much remains to be done, the attitude of the industry and 
government is accepted internationally as correct and progress is being made. 
In general terms, the amount of restructuring required by East European shipping in order to 
survive the political, social and economic changes taking place is substantial. The situation 
faced by POL can be broadly related to other shipping companies throughout East Europe. 
The research undertaken is highly transferable and could be applied for example to industries 
in Romania, Bulgaria or the Czech Rebublic, but the case of POL helps to develop an 
understanding of the general East European situation. 
As well as establishing the position of POL in late 1992, a number of issues stand out fi"om the 
research, many of which raise questions about the future. Notably, these issues fall into two 
main categories - commercial and theoretical. 
Commercial 
One of the most basic questions which must be asked is whether East Europe should remain 
involved in operating and owning shipping, in particular from an economic viewpoint. 
Although shipping is an efficient method of earning hard currency, the demise of the CMEA 
has meant that its defence and insularity are no longer issues, and returns on investments may 
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be greater in other areas. However, a decision to exit from the shipping market is complicated 
by the need to consider its political acceptability. Following on from this, it is peculiar that 
shipping operators throughout the world often persist in markets where they have made losses 
for a successive number of years, not least the North Atlantic, and that they often under market 
such a major industrial product. Each of these points may provide a basis for fiirther research. 
Another of the issues raised concerns the emerging evidence of western practice in East 
European shipping, for example in areas such as marketing, and quality assurance. It may be 
argued that some evidence of this has always existed due to the international nature of the 
shipping industiy. Further questions on this point include whether or not POL truly wishes to 
change, and if so, how much this is possible given the initial levels of understanding. This 
research has shown that POL is moving towards the EC position, but has not discussed 
whether this movement was planned or unintentional, welcome or feared. 
Privatisation is a major issue for POL. Questions here involve the pace of privatisation, and 
the levels of achievement. For example, whether privatisation is really taking place when 
subsidiary companies are sold to the state, or whether this is to convince and encourage 
western investors. Further, whether selling to the west is a politically acceptable option to the 
electorate. 
Privatisation and state withdrawal of regulation will mean that diversification in the shipping 
industry and beyond becomes possible and likely, although it remains to be seen whether this 
will occur, how, or to what extent. Alternatively the company may continue to sell off 
subdivisions and retreat to core activities to make it more attractive to future investors. 
Organisationally, privatisation of POL has both negative and positive aspects when compared 
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with other industries. Some aspects such as its capital intensive nature may inhibit 
privatisation, whilst others, such as its presence in international markets and its many saleable 
assets, are highly attractive. Generally small businesses are easier to sell, whilst shipping may 
often be a special case in Poland, East Europe and beyond. 
The research also raised technical issues and the implications of change for the industry. Poor 
technology can hold back new ideas, plans, training and skills, for example in terms of logistics, 
speed or costs. There are conflicts here between state withdrawal, subsidy redirection and 
market needs, and questions as to when, if and how the issues will be resolved. 
All areas of commercial operation are likely to be affected if Poland's 1994 application, results 
in full or partial membership of the European Community. The underlying principles of 
harmonisation and liberalisation will translate to POL as subsidy removal, reduced regulation, 
and open markets, to name only a few effects. More specifically the adoption of Community 
shipping policy will have implications for the environment, safety, conference membership, flag 
availability (eg EUROS), cabotage impacts and so forth. These are expansive areas requiring 
much more detailed work. Meanwhile the development of the TAA provides fiirther grounds 
for research especially in the context of European Community policy towards conferences, 
consortia and competition. 
POL will also be affected by moves in the market place fi"om East to West. The new openness 
of markets in the East should be considered in tandem with its recession and instability 
problems. Notably POL has moved its base port to Hamburg which will have ramifications 
for Gdynia, including changes in trade direction, new transit routes to the CIS, and possible 
changes in the ratio of shipping to trucking or rail. 
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Conmiercial considerations must include managerial issues, for example whether POL are 
coping with management change and what real changes have taken place. Requirements for 
training or fiindamental cultural change are also relevant. Industry's changing lo^stical 
requirements raise questions as to whether POL can hope to keep up, or whether it will 
increasingly become a flag of convenience, characterised as a cheap, low standard, 
unstructured member operator. 
Theoretical 
Part of this research was aimed at modelling the relationship between East European change 
and East European shipping. The level of success achieved here must be noted, and the issue 
raised as to whether a display technique is sufficient, and whether a more quantitative 
technique could have accommodated the diverse range of issues in a meaningfiil and 
substantive way. One of the benefits of the technique chosen is that it is transferable and could 
be applied elsewhere in East Europe or beyond. An alternative may have been to create a 
series of separate sub models, for example one economic, one political and so forth, but it 
might be questioned as to whether the impacts could then be aggregated to provide an overall 
assessment, in meaningful terms, of the complex relationships that exist. 
The practicalities and value of the contextual model should be considered, as to whether it was 
useful, comprehensive, transferable and whether it could have been carried out on a more 
quantifiable basis and still have some meaning. Notably there is scope for extending the 
managerial and organisational issues into more specific research areas with the development 
of more detailed models. 
The fi"amework approach to analyse the positional changes of POL and its competitors also 
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needs further consideration, and frameworks as a technique need more assessment, as is 
evidenced by the lack of research into their application, despite conclusive evidence of their 
soundness theoretically. Many other commercial issues are multifaceted, and may benefit from 
a framework approach to study, particularly when looking at their contextual interrelationships 
in a changing social, economic and political environment. 
The same is true of positioning generally. The concept appears to be widely accepted but there 
remains relatively little research. There is a notable dearth of information on measurement 
techniques as an alternative to Multi Dimensional Scaling which was unsuitable for this 
research and likely to be equally unsuitable for a variety of other applications. To date, 
positioning studies have concentrated upon the attitude of the consumer, not the producer, and 
have centred upon products, rather than services, which leaves considerable scope for further 
development. It should be noted here that shipping is a peculiar industry as the producer is 
often highly divorced from the consumer, for example by agents or conferences which may 
help to explain shipping's apparent naivety of marketing issues. In parallel with this, the size 
and variety of the industry means there is also scope for fiuther development of the framework 
model for shipping. 
In addition more work is needed on marketing in shipping. The shortage of shipping 
applications amongst a profusion of marketing literature may reflect shipping's naivety of 
marketing issues as a significant part of commercial activity. 
The relationship between the political environment and shipping might be fijrther researched 
and a series of models developed, as shipping has a political role to play as a sizeable and 
strategic industry. These ideas can be expanded to include the development of, for example, 
legal or social models with shipping, for example to explore the relationship between 
302 
unemployment/ poverty and shipping industry development in East Europe and elsewhere. 
The need for more shipping marketing research can be expanded to include product 
differentiation, buyer behaviour, pricing practices and effects, image, and the impact of 
independents operating in competition with conferences. 
Moving fiirther away from the specific research analysed here, one of the arguments for 
conferences which could provide fiirther research areas is that competition often leads to 
monopolies or oligopolies as the larger operators take over the market, leaving only small 
niches for the smaller operator. This conflict with conventional competition theory could 
provide fertile ground for fiirther work. 
Finally, a specific paradox stands out from the research. Areas such as marketing, logistics and 
training, need to be improved in East Europe before any significant profits can hope to be 
achieved by the old established state firms such as POL, but the same lack of profit means that 
no finance is available to improve these areas, and lack of initiative may prevent its 
development in any case. 
In highlighting the commercial and theoretical issues, we have shown that in attempting to 
achieve its objectives the research has covered a wide and diverse range of topics, many of 
which have presented potential areas for fiirther research. However, it is hoped that this 
research has made some progress towards developing and adapting a series of methods which 
can take this variety of multifaceted information into account when establishing and assessing 
company position, even against a background of intense instability. 
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Postscript 
In May 1995 the situation regarding the TAA, now TACA (Trans-Atlantic Conference 
Agreement), remained unresolved. Although the agreement, which now had sbcteen member 
lines, had been banned by the European Commission in October 1994, the European Court of 
First Instance suspended this ban in March 1995. This meant that there was now a moratorium 
on prohibitions affecting conference operations on the North Atlantic at least until the court 
ruled on the overall legality of the TAA. The Commission was free to appeal against this 
decision but only on a point of law. 
Meanwhile, POL withdrew and subsequently sold, four 1,700 TEU con-ros from the North 
Atlantic line in 1993 in favour of slot charter agreements with Atlantic Container Line and 
Mediterranean Shipping Company. Two new 3,000 TEU vessels were envisaged for the trade 
in the near future, finance permitting. 
More generally, Poland progressed positively towards economic stability, and confidence was 
demonstrably returning. Many feel that Poland will eventually take its place among the 
mainstream European economies, in all probability become a member of the European Union, 
and be amongst its leaders in the maritime economy. 
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U.S.S.R. 
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Director, 
Soviet Danube Shipping Company, 
Pr. Suvorova 2, 
272630 Izmail 
U S S R . 
Director, 
Volga Don River Shipping Company, 
Ul. Pervaya Sovetskaya 63, 
344081 Rostov-Na-Donu, 
U S S R . 
Director, 
Volgo-Tanker 
Ul. M.Gorkogo 105 
443603 Kuybyshev 
U.S.S.R. 
Director, 
Western River Shipping Company, 
Alleya Kashtanovaya 28 
236017 Kalingrad 
U.S.S.R. 
Director, 
White Sea & Onega River Shipping 
Company, 
Ul. Rigachin 7, 
185640 Petrozavodsk, 
U S S R . 
Director 
Anglo-Soviet Shipping Company Ltd., 
10 Lloyds Avenue, 
LONDON. 
EC3N 3DA 
Director, 
Volga Joint River Shippmg Company, 
Astrakhan, 
U.S.S.R. 
Director, 
Kuban River Shipping Company, 
Temryuk 
U S S R . 
Director, 
North Eastern Department 
Vladivostok, 
U.S.S.R. 
Director, 
Northern River Shipping Company, 
163061 Archangel, 
U.S.S.R. 
Director, 
NAVROM Shipping Company, 
Constantza 8700, 
ROMANL\. 
Director 
Petromar, 
Constantza, 
ROMANIA 
Director 
Petromin Shipping Company, 
Constantza 8700, 
ROMANIA. 
Director, 
Romline Shipping Company, 
Constantza 8700, 
ROMANIA. 
Director, 
Overseas Tramp Bait 
Szczecin 
POLAND. 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development 
2 Rue Andre Pascal 
75775 Paris Cedex 16 
France 
Loadmasters Ltd 
Lakkisepantie 9 
00620 Helsinki 
Finland 
Baltic Line A/S 
Annankatu 42 
PL 960, 00101 Helsinki 
Finland 
Fmnish Foreign Trade Association 
Arkadiankatu 4-6 B 
00100 Helsinki 
Finland 
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Centre for Finnish Statistics 
Taloustilastot 
Annankatu44 
00101 Helsinki 
Finland 
The Managing Director 
Amerbank 
Marszalkowska 115 
00-102 Warsaw 
POLAND 
Finncarriers Ltd 
8-17Porkkalankatu7 
PL 197 00181 Helsinki 
Finland 
Director 
Institute of Shipping Economics 
Borsenhof A, Am Dom 5a 
D-2800 
Bremen 1 
Germany 
Institute of South East Asian Studies 
Heng Mui Keng Terrace 
Pasir Panjan 
Singapore 0511 
Japan Maritime Research Institute 
Kauin Building 
2-6-4, Hirakawa-cho 
Chiyoda-ku 
Tokyo, 102 
Japan 
Research Chamber 
Nippon Yusen Kaisha 
Yusen Building 
3-2 Marunouchi 2-Chome 
Chiyoda-ku 
Tokyo 
Japan 
Polska Isba Handlu 
Komisariat Awaryjny 
Plac Batorego, 4,70 207 
Szczecin 
Zagranicznego 
The Managing Director 
Bank Handlowy W Warsawie S.A. 
00-950 Warszawa 
Chalubinskiego 8 
POLA^ro 
The Managing Director 
Hortex 
Foreign Trade Enterprise 
Warecka 11a 
00 - 034 Warszawa 
POLAIslD 
The Managing Director 
Skorimpex 
Foreign Trade Company Ltd 
Piotrkowska 148/150 
90 - 950 Lodz 
POLAND 
The Managing Director 
Booz, Allen and Hamilton 
100 Picadilly 
London W1V9HA 
The Managing Director 
Bank Polska Kasa Opiekisa 
Head Office 
7/9 Tragutta St 
00 - 950 Warsaw 
POLAND 
The Managing Director 
Arthur Andersen Sp. z.o.o. 
ul. Nowy Swiat 6/12 
IV Pietro 
00 - 400 Warszawa 
POLAND 
The Managing Director 
Powszechny Bank Gospodarcy SA 
09 - 950 Lodz 
POLAND 
The Managing Director 
Polish Development Bank SA 
00 - 680 Warsaw 
ul. Zurawia 47/49 
POLAND 
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The Managing Director 
NMBBank 
LIM CENTRUM 6th Floor 
Al Jerozolimskie 65/79 
00-950 Warsawa 
POLAND 
The Managing Director 
European Privatisation and Investment 
Corporation 
ul. Polwale 13 
3rd Floor 
00-950 Warsawa 
POLAND 
The Managing Director 
SSRGiyfia 
ulLudowa 13 
71-700 Szczecin 
POLAND 
Mr Wojciech Michalski 
Director of Shipping Department 
ul. Chalubinskiego 4/6 
00-958 Warsawa 
POLAND 
The Managing Director 
Gdansk Shiprepair Yard 
PL-80-958 Gdansk 
Na Ostrowiu 1 
POLAND 
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Shipping abbreviations used in the text: 
AN 
AR 
BA 
BB 
BC 
BN 
BO 
BS 
CC 
CL 
CN 
DC 
DK 
DN 
DR 
GT 
FC 
FT 
JN 
MB 
PB 
PM 
PU 
PV 
RC 
RF 
RH 
RR 
SC 
SP 
TB 
TC 
TN 
TO 
TQ 
TR 
WA 
WB 
WL 
ZO 
barge 
crane/derrick barge 
barge carrier 
break bulk 
bulk carrier 
bulker 
ore carrier 
bulk carrier ore strengthened 
converted to FC 
container liner 
container ship 
multi purpose 
livestock carrier 
dry cargo ship 
part refrigerated 
trailing suction dredger 
fully cellular 
fishing vessel 
training vessel 
ore/bulk/oil carrier 
push barge 
passenger/train/vehicle vessel 
cruise vessel 
passenger/car ferry 
ro ro and cellular space 
reefer 
refrigerated fish carrier 
roro 
semi container ship 
self propelled barge 
tow barge 
chemical tanker 
tanker 
crude oil carrier 
chemical/oil tanker 
products tanker 
ro ro 
rolo 
ro ro/cellular 
oil drilling rig 
Sources: Containerisation International 1994 and Fairplay World Shipping Directory 1993 
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Explanation - myself/ research purpose/ confidentiality 
Introduction - basic company information - data 
policy 
structure 
any published material available, 
brochures / schedules etc 
Details: 
Price 
Rebates - deferred / % 
Discounts - details 
Price for transporting one TEU 
Market Segmentation - how 
Subsidy - amount / type 
Currency Convertibility 
State Control 
Profits 
Competition 
Promotion 
Sponsorship and Hospitality 
Advertising - budget, press, types, fi^equency 
Image 
Representatives - number, locations 
Market Research - budget, people 
Public Relations - budget, items 
Directories 
Literature - types, destinations 
Agencies - type, budget 
Exhibitioneering 
Press Releases 
Physical Evidence 
Containers - own/lease, own colours 
Vehicles 
Company OfiBces 
Ports Served 
Routes Served 
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Process 
Conference and Consortia - TAA membership 
Guaranteed traffic 
Collaboration - with 
Place 
Origins and destinations served 
Computer reservation systems 
People 
Qualifications and training 
Employees - number sea/shore 
Management structures 
Unions/workers councils - membership, role 
Product 
Speed - kts and days 
Safety 
Reliability 
Frequency - services on North Atlantic 
Quantity - TEU capacity 
Ship types 
Ship ages 
Flag 
Cross trades 
Computer tracking for containers 
Trading terms 
Check all points covered 
Any other points/ further information ? 
Thank you 
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Bulgaria 
At the end of April 1992, six days after the deadline given by the World Bank and IMF, 
Bulgaria's Privatisation law was passed. In principle the law is based upon a balance between 
two kinds of privatisation: auctioneering and preferential sale of the enterprise to those 
working in it. The creditors of Bulgaria will be able to buy enterprises against their debt. 
ThCTe are no limitations upon foreign companies or physical bodies taking part in the process 
of privatisation, and the money raised from privatising state property will be collected in a 
mutual fiind, which will be used for social security, compensating ex-owners and for free 
participation of ex-owners, in the privatisation (East European Markets, 01/05/92). 
Ex-Czechoslovakia 
The situation here is complicated by the split of Czechoslovakia into two separate states in 
1993 - the Czech Republic and Slovakia. The privatisation programme was in the hands of the 
Czechoslovakian Federal Ministry of Finance, which aimed to privatise 40% of the economy 
by 1996. A new transformation law was to apply to about 4000 major companies (Wall Street 
Journal 28/10/91). On 18th May 1992 the then Czechoslovakia accelerated this process by 
anbarking upon an ambitious attempt to transform economic ownership. In the biggest sale 
of companies ever seen, Czechoslovakia auctioned shares in 1,200 state owned firms to more 
than 8.5million of its citizens through a voucher scheme before the split (Economist 16-
22/05/92). A privatisation commission helped by Western advisers has decided how much of 
each business was to be sold to foreign investors. The millions of voucher holders could either 
invest directly in individual companies or indirectly through investment funds. If this first stage 
goes smoothly more businesses will soon be sold and there are plans for a stock exchange to 
open in Prague in October 1992 (Independent 18/5/92). The split has now divided the country 
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into two, with differing privatisation ambitions - the Czech Republic has been accelerating 
privatisation progress while Slovakia is taking more time and may possibly end progress 
altogether. 
Romania 
As the only East European country with no debt liability Romania published its draft laws on 
privatisation in 1991. It planned to place 30% of ownership in the hands of the population, 
while 70% would be held in a State Ownership Fund and sold later as shares at the stock 
market. This would be achieved by privatising 10% of the economy per year (The Wall Street 
Journal Europe 28/10/91). 
There were fears that the most attractive companies would be sold very quickly at very low 
prices to foreign investors able to use black market lei bought at the then current rate of over 
200 lei per dollar - more than three times the oflBcial rate of exchange. 
In 1993 Romania sold off" two companies in the first quarter, 54 in the second, 47 in the third 
and 136 in the fourth. An accelerated process of privatisation is planned for 1994 which gives 
industrial conversion priority as it forms a large part of Romanian GDP generation. 
During 1994 the Government hopes to privatise 1,930 small businesses with Lei 280 bn of 
nominal capital, 403 medium firms with Lei 443 bn of nominal capital, and 35 large firms with 
Ld 442 bn of nominal capital. At the official central bank rate, one US dollar was 1,345 Lei 
in January 1994. Market sources said that possible candidates for privatisation included some, 
or all, of Romania's extensive shipbuilding and repair industries (Lloyds List 13.01.94 ). 
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East European Markets 01/05/92 
Economist 16-22/05/92 "Crossing the East West chasm" 
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Wall Street Journal Europe 28/10/91 "Privatisation and Market reform in East Europe and the 
Soviet Republics" 
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The important issues here are the shipping policy of the European Community, particularly its 
consideration of East European competitors and its impact upon European Community liner 
operations, and to place this situation into context, the development of relationships between 
East Europe and the European Community in the maritime sector. 
With the changes taking place in East Europe, the attitudes of the European Community 
towards the East have altered considerably. Merritt (1991) commented that the European 
Community nations' policies towards East Europe might be described as "chaotic and 
unpredictable", and that establishing a durable and consistent relationship between the 
European Community and East Europe is essential although it will not be easy. This section 
aims to exanwne the development of a Community shipping policy in the light of these changing 
attitudes and relationships, and to look at the impacts upon East Europe. 
When the Community was founded in the late 1950's, the Soviet Union saw it as a 
reinforcement of the capitalist camp, detrimental to Soviet interests, and having decided not 
to accord it juridical recognition continued to treat it for over two more decades with varjdng 
degrees of coldness. The Community for its part paid only marginal attention to East Europe 
throughout the 1960's although as detente began to replace the cold war, European 
Community members sought to outdo each other both economically and politically in their 
relations with the East. At first the British set the pace with a fifteen year credit for the Soviet 
Union in 1964. But the most important of this series of agreements was the Moscow Treaty 
between the Soviet Union and the Federal Republic of Germany, signed in 1970 which led to 
more normal relations between the two parties (Pinder 1991). Meanwhile the Treaty of Rome 
signed on 25th March 1957, under which the EEC was formed, had made no special provision 
for relations with the states of East Europe, apart fi-om the very specificTrotocol on German 
international trade and connected problems'. 
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Transport and Shipping policy of the European Community 
According to Arbuthnott and Edwards (1979) the general aims of the Treaty of Rome included 
(i). Drawing the people of Europe closer together. 
(ii). Encouraging economic growth. 
(iii). Improving living and working conditions. 
and these were to be achieved through the broad policies of harmonisation and liberalisation 
aimed at creating a level playing field for economic activity in the European Community 
characterised by a free market fi^amework. 
The treaty specified three areas as being essential to unification of the Community; these were:-
(i). Agriculture, 
(ii). Social Services, 
(iii). Transport. 
As far as transport was concerned, the Treaty stated that 
"the transport market must be organised in accordance with a market economy. Public 
intervention should occur only where it is otherwise impossible to proceed. The Community 
must ensure that restrictions to fi^eedom to provide services are removed. At the same time 
the aim is to harmonise the overall fi^amework in which modes and companies operate. 
Therefore we must not lose sight of the objective of optimising the transport process with a 
view to increasing competitiveness of the EEC, and improving services to the public"(Treaty 
of Rome 1957). 
Article 84(1) of the Treaty excluded sea and air transport fi'om the common transport policy, 
stating that "the provisions of this title (i.e. Title IV, Transport, of Part Two, "Foundations of 
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the Community") shall apply to transport by rail, road and inland waterway". Article 84(2) 
adds: "The council may, acting unanimously, decide whether, to what extent and by what 
procedure, appropriate provisions may be laid down for sea and air transport" (Seefeld 1977). 
Hence, for many years, the European Community did not have a shipping policy as the need 
for one was considered to be excluded by the Treaty. Also the law making process of the 
European Community was bureaucratically slow and shipping was not as prominent an issue 
with dther governments or the electorate as numerous others such as agriculture or industrial 
development. 
The result was that between 1957 and 1977 there was virtually no legislation relating to 
shipping. The first moves stemmed fi^om when the UK, Denmark and Ireland, each major 
seafaring nations, joined the European Community in 1973, and in particular when the 
Commission backed by the UK took the European Council of Ivfinisters to the European Court 
of Justice over a narrow maritime issue, relating to the employment mobility of European 
seaferers, and won. Meanwhile, during the 1980's, the European Community registered fleet 
declined drastically compared to world fleets, and the need for a stated policy became more 
than evident (Commission for the European Communities 1989). 
Between 1977 and 1985, in particular, several different shipping policy areas were investigated 
and developed, although little legislation was agreed. These policy areas can be summarised 
as follows :-
(i). Social issues relating in particular to fi^ee movement of people - including 
seafarers' employment - between countries, harmonisation of seafarers working 
conditions, and a range of social security measures relating to the maritime 
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sector, for example social and health benefits. 
(ii). The right to establish shipping companies throughout the European Community 
following the principles of harmonisation and liberalisation: The Treaty made 
it illegal for countries to show bias against any non-national attempting to set 
up a shipping company. 
(iii). Liner shipping conferences were recognised as violating the Treaty of Rome 
as they were anti-competitive. However, they presented strong political 
arguments for their retention and hence no progress was made to 1985. 
(iv). Safety and pollution le^slation in relation to shipping was agreed before 1985. 
The European Conmiunity entered into negotiations with organisations such 
as BIMCO, and between 1978 and 1982, produced shipping related Directives, 
for example concerning pilots and tanker operations. 
(v). The "Brussels package" agreed by all member states in 1979 stated that 
ratification of the UNCTAD code by European Community members was a 
requirement. The 40/40/20 agreement was to apply to Member States trade 
with developing countries. Cooper (1977) pointed out however that the code 
did not cover the activities of outsiders who do not belong to the conferences 
and hence would not affect operations of CMEA countries. 
(vi). The Commission also recognised that the Community shipbuilding industry 
was facing economic difficulties and accepted that member states might have 
to provide subsidies. Although the Community has consistently been anti-
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subsidy in stated policy, a fixed but reducing percentage of ship cost was 
allowed to be subsidised. 
(vii). In 1977 the European and Social Committee for the European Communities 
(ESCEC) produced an opinion on the "EEC's transport problems with East 
European countries". The report pointed out that the steadily moimting 
competition from the Eastern bloc in the field of maritime shipping was a cause 
for grave concern on account of the conditions under which it was flourishing. 
It added that because they were able to operate freely in the West, Eastern bloc 
countries were succeeding to an increasing degree in changing the pattern of 
East-West goods trafiBc in their own favour. Accordingly, the ESCEC pointed 
out that not only may Eastern bloc carriers' penetration of the markets threaten 
employment in transport, but in the long run, there may be grave drawbacks for 
industry in the Community as a whole. For this reason the Committee called 
on all the institutions responsible for East-West transport questions to tackle 
this matter with the utmost vigour in order to ward off developments that 
would be disastrous for the economy and have grave social consequences 
(ESCEC 1977). The Committee then outlined the objectives they considered 
important in the specific field of sea transport as follows :-
a. CMEA countries should be made to drop freight rates that are in no 
balanced relation to the normal terms in Western countries. 
b. Community shipowners should be given a balanced share of bilateral 
traffic between Community and CMEA ports in both directions, at 
adequate rates and without carriers from other countries being 
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excluded. 
c. West European shipowners should be given the chance to acquire a 
share of traffic between CMEA ports and ports outside the 
Community. 
d. Eastern bloc shipping lines should be allowed to accede to existing 
agreements between Western shipowners. 
The ESCEC along with the Commission and the European Parliament had shown an interest 
in Eastern bloc activities for a number of reasons as it had created problems for European 
Community shipping since the end of World War H. From 1977 onwards, the Seefeld Reports 
investigated the situation and reported back to the European Parliament and Commission -
Eastern bloc shipping at this time was described as having a conventional purpose of serving 
its own markets and as performing dubious defence exercises (Seefeld 1977 and 1979); all 
vessels were thought to have a defence bias or alternative defence purpose. 
The first Seefeld report (23/03/77) called for the Commission to establish a common position 
toward state trading countries and other countries that wanted to build up their own merchant 
fleets. It suggested that pressure fi^om outside the Community was forcing Europe to act, and 
highlighted the fact that state trading countries were "forcing their way onto the world shipping 
market and endangering the member states shipping industries". Until this time the Community 
had ignored these countries which in default of a clear cut Community decision on maritime 
policy were able to insist that all their export transactions were effected on a CIF basis and all 
their import transactions on an FOB basis, which left sea transport completely in their hands 
and eliminated European shipowners from this trade. 
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Even more important to the shipping industries of the Community countries was the threat 
represented by the wide-spread practice adopted by the state trading countries of undercutting 
conference tariflFs in transport operations direct to the member states and especially in cross 
trades. Many Western shipping companies were convinced that undercutting to an extremely 
low level in this way corresponded to dumping and pointed out that by Western standards the 
Eastern bloc fleets were operating uneconomically in that, for example, vessel replacement 
costs were not being covered, although many of these arguments were disputed by a number 
of commentators including Bergstrand and Doganis (1987). 
These points had akeady been identified in 1976 by Prescott (1976) who also noted the 
problematic practices of inter-governmental (either bilateral or multilateral) agreements 
reserving part or all of the cargo moving in the trade, and the establishment of joint shipping 
agencies in foreign countries without reciprocity; Western shipping businesses were not 
afforded the same possibility to run their business in Eastern bloc countries with the same 
fi-eedom (Russell 1975). 
The Seefeld report carried on to point out that state trading countries were "double-dealing", 
for example in connection with the code of conduct for liner conferences. On the one hand 
they voted with the developing countries in UNCTAD when it was a question of "thwarting 
the interests of the traditional maritime nations", on the other hand they adopted the position 
of an outsider by undercutting both industrialized and developing countries' shipping 
companies. 
Seefeld suggested that if the Community did not develop a coherent sea transport policy, the 
goods to be shipped would always be regarded as more important than the interests of those 
shipping them. Although the report did not suggest any policy alternatives, it did support the 
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call from the shipping companies associations for effective protection against the non-
commercial practices of the state trading countries and hoped that the Community would raise 
shipping questions in any negotiations between the EEC and the CMEA. Cooper (1977) went 
on to suggest that the initial aims of a Community shipping policy should include negotiating 
as a Community with the CMEA for the preservation of a co-ordinated seaborne trade. The 
second Seefeld report (5/1/79) revealed that the European Community was under pressure of 
time in working out and implementing a common transport policy from CMEA coimtries 
vdiich were "anxious to push their way on to the world market with its rich pickings in foreign 
currencies" (Seefeld 1979). 
The advance of industrialisation in the CMEA countries was seen as the reason for their 
emergence on world markets. The state trading countries penetrated world transport markets 
using all the resources at their disposal:- for example at the cost of the standard of living of 
their citizens and without regard for profitability. As most Eastern bloc shipping companies 
were state owned they did not need to operate commercially, only to earn hard convertible, 
currency without which they would not be able to purchase vital foreign commodities from the 
West. Being able to charge less than cost because of state subsidy, these vessels were able to 
undercut western shipping. Although this was seen as unfair trading by the European 
Community, little action could be taken, as Community countries had no jurisdiction over East 
Europe, and could not risk taking action which might provoke retaliatory measures from East 
European countries. The European Community did however set up a review of activities in 
the international trading and shipping industries of the CMEA with which it also entered into 
negotiations. 
The Seefeld reports suggested that the European Community needed to find ways to persuade 
the state trading countries to adopt a more western approach without destroying the 
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foundations of free competition or forfeiting the high degree of eflBciency that had 
characterised world sea transport. 
Overall, until 1985 there was little shipping policy, and in particular legislation, to show for 28 
years of the European Community, although it is interesting to note the significance attached 
to East Europe throughout this period. The 1970' s saw the beginnings of slow talks between 
the CMEA and the European Community, and by the mid 1980's, the Community's 
relationship with the CMEA countries seemed to have stabilised at a modest level of activity. 
In June 1984 the CMEA summit meeting expressed its interest in a relationship with the 
Community, and in October of the same year a communication from the CMEA to the 
Community suggested negotiations for an agreement, declaration or other document (Pinder 
1991). By the time the first real European Community shipping legislation was developed 
changing circumstances had caused East Europe to decline in its significance to the Community 
as a maritime competitor, and other issues became dominant. 
STAGE 1: SHIPPING POLICY 
To obtain a fiall picture of the operating circumstances of Community shipping companies, we 
need to go on to examine the development of policy over the 1980's and 1990's. On 16th 
December 1986 the European Community, at a meeting of the Ministers of Transport, agreed 
a maritime package which combined with measures adopted earlier and outlined above formed 
the basis of a Community Shipping Policy. The package included four regulations outlined by 
Erdmenger and Stasinopoulos (1988) as follows :-
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(i).Council Regulation (EEC) No. 4055 / 86. Freedom to provide services 
This introduced the principle of freedom to provide services to intra community trade, 
distinguishing existing arrangements from future agreements. Applying to nationals of member 
states, it aimed to prevent any member state from discriminating in favour of its own shipping 
companies over those from another member state. 
It called for unilateral cargo restrictions by member states to be phased out by 1st January 
1993. Other discriminatory cargo sharing arrangements between member states should be 
phased out or adjusted to comply with Community legislation. This regulation was of note to 
East European countries, as the council could extend it to nationals of a third country who 
provide shipping services and are established in the Community, for example Polish Ocean 
Lines' activities into and out of the UK. 
(ii). Council Regulation (EEC) No. 4056 / 86. Competition Rules 
This aimed to apply Treaty competition rules to shipping, and affected all international shipping 
services to and from Community ports, except tramp services. 
It exempted liner cargo conferences from Treaty provisions on restrictive practices. 
Restrictive practices of member states may prompt action from the Commission, although 
Council iauthorisation was required to deal with conflicts in international law. This had little, 
if any impact for East Europe as the shipping companies of these countries were usually non 
conference members. However, it was to be significant in its impact upon the development 
of the TAA, during 1991, and its subsequent operation, and consequently POL's activities on 
the North Atlantic. 
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(iii). Council Regulation (EEC) No.4057 / 86. Unfair pricing practices 
This regulation applied to liner trades, and enabled a compensatory duty to be imposed on non 
EEC shipov^ Tiers by the Community if the following conditions were cumulatively present:-
a. There are unfair pricing practices - defined as undercutting Community shipping 
services, where this is made possible because the non Community shipowners enjoy 
commercial advantages such as subsidy. 
b. They cause financial or commercial injury to Community members. 
c. The interests of the Community make intervention necessary. 
This regulation was particularly relevant to East European shipping companies who were 
believed to be undercutting Western companies by charging less than cost because of state 
subsidy (Cooper 1977). 
(iv). Council Regulation (EEC) No. 4058 / 86 Co-ordinated action 
This regulation dealt with distortion of competition by governments giving preferential 
treatment to their own shipowners, and provided for co-ordinated Community action where 
third countries restrict access of European Community shipping companies to ocean trades. 
It was based on the assumption that it is in the interests of Community shipping not to 
encourage a protectionist approach in the rest of the world. The Community aimed to 
continue a commercial regime by taking action against non commercial attacks upon it. It is 
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posable that this may have had some East European impact, especially where East European 
shipping companies had offices in the European Community as well as in East Europe. 
Although Stage one was somewhat limited in scope it nevertheless provided the first 
substantive legislative basis for a European Community shipping policy. By the time Stage two 
of a shipping policy for the European Community emerged, changes in East Europe such as 
the accession of Gorbachev, decreasing Soviet intervention in other East European states and 
declining East European economies meant that shipping in East Europe was no longer of such 
significance to the European Community, although it was beginning to be replaced by a need 
to adopt measures to encourage and support the East Europeans' development in the new 
social, economic and political context. 
STAGE 2. SHIPPING POLICY 
On 5th June 1989 the Commission produced two separate documents which constituted the 
baas for stage two of the European Community shipping policy, which were intended should 
be translated into legislation. 
PAPER 1. "A Future for the Community Shipping Industry : Measures to improve the 
operating conditions of Community shipping" (Commission of the European Communities 
1989) 
Several policy initiatives were proposed in this paper:-
(i). A Community ship register : EUROS. 
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This was hoped to be introduced on the 1st January 1991, for vessels of less 
than 20 years, and greater than 500 grt. Run in parallel with national flags, 
EUROS would offer benefits such as : 
easier movement of ships between member states ie technical compatibility 
mutual recognition of seafarers qualifications 
the 'opening up' of cabotage to all vessels on the Community register. 
Vessels would be required to meet safety and certification levels of every member 
state; additionally all oflBcers plus half the crew had to be Community nationals. The 
aims of the scheme included the revitalisation of the European Community national 
fleets. 
Following some slight delay, it was expected that EUROS might come into effect in 
June 1991 (Lloyds List 16/1/91), but disagreements over the issue of tax relief led to 
fijrther delays. On 19th November 1991, Lloyds List reported that the European 
Commission would adopt fresh proposals for a European ship register by the end of 
the year pending final agreement on the new income tax relief measures for seafarers. 
By December 18th 1991 European Transport Commissioner Karel Van Miert said his 
latest amendments to the Commission's proposed EUROS ship register, giving income 
tax concessions to seamen on EUROS registered ships, had been welcomed by a 
majority of transport ministers. Despite continuing discussions, no agreement on 
EUROS had been reached by the beginning of 1994. 
(ii). The Commission suggested a research fond to decrease maiming requirements 
on ships and improve competitiveness. 
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(iii). Technical standardisation of equipment for member states, in order to reduce 
existing conflicts. This related to the overall Community theme of 
harmonisation. 
(iv). Social measures to improve woridng conditions, for example decreased hours, 
common training schemes, and mutual recognition of qualifications. Agmn this 
related to harmonisation. 
(v). Envirormiental action to ensure the same standards of marine pollution 
prevention in all ports. 
(vi). As an incentive to join EUROS, all vessels registered under the scheme would 
receive priority to transport surplus foodstuffs as Community aid. 
(vii). A Community shipowner was defined - an important issue to clarify as it 
affected cabotage rules. 
(viii). Removal of restrictions on cabotage, which related to liberalisation. Although 
it attempted to open up the maritime market this was a highly politically 
contentious area. The Commission put forward the idea that all Community 
countries should open up their domestic shipping to EUROS vessels. Manning 
requirements would be the same as for the member state in question, which 
might conflict with EUROS requirements. It was proposed that this item be 
reviewed in January 1993. A "get-out" clause was provided in that each 
member state could define specific routes which required subsidy to operate 
and were needed for public service reasons. Subject to Commission approval, 
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these routes could then be reserved for national carriers. 
In December 1990 European Community transport ministers agreed that a first phase of 
liberalising cabotage was to begin during 1993, amid strong opposition fi-om the Greek and 
Italian governments and doubts over its legality. The ministers agreed that the first phase 
should cover mainland cabotage and a second phase island cabotage. Legal doubts surrounded 
the setting of a date "during 1993" - after the 1992 deadline, stemming fi^om the Single 
European Act - and the way that only "mainland" shipping would be included in the first phase 
of liberalisation. 
In Fdjruary 1991, lawyers confirmed that the agreement reached in December was in breach 
of the Treaty of Rome (Lloyds List 20/2/1991). However, the Commissions' lawyers 
concluded that derogations from a January 1993 cabotage introduction could be made. 
In December 1991 Lloyds List reported that European Community transport ministers had 
agreed a framework for Uberalising maritime cabotage and that they hoped to finalise a deal 
wdthin the following sk months. The new scheme envisaged liberalisation by January 1st 1993 
of mainland cabotage in the tramp and liner sector, where a journey is seen as one leg of an 
international voyage. The first stage, from January 1993, would involve liberalising cabotage 
for tramp shipping and liner traffic between mainland destinations. The second step would 
involve all other tra£Bc between mainland ports. The last three stages cover island traflBc and 
would begin with tramp and other liner traffic, before all remaining island traffic except 
passenger traffic, with the last stage being regular passenger ferries ( Lloyds List 02/12/91). 
However, Lloyds List (24/06/92) reported that the twelve member states were at last in general 
agreement that for most services crew would be dictated by flag where vessel size was equal 
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to or greater than 650 tonnes. Exceptions included some Mediterranean island routes where 
higher nimibers of nationals were allowed. New cabotage target dates were set in 1992, which 
would see legislation coming into force throughout the European Community by 2004. The 
m^ority vote needed was gained fi'om nine of the member states, those not in favour were UK, 
Denmark and the Netherlands - who abstained. Criticisms included the number of exceptions 
and derogations. 
PAPER 2. "Financial and fiscal measures concerning shipping operations with ships 
registered in the Community" (Commission for the European Communities 1989). 
Whereas the first document set out proposals for legislation, this second document was mainly 
advisory and concerned subsidy, its definition in a European context and the limitations 
acceptable to the European Community. 
The Commission recognised that Community shipping was already heavily subsidised, and that 
this was distorting the market. However, the Commission agreed to approve certain limited 
subsidies to help to retain Community ships under Community flags and employ Community 
seamen. Subsidies were only to be allowed for social security payments, training and 
differential tax regimes. 
On 15th April 1991 the Community drew up "Guidelines for the examination of state aid to 
Community shipping companies" (Commission for the European Communities 1991). These 
guidelines, which replaced the second document of stage 2 of the European Community 
shipping policy, defined ten types of vessel which could receive different levels of subsidy. The 
aim of the plan was to restrict subsidies to the lowest levels possible. 
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The stage 2 package was only a set of proposals which it was hoped, would be implemented 
by 1993. Whatever other components of the single market were in place by the end of 1992, 
a common European shipping policy was present only in skeletal form (Lloyds Shipping 
Economist 1990). Universal agreement on policy remained diflBcult because of the varying 
interests of member countries. 
A later paper outlining a new European Community maritime policy was drawn up by Dr 
Bangemann, Vice President of the European Commission. According to Bangemann the 
advent of the single market within the Community will double the present volumes of cross 
border transport - the vast majority of it by sea - by the year 2000. At the same time 
international trade, 90 % carried by shipping, was expected to continue growing (Lloyds List 
29/8/91). To prepare the Community for the upturn Bangemann advocated a European 
Maritime Agency, primarily as a forum for promoting co-operation between all parts of the 
industry and Community governments. He dismissed previous maritime policy as "out of date" 
(Lloyds List 30/8/91). 
In an interview with Lloyds List on 3rd September 1991 Dr kroeger managing Director of the 
Association of German Shipowners, stated that the test for an effective European maritime 
policy is "whether it oflfers conditions which would make the industry want to stay in Europe". 
Although commenting that Bangemann's proposals were welcome he felt that they had not 
gone beyond a "very initial phase". 
On September 28th 1991 it was reported in the Telegraph that the European Commission had 
set up a forum to examine Community maritime policies and to find ways of making European 
Community shipping, shipbuilding and maritime services more competitive. The forum was 
asked to produce a report and recommendations by summer 1992 (Telegraph 28/9/91). 
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Meanwhile consortia, which were first raised as a policy issue in 1984, were defined by the 
Commission as: 
" coalitions of several independent shipping lines seeking some form of cooperation in 
order to maintain profitability through rationalisation in the widest service and to 
spread the expense of investment in container operations". 
The Commission concluded that consortia are legally different fi"om conferences so that 
regulation 4056 does not apply, and that they need to seek block exemption otherwise they are 
illegal. The industry generally disagrees with this, arguing that consortia allow shipping to 
compete worldwide and are therefore commercially necessary, and that many are only of a 
technical nature. 
The Commission eventually decided that a block exemption was necessary as overall consortia 
do provide benefits, such as regular sailings and economies of scale. Hence the enabling 
regulation 479/92 (25/02/92) which permitted the Commission to adopt in due course, detailed 
rules for the automatic exemption of Consortia fi^om Article 85(1) of the Treaty of Rome. 
On 15th November 1993 Lloyds List reported details of the draft, which stated that any 
consortia with a 50% or higher market share had to notify the Commission of their agreements 
for individual approval. Conference member lines were allowed 30% of a market and non 
conference members 35%, or 50% with special agreement. The rules allow fixed timetables, 
exchange slots, pooled capacity, joint offices and terminals and pooled receipts/ tonnage. 
Liner companies wishing to join a consortium would be limited to a maximum 18 month period 
after which they can leave the consortium although there would be a six month notice period 
of leaving. The market share and joining regulations were unpopular with the shipping 
industry, who stressed the already highly competitive market environments and the need for 
greater commitment to ensure consortia success. 
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The developing consortium regulations are clearly relevant to the design and future of the 
TAA, and thus to this research in particular in that Regulation 4056 does not apply, but by the 
beginning of 1994 these regulations had still not passed into law. 
New Members 
The majority of East European countries have aspirations of joining the Community. Their 
hopes were hdghtened in May 1991 with a suggestion from within the European Community 
executive that a form of flexible affiliation could solve many of the problems blocking 
membership. The idea suggested that criteria for membership must be loosened if they were 
to be appropriate for developing economies (Lloyds List 05/91). On 16th December 1991 
Poland entered into an associate agreement with the Community (EIU 1992). However, 
Community sources described its timetable as over optimistic and indicated several problems 
that would need to be dealt with before associate status was possible. Overall, Polish 
membership of the European Community would still appear some way off". Perhaps its only 
impact for this research is in terms of the Polish economy adapting slowly to European 
Community needs, as noted in the Contextual model. 
Since the recent economic and political changes have taken place in East Europe, maritime 
developments in that area have received little attention from the European Community. 
Whereas in the early stages of formulation of a maritime policy, the Community saw East 
European coimtries as a competitive threat (ESCEC 1977) this is no longer the situation. The 
main concern of the Community now is how to help former members of the CMEA survive 
the diflScult transitional period. It is in the interests of the Community that pluralist democracy 
and the maricet economy should prevail throughout Europe (Pinder 1991), and the Community 
must consider what it can do to help East Europe towards this situation, and how in this 
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process to aid East European shipping as part of economic redevelopment. In the meantime, 
othCT issues have taken a greater role, for example the SEM, harmonisation and liberaUsation, 
and European Monetary Union, and these temporarily have pushed European maritime issues 
back. 
Conclusions 
Since the early days of the development of a European Community shipping policy, when 
concern about East European shipping activities was evidenced by the reports of Prescott 
(1976-77), Cooper (1977), ESCEC (1977) and Seefeld (1977 & 1979), it is noticeable that 
East Europe has declined in its significance as other issues have become dominant, and the 
recent dramatic changes in East Europe, for example the accession of Gorbachev and the 
collapse of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA), have called for a change 
in the attitude of the Community towards East Europe generally, as well as specifically in 
relation to shipping issues. 
Looking at the European maritime scene, an article in Lloyds Shipping Economist, February 
1990, highlighted that "it is likely that the main issues wdll remain unresolved for a long time 
yet" (Lloyds Shipping Economist 1990). This indicates that the situation regarding the 
relationship between European Community and East Europe and their shipping policies is 
likely to remain unsettled for the time being. Although European Community progress 
towards a common policy has been slow. Stage three of a Community shipping policy seems 
likely to emerge eventually; the effect that this has on East Europe will depend upon whether 
East European countries decide to join and are accepted by the European Community. 
According to Merritt (1991) the East Europeans eventual membership of the Community is 
inevitable. During his Commission Presidency, Jacques Delors repeatedly emphasised the 
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point to political leaders across Europe that if the rest of the Community wants Germany to 
remain firmly anchored inside the Community, Eastern Europe cannot be left outside it. The 
turning towards the West of the former CMEA countries marks a fiandamental shift in 
relationships within Europe, which will undoubtedly have impacts upon the shipping industry. 
Although East Europe has declined in its significance to the European Community recently in 
terms of shipping policy, a number of major issues in this area will remain of interest to the 
Commumty. These may include the consideration of Western access to East European 
markets. Also there are still likely to be some concerns about East Europe's need to earn hard 
currency and the methods by which this is achieved; for example by undercutting western 
shipping operations. Linked to this are concerns over hidden maritime subsidies in East 
Europe leading to anti-competitive practices. The Community may also be interested in the 
advance in technology and efficiency of East European shipping industries which may be 
achieved through the introduction of privatisation or joint ventures. These broad maritime 
issues are likely to remain of some interest and concern to the European Community until a 
better understanding and a closer relationship develops with East Europe. 
Finally, the development of a European Community shipping policy in general has a clear 
significance for liner operators, including those of East Europe. As a consequence it is of 
direct relevance to this research. 
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